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CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC WARFARE AS
A SECONDARY POLICY DEVICE
INTRODUCTION

When economic warfare is waged as a secondary policy device in
support of military operations, military requirements dictate the
choice of economic warfare forms and techniques. Protracted harassment was emphasized in World _Wars I and II because required by
the military situation.
The web of naval-administrative control devices characterizing
Allied economic warfare in both world wars is described in this
book as N A V AD blockade. N A V AD blockade is an extension and
refinement of contraband controls and controls over enemy property
supplemented by various techniques to prevent land shipments
by neutrals to the adversary. Features of NA VAD blockade are
considered distributively in the materials in this Chapter.
Naval officers figured prominently in N A V AD blockades, although mainly in the interception and diversion of suspected vessels
rather than in contributions to economic warfare policy or to the
law governing it. Their opportunities to make or influence basic
economic warfare decisions were limited when compared to opportunities provided them when economic warfare is waged as a
primary policy device. Their "policy voices" were muted and in
some phases of economic warfare, silenced, by belligerent practices
to centralize the administration of economic warfare and to control
potentially hostile shipments at source.1
But the economic warfare practices of World vVars I and II may
not be repeated in their same form. In gener-al wars involving employment or threat of employment of ultradecisive weapons, the
techniques of N A V AD blockade familiar in the two global conflicts
may be substantially altered. In these, or in "limited" wars, economic
warfare by "economic sortie" rather than by "protracted harassment"
may be dominant. The military aspects and requirements of wars
differ so radically that general assumptions and certainly precise
See Fitzmaurice, "Some Aspects of Modern Contraband Control and the
Law of Prize," 22 Brit. Y. B. Int. L., 73 (1945).
1
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predictions about the form of economic warfare as a secondary policy
device tend to be quite idle.
The Discussions in this Chapter are based upon General Situation
7 and four Special Situations. The economic warfare operations are
first conducted unilaterally by the United States (a Naval Blockade,
considered in Special Sit'ltation 7.A) and are then extended as the
conflict increases in intensity through -enforcement action undertaken
by the Organization of American States in which the United States
participates. Contraband (Special Situation 7B) ; Ultimate Destination and related problems (Special Situation 70); and Maritime
Enemy Property Control (Special Situation 7D); are considered in
this context of multilateral-regional security action. The entire action
occurs with a backdrop of pending major conflict involving NATO.
This impending conflict requires the United States to husband its
naval resources.
General Situation 7 is followed by a summary of major sources
of legal doctrine pertinent principally to economic warfare supporting military operations and an introductory analysis of "neutrality." The reader will find it helpful to examine these before
considering the Special Situations.
A. SOURCES OF LEGAL DOCTRINE IN ECONOMIC WARFARE
AND THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY
General Situation 7

The Zone of Surveillance proclaimed by the President in Situation
6 was established and the naval action within it executed as directed.
Two trawlers, equipped with aerosolizing devices, and having aboard
aerosols tentatively identified as containing Melioidosis-B bacteria,
have been intercepted and diverted to Key West. Disposition of the
vessels, both formerly Scythian trawlers, now of Nuevan registry,
is undecided.
During operations in the Zone of Surveillance, a revolt occurs in
The Peoples Republic of Carthage, a Scythian ally. Scythia intervenes to suppress this revolt by military force, contending the revolt
was organized by the unconventional warfare service of a NATO
member. The threats against this member by Scythia are considered
so serious that most units of United States STRIKE Command are
committed to Europe in support of NATO. Numerous naval units
are withdrawn from the Zone of Surveillance and transferred to the
United States Sixth Fleet.
Salvaje takes advantage of this reduction of United States
strength immediately available for commitment against him to
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land troops in Antioka. Assisted by a local revolutionary, Hernando,
Salvaje overthrows the Gondomar government. Marshal Gondomar,
with his principal officers, are flown to the United States from
Coloso. They are recognized by the United States as the Antiokan
government-in-exile.
Attacks then occur against United States merchantmen along the
Louisiana and Texas coasts by motor torpedo boats. Four tankers
are sunk with forty-two crewmen lost.
One motor torpedo boat is destroyed and its crew captured by
U.S.S. Buchanan. The crewmen are identified as Nuevan naval
personnel. They have been ordered to make selective attacks upon
United States shipping in reprisal for interception and diversion of
the two Nuevan trawlers now held at Key West.
To forestall further attacks from Nueva or A.ntioka without committing air or ground forces until the degree of support required
for NATO is determined, the President determines to place Nueva
and Antioka under naval blockade. Congress has approved the
President's decision by Joint Resolution. The case of the United
States has been placed before the Security Council with a draft
resolution for action against Nueva and Antioka under Article 42
of the Charter. The Organ of Consultation of the Organization of
American States has before it a proposal for action against Nueva
and Antioka under Articles 3 and 8 of the Rio Pact.
Admiral Brown, Commander Second Fleet, issues the following
declaration of blockade pursuant to orders of the President:
DECLARATION OF BLOCKADE
At 2400 hours, Greenwich time, 3 June 19 __ , the coasts and ports
of the islands of Antioka and Nueva will be placed by order of the
President of the United States under blockade by United States
naval forces under my command. Neutral vessels or aircraft seeking
ingress will be permitted to pass if carrying cargoes of medical
supplies or food only. Such vessels having obtained ingress will be
permitted egress if in ballast or without cargo. Vessels, surface or
subsurface, or aircraft, seeking ingress will transit waters or superjacent airspace in the are~ delimited by * * * [description.. by longitude and latitude] * *
on routes indicated upon the attached
chart. [Chart omitted.]
Neutral vessels and aircraft which are in the blockaded region at
the time of this Declaration are given a period of grace expiring at
2400 hours, 6 June 19 __ , in which to depart the area blockaded.
This period of grace is granted upon the express condition that
neutral vessels and aircraft departing the area blockaded do not
violate the law of nations.

*
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All means authorized by international law and by treaties with
neutral powers to which the United States is a party will be enforced
by the United States against surface or subsurface vessels or air~
craft attempting to breach this blockade.
A surface or subsurface vessel approaching the blockaded area will
be warned by the commander of the intercepting United States
naval vessel. This warning 'vill be indorsed on the register of the
vessel.
Aircraft will be instructed by radio to proceed to the nearest appropriate landing area under United States control where an
appropriate entry of the warning will be made upon the log of the
aircraft.
If such vessel or aircraft again attempts to enter or leave the
blockaded area, with the exceptions hitherto noted in this Declaration, the vessel or aircraft will be seized and sent to the nearest convenient port of the United States for such proceedings against the
vessel or aircraft and its cargo as 1nay be deemed advisable.
Vessels which cannot be searched conveniently at sea. and all aircraft will be diverted for search to ports to be designated by the
blockade commander. Subsurface vessels encountered in the blockaded area will be warned to surface by exploding four harmless
underwater charges, accompanied by the sonar signal IDKCA.
Submarines so 'varned 'vill surface on an easterly course.
Given on board the U.S.S. Columbia at long. ____ , lat. ____ at 0900
2 June 19 __ .
The Secretary of State has notified diplomatic representatives of
the President's order and the Declaration of Blockade. Consuls in
Antiokan and N uevan ports have been similarly notified. Information concerning the Declaration has been broadcast by the Navy at
intervals to vessels and aircraft.
Having examined the Declaration, you are now considering the
sources of law likely to bear upon the conduct of United States and
other naval units and are trying to determine the status to be accorded naval units other than those of Antioka and Nueva. What
are the major sources of doctrine? Should vessels other than Antiokan or Nuevan be considered "neutral"~
Discussion: General Situation 7
I. Sources of Doctrine: Economic Warfare at Sea as Secondary
Policy Device

Many of the legal doctrines, or past community policy expressions,
applicable to economic warfare at sea, are derived from custom. This
custom developed sporadically-principally in the Napoleonic Wars,
the American Civil vVar and World Wars I and II. Much of the
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custom is found described in the decisions of prize courts and in
national prize legislation.
Several multilateral international transactions are also sources of
legal doctrine applicable to sea economic warfare. The most important of these are the Declaration of Paris, 1856,2 and the "unratified" Declaration of London, 1909.3 Several conventions formulated at the Hague in 1907 bear in part upon economic warfare at
sea. 4 The 1949 Geneva Convention relating to Civilian Persons in
Time of War 5 and several other of the 1949 Conventions 6 bear to
a limited extent upon maritime economic warfare practices.
2 See Naval
War College, International Topics and Discussions, 1905,
109 for preamble and full text.
s See Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, for general report
and text.
4 IV Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
56 UST 3516, TIAS 3365, 75 UNTS 287.
6 For texts of The Conventions see Naval War College, International Law

Documents, 1950-51.
Annex (containing several provisions relevant to blockade, particularly NAVAD
blockades) 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539, II Malloy, 2269; V Convention Respecting
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land (containing provisions relevant to NAVAD blockades) 36 Stat. 2310, TS 540, II
Malloy, 2290; VI Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities. (Not signed by United States delegates or ratified. Denounced by Great
Britain in 1925.)
VII Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships
(not signed by United States delegates or ratified) ; VIII Convention Relative
to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact l\1ines, 36 Stat. 2332, TS 541,
II Malloy, 2304; IX Bombardment by Naval Forces, 36 Stat. 2351, TS 542, II
:Malloy, 2314; X Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention of July 6, 1906 (replacing for the United
States and most of the other contracting parties a similar Convention of 1899
applying the 1864 Geneva rules), 36 Stat. 2371, TS 543, II Malloy, 2326; XI
Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of
the Right of Capture in Naval War, 36 Stat. 2396, TS 544, II Malloy, 2341;
XIII Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War (ratified by the United States with reservations. Not ratified by Great
Britain. Generally regarded as expressing customary rules), 36 Stat. 2415, TS
545, II Malloy, 2352.
III Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 36 Stat. 2259, TS 538,
II Malloy, 2259 is of diminished importance under the aegis of the United
Nations and in the light of contemporary power practices. XII Convention
Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court was signed by the
United States delegates but not ratified.
No international prize court was established and the modern blockade and
other economic warfare techniques render the prospect for such a court remote.
All of the Hague Conventions of 1907 may be found conveniently set forth in
Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1908, 117-248.
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Special conventions, such as those applicable to the Suez 7 and
Panama 8 Canals, deny a belligerent right of blockade of the canals
at least as to parties to the conventions. The Pan American Maritime
Neutrality Convention,9 signed a.t Havana in 1928, and ratified by
the United States with reservations, establishes as between the
American signatories a comprehensive neutrality code bearing
directly upon blockade practices. Part IV of the London Naval
Treaty of 1930 10 states "established rules of International Law"
applicable to submarine attacks on merchant shipping. Numerous
conventions of limited scope and bilateral treaties indirectly bear
upon blockade practices.
The Declaration of Paris of 1856 11 stemmed from a modus vivendi
developed between Britain and France as part of their Crimean War
alliance. 12 Four points are set forth in the Declaration. As a concession to the British, privateering was abolished. A neutral flag
was stated to protect noncuntraband enemy goods, and neutral
goods not contraband were stated to be immune from capture although under an enemy flag. Directly applicable to blockades of the
nineteenth-century type was the statement: "Blockades, in order
,to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by force
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.* * * " 13
Convention of Constantinople (1888), Art. I, 15 Martens, NRG 2d Ser. 557.
Le Canal ne sera jamais assujetti a l'exercice du droit de blocus."
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands,
R ussia, and Turkey were parties.)
s Treaty to Facilitate the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty) (1909), Art. III, 32 Stat. 1903, TS 401, I Malloy, 782. The United
States adopted the Rules of the Convention of Constantinople in substance as
t he basis for neutralization of the proposed canal.
Article III (2) states: "The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any
r ight of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The
United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police
along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and
disorder."
Stipulations of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty were applied to the Panama Canal
in Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau Varilla
Treaty) (1903), Art. XVIII. For the difficulties arising in the passage of ships
in time of war through these international waterways among others, see Baxter,
The Law of International Waterways, 187-244 ( 1964).
9 47 Stat. 1989, TS 845, 135 LNTS 187.
10 46 Stat. 2858, TS 830, 112 LNTS 65. The text of this treaty will be found
in Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1930, 139, (Part IV at
159).
11 See Fn. 2, supra.
1 2 See Malkin, "The Inner History of the Declaration of Paris," 8 Brit. Y. B.
Int. L., 1-44 (1927).
13 The French rendition of this provision is: "Les blocus, pour etre obliga7

"* * *
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The four parts of the Declaration 'vere stated by the declarants
to be inseparable. Other states were invited to accede to the Declaration; and all significant maritime states have done so except the
United States.
When President Pierce expressed his objections to the British
and French proposal in 1854, the United States did not contemplate
the creation of a large navy yet cherished a long-standing grievance
against both France and England for seizures of private property at
sea during warfare. Consequently, President Pierce was prepared
to renounce privateering only if all noncontraband private property,
including that owned by citizens of b~lligerents, whether or not under
an enemy flag, should be exempt from seizure. 14
With the development of a large navy by the United States and
the gradual extension of the scope of contraband lists by belligerents
in World Wars I and II, the objections voiced by President Pierce
are no longer viable. The United States applies the provisions of the
Declaration without accession.
The London Declaration, 1909,15 unlike the Declaration of Paris,
1856, contained a provision for ratification as well as for adherence
by powers not represented by the London Conference. 16 Article 68
of the Declaration provided for effectiveness only upon ratification.
The British House of Lords failed to approve the declaration and
Great Britain failed to ratify. Since Great Britain was then the
major naval power, and had called the Conference, the other declarants refused to ratify also.
The Declaration was accepted by the belligerents in the TurcoItalian War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and was
applied by the British and French with certain additions and modifications at the beginning of World War I. 17 After three further
modifications, 18 the decision to apply the Declaration directly was
toires, doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante
pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral de l'ennemi." The English "prevent"
is not, of course, an exact translation from "interdire" and this has produced
difficulty in applying this rule of the Declaration.
14

See Naval War College, International Law Topics and Discusssions, 1905,
111-112.
15 See Fn. 3, supra.
16 Germany, United States, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands and Russia were represented at the Conference.
17 Order-in-Council (Declaration of London No. 1) 20 Aug. 1914, 108 Brit. and
F. St. P. (Pt. II), 100 (1914). A convenient statement of this and the four
subsequent Orders-in-Council relative to the Declaration of London may be
found in Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea, 246-252 (3d Ed., 1959).
18 Order-in-Council (Declaration of London No. 2) 29 Oct. 1914, 108 Brit. and
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'vithdra wn with a decision announced to exercise belligerent rights
"in strict accordance with the law o£ nations." 19
Provisions were inserted in the Order concerning £acts to raise a
presumption o£ hostile destination required £or condemnation o£
contraband articles; expressly extending the doctrine o£ continuous
voyage to blockades; clarifying the unneutral service doctrine to be
applied to a neutral vessel carrying contraband which proceeds to an
enemy port despite the destination shown on her papers; and providing £or capture and condemnation o£ a vessel carrying contraband i£-by value, 'veight, volume or freight-the contraband forms
more than hal£ the cargo.
Despite failure o£ the Declaration o£ London o£ 1909 to develop
as the basis o£ a formal legal regime £or naval 'var, the rules represent a consensus concerning blockade, contraband, unneutral service and enemy character among major sea powers in the early
twentieth century. Had the House o£ Lords approved the Declaration
and Great Britian ratified, it seems generally agreed that other
participants in the London Conference would have followed suit.
Some provisions o£ the Declaration, particularly those relating to
contraband, contained a built-in obsolescence element rendering them
useless in World Wars I and II. The theme emphasized in the
Declaration, the importance o£ safeguards £or private property at
sea, may render the Declaration principles entirely inapposite in
any future naval contest with Communist powers or in contests in
which the navies o£ merchant shipping o£ these countries become significantly involved.
The Hague Conventions o£ 1907, because o£ their general participation clause, were not technically in force in World Wars I and
II. But prize courts o£ several countries and international tribunals
have pointed out that the Hague provisions may reflect accurately
an existing and binding custom.
One cannot assume, o£ course, that the discovery and application
o£ legal doctrine £rom either custom or treaty will provide a certain
standard by which contemporary community characterizations o£
economic warfare at sea 'vill be guided. One obvious difficulty is
presented by the breakthroughs in physical sciences leading to improvements in naval hardware.
F. St. P. (Pt. II), 156; Order-in-Council (Declaration of London No.3) 20 Oct.
1951 (Abrogating Art. 57 of Declaration of London which states that neutrality
of a vessel is determined by flag she is entitled to fly) 109 Brit. and F. St. P.,
344 (1915) ; Order-in-Council (Declaration of London No. 4) 30 March 1916,
110 Brit. and F. St. P., 173 (1916).
19 Order-in-Council (Declaration of London No. 5-l\Iaritime Rights Order)
7 July 1916, 110 Brit. and F. St. P., 236 (1916).
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Some important developments since the Declaration o:f London
are in subsurface vessels and aircraft and in electronic scanning
devices and nuclear power. These improvements are conducive both
to the effective establishment and breaking o:f blockades and to the
efficient carriage and efficient interception o:f contraband. Controls
by governments over their internal economies have vastly expanded.
State trading and interlocking private business arrangements present
special problems in determining enemy character.
These and other difficulties will be considered distributively in
discussions o:f the various Special Situations. However, embedded
in all doctrinal sources :from which viable policy standards might be
developed is an analysis o:f belligerent "rights" in terms o:f "neutral
rights and obligations."
The concept o:f neutrality has at all times been shifting and
elusive. This might be expected when one attempts to deal with a
physiological process o:f \vithdrawal :from conflict by applying legal
norms developed to regulate participation. 20 Yet it is important to
understand how neutrality is used in economic warfare at sea. Thus
the subject o:f neutrality will now be examined prior to a detailed
treatment o:f specific economic warfare problems.

2. Neutrality and Eonomic Warfare at Sea
Several preliminary and provisional generalizations may be based
upon the troubled history o:f neutrality in sea warfare.
(a) "Neutrality," while used to describe a complex o:f claims
stemming :from military conflict, typically characterizes a limited
withdra\val :from conflict by an avowed nonparticipant. Seldom is
the withdrawal complete. Some contact is maintained by the nonparticipants (neutral) with one or more o:f the participants (bel~
ligeren ts) .
(b) Non participants (neutrals) tend to assert a legal status quo.
The general thrust of legal development has been the creation of legal
institutions to maintain a dynamic balance in the flow of values within a
community. To m~intain this balance, most legal techniques have been directed
to moderating the pace of change within the community by orderly methods for
resolving conflict and controls over the results of conflicts.
In primitive communities, there is little concern with the withdrawer from
conflict-he takes his chances without the protection of kindred or tribe. In
more highly organized communities, all withdrawal phases become of increased
importanc~being enforced (as in imprisonment or exile) stabilized (as in
quarantine for disease) or prevented (as in penalties for desertion from the
military services or sleeping on guard duty). It has proved much simpler to
deal with the basic problems which legal institutions were first developed to
solve-cases of physical injury or business disagreement-than to use these
institutions to maintain or break the cords of community contact.
20
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The tendency is to rely almost exclusively upon past expressions o:f
legal doctrine :for guidance. The strategic position o:f the neutral
(in a legal sense) essentially is defensive. The initiative and :factual
perspective o:f the nonparticipant tend to be sharply limited.
(c) Participants tend to hold the legal initiative in dealing with
conflict withdrawals. Participants, however, labor under the disadvantage o:f ambivalence in applying legal institutions. To accomplish their economic warfare objectives, participants incline towards
an aggressive :formulation o:f novel neutrality doctrines. At the same
time, participants seek stability in much neutrality doctrine with a
view to their :future nonparticipation in conflict.
The neutrality policy o:f the United States has changed directions
in the past like a weather vane in an uneasy wind. As a participant
in conflict, the United States has been a leader in :formulating new
restrictions upon neutrals. As a nonparticipant the United States
insists with equal vehemence upon the vitality o:f neutrality doctrine
o:f the past.
Operation o:f the :factors briefly outlined in (a) through (c) has
invited chaos in international law concerning withdrawals :from
conflict. Part o:f this impending chaos stems :from basic limitations
upon the use o:f legal institutions :for policy guidance. The chronic
obsolescence o:f legal doctrine has been mentioned repeatedly in
earlier discussions in this book. Obsolescence is accentuated in withdrawal problems by the strikingly sporadic :formulation o:f neutrality law.
From the perspective o:f the participant, three immediate objects
tend to be involved in applications o:f neutrality law. The withdrawal
must be (1) :forced; (2) stabilized; or (3) prevented.
In past naval warfare at sea emphasis has rested upon :forcing
complete withdrawals through the interception o:f commerce o:f
nonparticipants and by other pressures. Emphasis may well rest
in the :future upon stabilizing or preventing withdrawals. In nuclear
warfare, :for example, nonparticipants may be carefully cultivated by
the participants in a manner which will expand the participation o:f
a neutral state rather than the contrary.
Each claim to nonparticipation or limited participation in conflict, whether or not couched in neutrality terms, tends to be sui
generis. A premium :for each decision maker lies in the development
o:f a maximum span o:f multidimensional :factual perspective relevant
to opposed participation and nonparticipation claims in each confrontation.
Basic to an analysis o:f claims to participation and nonparticipation in armed conflict is discrimination between the pattern o:f :factual
interaction, the claims asserted by the participants and nonpar-
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ticipants and the flo\v of authoritative decisions which bear upon
these claims. This discrimination is especially useful when dealing
with economic warfare used as a secondary policy device. In these
cases, :facts relevant to opposed economic claims are often obscured
by glaring military requirements.

Pattern of Interaction Between Participants And Nonparticipants:
GeneTal Conditions for Action
The pattern of interaction among participants and nonparticipants
in the economic sphere reveals much stability in practice since
World War I. There is a prospect of future major evolution in
practice due to the rapidly changing general conditions by which all
international processes for coercion are affected. These general conditions furnish a background for all decisions in current conflict
contexts and thus will be considered briefly.
The current power environment is characterized iby rapid erosion
of the post-World War II bipolar power structure. The pattern is
one of withdra\val from the shelter afforded by the superpowersthe United States and the Soviet Union. Such a withdrawal is permitted by the military stalemate produced by a temporary balance
in nuclear armament.
This process is demonstrated by the growing spirit of independence among Soviet satellites, the breakdown of European colonial
structures, and frequent challenges to the influence of the United
States in Latin America. Pronounced strains have been experienced
in NATO. "Neutralist" countries seek competing economic assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union. Red China has
made a bid for leadership within the Communist and uncommitted
worlds. There is no likelihood that this trend of withdrawal from
the central arena of struggle between the United States and the
Soviet Union will be reversed.
These withdrawals from the central arena of conflict have not
been accompanied by withdrawals from conflict general!Y· To the
contrary, the withdrawing nations have exhibited a belligerent spirit.
In any future major war, these aggressive postures may be expected
to offset a trend towards withdrawal from military violence. Extensive economic contacts may be claimed with belligerents. Many
of the states in the process of withdrawal currently are nonviable
economically. The continued economic contact with sources of
materials and technology will be critical. The probability is that these
nations will appear as active proponents of neutral rights while
being peculiarly susceptible to economic coercion.
Contraposed to this general pattern of withdrawal is the orga-
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nization in the United Nations of a 'vorld community structure. This
structure rejects as a premise the prerogative right of a sovereign
state to engage in warfare and postulates a viable administrative
structure by which recourse to force will be held at a minimum and
persuasive practices in interstate relations encouraged. A principle
of minimum order is established which members of the organization
and less comprehensive organizations are committed to support.
When, by the processes for authoritative decision within comprehensive organizations of this nature, a state is deemed to resort
to coercion "illegally,~' member states no longer are entl.tled to treat
participants in the conflict impartially. They must discriminate
and award differential treatment to the combatants.
A possible escape for the withdrawer lies in incompleteness of the
pattern of commitments.-The involvement of nonmembers in armed
conflict is a typical example. The commitment may be argued as
inoperative in a case in which both the Security Council and the
General Assembly fail to act to preserve peace.
These routes for evasion, coupled with the trend toward withdrawal or noncommitment, have contributed to expectations that
differences between states will be solved by violence and intervention by comprehensive security organizations will prove ineffective.
A condition tending to weaken these expectations is the preparedness
of the United States, and other states with an interest in international order, to act to preserve peace until comprehensive security
organizations can shoulder this burden.
The expectation that interstate differences will be solved by violent
methods nevertheless remains pervasive. The tendency in a power
context is to think in terms of balance, with the chance of effective
withdrawal by a nonparticipant in conflict, armed or otherwise,
depending upon the common interest of major powers to prevent
interferences with or incorporation of the smaller withdrawing
members of the community. As stated by McDougal and Feliciano: 21
* * * /T/he probabilities of noninvolvement in a given conflict appear to be a function of, among other factors, the general configuration of the arena and of the maintenance of a
relative equilibri urn of power between the belligerents inter se,
as well as between the belligerents and nonparticipants.
The expectation as to effectiveness of a balance of power to safeguard the withdrawer is a pessimistic one. The range of raw rna21 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 392
(1961). The analysis of neutrality here suggested follows substantially the
outline propounded by these authors.
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terials necessary to sustain a contemporary military effort upon a
broad scale may induce a participant in military conflict to subject
a withdrawing state to its direct governmental control.
The destruction of industry by nuclear weapons may attenuate
wars to such a degree that participants will have no opportunity to
press their claims to control raw material sources upon nonparticipants. It is equally possible that the trend under such circumstances will be to·ward "open" -or "effectively neutral" states sustained by the common interest of participants. This common interest
may be founded either upon the preservation of neutrals as havens or
places of refuge for civilian populations or upon the use of the
neutral as a figure in nuclear strategy. These developments are
conjectural. However, the use -of nuclear armaments in warfare
promises profound shifts in neutrality doctrine.

Oonflict Situations
Turning from the conditions to which any current naval decision
made during conflict will be subject and concentrating upon particular conflict situations, it is desirable to identify carefully both
participants and affected nonparticipants in the conflict and to
appraise their policy processes. The participants should be identified,
both on a formal and on an effective level.
In General Situation 7, the United States, Nueva and Antioka
are participants. Neither the United Nations nor the Organization
of American States are yet participants in the sense either has
characterized the action of Nueva or the action of the United States
as "permissible" or "impermissible." Scythia is a nonparticipant,
but can shift quickly in either direction.
In some cases, participants or nonparticipants on an informal
level will be involved. Merchants, for example, had much influence
upon British policy as a nonparticipant during the American Civil
War; and similar influence has been exerted by American merchants
upon United States policies in our periodic phases of neutrality.
Participants and nonparticipants are characterized by the comprehensiveness of their organizations and the locations of decision
makers involved in the particular confrontation within the policy

structures of their organizations. Concomitant consideration of these
features is useful in predicting the primacy of objectives which will
be sought in the contest and the latitude for concession which the
immediate decision makers will enjoy.
With an international security organization as a participant,
such as the United Nations, the primary objective will be reestablishing order with minimum destruction of values. Decision makers of
such an organization, concerned with the blockade and the under-
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lying conflict between the United States, Nueva and Scythia, usually
will have an extensive latitude for concession.
The bases of power of the participants and nonparticipants should
be assessed on the basis of: ( 1) diversity; ( 2) dispersion ; and ( 3)
magnitude. Upon what values does a participant base its power~
The usual territorially based community, excluding minor principalities, will enjoy a multivalued power base. These values may be
concentrated or dispersed. Stockpiling practices of the United States,
pursued intensively after World War II, have placed the United
States in a secure resource position. This secure position may be
relied upon defensively to support a claim of neutrality if the United
States chooses nonparticipation in a conflict between major powers.
The position may be relied upon offensively when economic warfare
is used as a primary policy device. It may also be used as a bargaining element when the United States is a participant, uses economic
warfare as a secondary policy device, and deals with a nonparticipating state possessing a strategic resource.
The failure by a participant to develop such a resource base for
the production of values in sufficient diversity and magnitude will
limit its warmaking potential. The failure also will bear significantly
upon its relations with nonparticipants which possess an adequate
resource base. Nazi Germany, for example, failed to stockpile
strategic materials for a war of the duration which World War II
proved to be.22 During the Russian campaign, an invasion of Sweden,
a nonparticipant, might have been to the military advantage of
Germany but could not be considered seriously because of the dependence of Germany upon Swedish iron, steel and precision parts,
resources which might have been lost in an invasion by application
of a Swedish "scorched earth" policy.
Writers have emphasized relative magnitudes of power in determining lines of compromise between participants and nonparticipants
in conflict.23 The diversity and dispersion of bases of power are also
22 General Thomas, director of the Rustungs-una Wirtschaftsamt, OKW,
defined Hitler's instructions for war mobilization as a choice of armament in
width instead of armament in depth. Apart from the miscalculation of a short
war, German accumulation of stockpiles of critical materials was hampered by
a shortage of foreign exchange.
23 E.g., McDougal and Feliciano, Law ana Minimum World Public Order, 388
(1961); Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality 1911,.-191,.1, 13 (1953). Other writers
place emphasis upon "sanctions" supporting neutrality, describing the institutional structure by which neutral claims are asserted, and appear to place value
upon the routine functioning of these institutions as sanctions supporting
neutral positions. Professor Stone, for example, while apparently considering
the relative power of participants and nonparticipants highly significant refers
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significant. These, coupled with the determination of the competing
parties, are of the greatest relevance in establishing their bargaining
power and the outcome of a neutrality contest as well as the types
of neutral claims asserted.
The objectives of participants and nonparticipants can be anticipated by an appraisal of the comprehensiveness of their organization. In addition their objectives can be characterized in terms of
exclusiveness or .inclusiveness. The objectives of the withdrawer
(nonparticipant or neutral) tend to be exclusive in the sense that
the values sought to be protected are not to be widely shared. The
objectives of the participant tend. towards inclusiveness, not for
philanthropic reasons, but simply because the participant tends to
seek allies and thus projects its policies as those in which values are
intended to be shared-at least by the potential allies whose favor
is courted.
The objectives of both participants and nonparticipants in a
situation of intense conflict tend towards exclusiveness when compared to the objectives of the United States when taking action in
a low intensity conflict such as that described in General Situation
7. The objectives of a state taking interim sustaining action to preserve the peace, pending action by the United Nations or a regional
security organization, and thus tending to support the general
security and well-being of states other than those against which the
action is taken, have dominantly "inclusive" characteristics. The
inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the objectives sought by participants
and nonparticipants will bear importantly upon the persuasiveness
of their arguments to support belligerent and neutral claims to
rights and obligations.
While in part a matter to be considered as part of the general
conditions under which conflict currently occurs, but useful to consider as an element of a special conflict situation, the orientation
of the participant or nonparticipant concerning government ownership or control of trading activities is an important feature in an
analysis of objectives. The overall volume of trade now handled by
private entrepreneurs in sea commerce has been drastically reduced.
States tend towards public ownership of trading facilities. Democratic states are asserting extensive administrative controls over
shipping policy, maritime construction, labor conditions and over
the volume and character of imports and exports. To the extent that
to the past strength of neutrality law with its comparatively "even and steady
pace" of development and the routine administration of justice in prize courts
as supporting neutrality. See Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict,
363-366 (1954). See also, Fox, The Power of Small States (1959), passim.
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a nonparticipant owns its shipping :facilities or asserts controls which
are tantamount to ownership, to this extent the traditional legal
dichotomy between state and private trading in a neutrality -context is eroded.
Moving :from an orientation in terms o:£ participant and nonparticipant characteristics to an analysis o:£ the nature o:£ the conflict
between participants and the degree o:£ involvement o:£ "nonparticipants,~' three :features should be considered: ( 1) The dimensions
o:£ the conflict-both institutionally and geographically; (2) Intensities-including strategies and techniques employed by participants
and nonparticipants; and (3) Specific claims to participation and
nonparticipation asserted. These :features are interrelated. The
tendency, :for example, is :for a current contest between states evenly
matched in an intermediate po\ver range to become complex institutionally or "vertically." Each state seeks assistance and allies.
The threat o:£ acceleration o:£ violence is such that international
security organizations, developed to prevent or confine extensions
o:£ violence, are involved immediately. The recurrent contests between
Israel and its Arab neighbors are excellent examples.
Powerful nonparticipants :furnish assistance to their :favorites
in the struggle with their degree o:£ participation conditioned or at
least complicated by their commitments to the international security
organizations which also are involved. Claims o:£ neutral rights by
these nonparticipants, which they can support by :force, are nevertheless curtailed by their obligations to international organizations
which seek to confine the conflict and resolve it.
The contest between the United States, Nueva and Antioka, while
between participants unevenly matched and currently confined
geographically, is subject to geographical extension by :fusion with
the concomitant contest between Scythia and NATO. 'Vithout this
extension geographically, the contest promises to become complex
only institutionally-by participation o:£ the United Nations, the
Organization o:£ American States and perhaps other international
organizations.
Conditioned claims o:£ neutrality may be asserted i:£ this institutiona! complexity develops with neutrality claims o:£ a "traditional"
nature asserted i:£ institutional complexity does not develop. I:£ the
conflict is extended geographically to one o:£ general dimensions,
an unlikely event i:£ the United States and Scythia are both armed
with ultradecisive weapons, the institutional (vertical) dimension
will recede in importance but traditional neutrality claims will be
curtailed both in assertion and in respect by the overwhelming
power o:£ the participants.
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The neutrality claim is thus likely to have its maximum effective
scope when the conflict is limited geographically; but the clailn in
this situation will tend to be conditioned by the institutional complexity or institutional (vertical) dimensions o£ the conflict.
The intensity o£ the conflict will also have a bearing upon the
claims asserted by nonparticipants which are recognized by participants. In high intensity conflict, strategies involving the use o£
ultradecisive weapons, such as nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons systems, as well as ideological and economic warfare, will
figure prominently.
Not only will the character o£ neutrality be greatly modified by
the socialization o£ risk in the potentialities o£ ultradecisive weapons
and the general effects resulting £rom their use, but supporting
ideological and economic warfare will be directed to a major extent
against nonparticipants with a view to indirect effects upon the
opposing belligerents. In conflicts o£ less than maximum intensity,
such as the conflict in General Situation 7 in which economic warfare
is being employed to maintain an area status quo to support a military commitment to NATO, claims o£ nonparticipants are likely
to be extensive and their recognition by participants probable.

Olaims to Participation and Nonparticipation
What claims have been asserted to participation and nonparticipation in past conflicts and what has been the structure and process o£
decision making with respect to them? What claims to participation
and nonparticipation are asserted in current General Situation 7
and what will the structure and process o£ decision making with
respect to these likely be? The pattern o£ claim and counterclaim
to participation and nonparticipation in past conflicts may b~
described briefly in three categories.
(1) First are claims to participation or nonparticipation based
upon self-preservation or self-defense. These claims and the structure
and process o£ decision making with respect to them have been
discussed in Chapter IV, Situation 6, in the context o£ economic warfare as a primary policy device. These claims also have a bearing
upon belligerency-neutrality contentions in military conflict when
economic warfare is used as a secondary policy device. The claims,
however, will probably be asserted by participants and nonparticipants with maximum force in conflict in which ultradecisive
weapons with generalized physical effects are employed; and in such
a conflict the maintenance o£ a community structure £or authoritative
decisions bearing upon such opposed contentions will be difficult.
The problem thus assumes the shape o£ one not amenable to the
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influence of legal norms and is not discussed in further detail here.
(2) Second are claims by an original or nominal nonparticipant
either to intervene or withdraw from military conflict between
other states. The claim of intervention is based upon an authorization
or requirement, the latter imposed by a collective security arrangement, to maintain the peace. The measures undertaken might range
from "policing" military measures to various forms of ideological
or economic assistance to a state characterized by the intervenor
or a collective security arrangement as the victim of an aggressor.
The action might he volitional or nonvolitional. An offended belligerent will counterclaim that the intervenor, because not a subject
of attack, has a duty of abstention or impartial treatment. The
opposed contentions normally will be discussed in the context of the
commitments of the intervening "nonparticipant" as a member of a
collective security arrangement.
The same context will be relevant if the nonparticipant insists
upon withdrawal from the conflict rather than upon intervention.
An offended victim of aggression will insist upon the obligations of
the withdrawer based upon its treaty commitments or upon a characterization of illegality by organs of the Unit~d Nations or a
regional security organization.
(3) Third are claims made in a context of "permissible nonparticipation" (that is, when participation is not required by a collective
security arrangement) concerning specific belligerent-neutral (participant-nonparticipant) relationships. The most important group
of specific claims in this category for the development of a decision
in General Situation 7 are claims by a belligerent to interdict economic intercourse between a nonparticipant and the opposing belligerent. Of less immediate relevance to a consideration of problems
of economic warfare at sea are participant claims against nonparticipants to abstain from direct military aid to opposing belligerents; and claims by nonparticipants against participants to
abstain from direct military intervention in the territory of the
nonparticipant.
Community decisions concerning claims in these three categories
may be rendered at levels of authority ranging from representatives
and officials of international organizations functioning during the
conflict to prize courts and administrative officials at ports of
diversion of the belligerents. 24 Decisions may also be rendered by

24 A convenient description of prize courts and their jurisdiction may be
found in Colombos, The Law of Prize (2d Ed., 1940). To administrative officials
at ports to which vessels might be diverted, can be added the host of navicerting officials and economic warfare officials functioning during modern military
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international courts and claims commissions when the conflict has
terminated. 25
The objectives of international organizations as participants in
conflict have been considered heretofore in this analysis. National
prize courts and administrative officials of a belligerent predictably
will share the objectives of the belligerent. Prize courts, however,
tend to build up a body of prize doctrine conforming quite closely
to norms established by world community decisions. "While belligerents can and have changed their national prize law by legislation to
accomplish wartime objectives, these changes are made infrequently
and tend to encounter judicial resistance.
With respect to the two general categories of claims principally
relevant to economic warfare at sea: (1) The claim by an original
nonparticipant either to intervene in conflict to preserve order or
withdraw from it; and (2) Claims in a context of "permissible
nonparticipation" concerning specific participant-nonparticipant
(belligerent-neutral) relationships; basic policies of community
decision makers have been established by agreement-by multilateral conventions.
Policies concerning claims of the first category currently are
expressed in the United Nations Charter and constitutive and other
instruments of regional security · organizations or arrangements
established under Charter provisions. These agreements express
generally the revived policy of minimum order.
Agreements concerning claims in the second category, such as
the Declaration of Paris, 1856, the London Declaration, 1909 ( unratified), relevant Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Pan American
Neutrality Convention of 1928, heretofore described, basically are
codifications of custom developed over several centuries. These older
conventions do express a policy for minimum value destruction. Such
values include the well-being and respect of the individaul as well
as his wealth.
The policy. of minimum value destruction remains viable. But
detailed prescriptions in the older conventions must be reconci-led in
community decisions with the minimum order policy expressed in the

later United Nations Charter and related agreements.
contests, all of which can be expected to reflect belligerent demands and seek
belligerent objectives if these are maintained in spite of conflicting community
decisions.
25 The postconfiict claims decisions, by and large, tend to involve rough and
ready compromises in which the principles of decision remain obscure. To a
degree the Alabama Arbitration shared this defect, although the Commission
induced the parties to agree to the Treaty of Washington establishing three
rules for determination of the various cases. A full account of the Alabama
proceedings may be found in I Moore, History and Digest of the Arbitrations
to which the United States has been a Party, 496-665 (1898).
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The community methods for characterizing particular resorts to
coercion as permissible or impermissible in the light of these principles, and the community methods for identifying a transgressor,
have tended, during the twentieth century, to become centralized in
formal decision-making structures. The formal pattern of state
commitments to support of these decisions has become more comprehensive. But commitment practices have been eroded effectively
by systemic conflict since the end of World 'Var II and the pattern
of withdrawals from this conflict previously described.
The Covenant of the League was the first significant formal
departure from the traditional international legal position that a
state had a sovereign right to resort to war. It was thus also the
first significant assault upon the traditional doctrine of neutrality.
The Covenant, conservative_ly, stated four cases in which resorts
to war were impermissible. 26 These prohibitions were not, however,
supported by a decision-making structure which definitely could:
( 1) characterize a breach ; (2) label a wrongdoer ; or ( 3) direct consequent action by members.
The authority of the League Council was limited to recommendations to its members; and an undertaking in the Covenant for economic action and severance of communications with a transgressor 27
was construed to be operative only if the member whose response
was solicited determined that the transgressor had breached the
Covenant. In a practical sense, this left the imposition of economic
sanctions to the volition of individual members, many of whom
failed to act in patently appropriate cases. By the outbreak of
World War II most of the League members viewed economic sanctions as nonobligatory.
In this decentralized system for developing the relevant decisions,
a6 The four prohibited cases were: (1) No resort to war without submission
of dispute to arbitration, judicial settlement of inquiry by council (Art. 12) ;
(2) No resort to war within three months after award, decision or report by
arbitral tribunal, court or council (Art. 12) ; No resort to war against member
complying with a ward, decision or report (Art. 13 ( 4) , Art. 15 ( 6) -if report of
council unanimously agreed to by other than parties to dispute); (4) Nonmember cannot resort to war against member without meeting certain conditions of inquiry by council (Art. 17) .
27 Art. 16 (1) : "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard
of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to
have committed an act of war against all other :Members of the League, which
hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or
financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and
the nationals of the covenant breaking State, and the prevention of all financial,
commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenantbreaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the
League or not."
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non participations were endemic; 28 and, in the festering chaos which
immediately preceded World War II, claims to avoid participation
in the impending debacle were "asserted with a vigor begotten of
desperation." 29 This hopeless flight from an engulfing conflict was
not stemmed by the Pact of Paris of 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact)
in which war was renounced by the signatories as an instrument of
national policy.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact did provide a basis for permissive
participation by a signatory in maintaining order, whether a Member of the League or not. It also provided a ground for discrimination by a military nonparticipant against a violator of the Pact in
a manner which would conflict with the traditional neutral duties
as formulated in custom and as embraced in earlier conventions. The
early World War II exchange of destroyers for bases by the United
States and the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, both before the formal entry
of the United States into the War, could be reconciled with the
neutral "obligations" of the United States by a "right" to discriminate against Nazi Germany as a violator of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact.
In the United Nations system for collective security, the weaknesses of the League were partially repaired by centralizing in the
Organization power to characterize as impermissible exercises of
coercion in a broader spectrum than the limited "resorts to war"
mentioned in the Covenant. The Security Council could identify the
transgressor. In addition to recommending action to settle a dispute,
or to maintain or restore international peace or security, the Council
could decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
should be employed and call upon the members to apply them. 30 It
could also act by the use of armed force. 31
Declarations of neutrality were made by nonparticipants in the TurkishGreek War of 1921 and in The Chaco War. Upon the outbreak of hostilities in
1939 there were numerous declarations. Furthermore, the Pan American Neutrality Convention of 1928 was ratified by some League Members and the Nine
Power Treaty of 1922, signed by nine League Members, contained provisions
respecting the neutrality of China in time of war to which she was not a party.
There were also a number of bilateral treaties concerning neutrality.
29 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 423
(1961).
3 0 Article 41: "The Security Council may decide that measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations."
31 Article 42: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
ti9ns, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of
28
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By Article 25 the members agreed to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter ;
and in Article 2 ( 5) to give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action.
A significant gap in the pattern of commitments to support
Council action was the keying in Article 43 of the obligation to
furnish armed forces, assistance and facilities to special agreements
between the Security Council and members or groups of members.
These agreements have not been made and the provision of the
forces contemplated in Article 42 hinge upon the recommendation
of the Security Council and the goodwill of the members.
Th~re was, however, a block to any Security Council action,
whether recommendatory or not, in the veto. While the issues might
then be discussed by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee
under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, a decision rendered would
be recommendatory and impose no obligation to act upon the Members. However, consideration of the issues by the General Assembly
would permit characterizing the coercion as "permissible" or "impermissible" with identification of any transgressor.
Although the level of commitment as a result of the veto was only
slightly higher than under the League, the traditional neutrality
pattern was substantially changed by other features. These were
centralization of the characterization process; an obligation under
Article 2( 5) to abstain from aid to any state against which the
United Nations was taking preventive or enforcement action; and
commitment under regional security arrangements or agencies contemplated under Article 52.
In the Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)
of 1947, the Organ of Consultation can agree upon and direct
ruptures of diplomatic relations and interruptions of economic
relations, transit and communications with a transgressor. It can
only recommend uses of armed force. 32 The Organ of Consultation
takes its decisions by a vote of two thirds of the member states. 33
Under the United Nations aegis, if coercion is characterized as
"impermissible" by the Security Council or the General Assembly,
and a transgressor is identified, the maximum degree of "permissible
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of
the United Nations."
32 62 Stat. 1699 (1947) .Arts. 8, 20.
sa Ibid., Art. 17.
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nonparticipation" is enjoyed only by nonmembers. A nonmember
might nevertheless be committed to participate pursuant to a regional
security arrangement.
Members o:f the United Nations are bound to no participation
simply upon recommendation o:f the Security Council or General
Assembly. "Permissible" participation is possible. I:f action is
directed by lhe Security Council, :for example under Article 41,
members are committed to comply.
When coercion is not characterized as impermissible by appropriate organs o:f the United Nations or regional security arrangements, community decisions~ concerning specific participant-nonparticipant relationships will be :formulated in the traditional manner. The degree o:f "permissible" participation under these circumstances is limited. A "nonparticipant" may accord differential treatment to participants based upon conventions such as the KelloggBriand Pact. Self-defense or interim sustaining action are viable
bases :for limited participation.34
McDougal and Feliciano recommend states under these circumstances should characterize "impermissible" coercions and discriminate among participants in appropriate gradations by decisions o:f
a provisional nature.35 I:f goals are shared by the characterizing
states, diverging characterizations with resulting chaos might be
avoided. There is a common interest in preserving minimum order
which might militate against these divergences.
In General S-ituation 7, no characterizations o:f the coercive exchanges have been made by community institutions. This may soon
occur. May Scythia, under these circumstances, characterize the
conflict and discriminate against the United States?
Non participation seems the proper course unless a different posture
can be taken by treaty or on defensive grounds.36 Although the
United States has not declared war against Nueva and Antioka,
blockade is a belligerent act: in this case responding coerciondefensive in nature. Correspondingly the United States must treat
Scythia as a nonparticipant or as a "neutraF' until its policy o:f
participation or nonparticipation is expressed.
It is unlikely, however, that Scythian withdrawal from this conflict will be complete until the coercive exchanges are characterized.
See Chapter IV (B) (Situation 6).
McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Jiinimum World Public Order, 414-418
(1961).
36 Judge J~ssup and Dr. Bowett, for example, recommend nonparticipation
absent a community characterization of the coercion. Jessup, A Modern Law of
Nations, 205 (1948) ; Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 180 (1958).
34

35

340

The most apt description of its position in such a case, assuming no
military involvement, is that of "military nonparticipant."
The Security Council or the General Assembly (or its Interim
Committee) may or may not characterize the initiating coercion by
Nueva and the responding coercion by the United States as "permissible" or "impermissible." Whether or not a characterization
will occur can usually be ascertained within about forty-eight hours
after the appropriate organ is notified.
If no characterization occurs, the Security Council or the General
Assembly will probably attempt peaceful settlement of the dispute.
Members of the United Nations are committed to support these
efforts towards a peaceful solution.
During the initial forty-eight hours, or longer or shorter time
period, while the policy of the appropriate organ is in doubt, the
actions of members may range from active military intervention,
perhaps on a theory of self-defense or "interim sustaining action"
to preserve the peace, to military nonparticipation with economic
contact only with participants, to substantially complete withdrawal both in a military and economic sense.
Discrimination against participants may be anticipated until
community policy is clarified. When community policy is clarified,
discrimination may be anticipated against the identified transgressor. In the unlikely event the community policy is one of detachment and noninvolvement, pressures by participants will tend to
reinforce the traditional neutrality norms of nondiscrimination by
nonparticipants.
B. NAVAL BLOCKADE
Special Situation 7 A

You are Captain of U.S.S. Buchanan, a destroyer, now on blockade. You have received a copy of the Declaration of Blockade stated
in General Situation 7 with supplementary operational instructions.
You have reviewed the Instructions to United States Naval Forces
Employed in Blockade Operations.
A Scythian merchantman, Electra, is approaching your position.
The vessel is not proceeding on the course on the chart attached
to the Declaration of Blockade. You have radio contact with the
master of Electra. He states he is bound for Rivadavia, Nueva;
that his cargo is none of your business; that he knows of no blockade;
that Electra is a public vessel of Scythia, and an attempt by you
to seize her will be an act of war.
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Anticipating difficulty with the master when you halt Electra
£or a visit and search or diversion, you are reviewing the principles
o£ naval blockade before you issue final instructions to your boarding officer. \Vhat are the principles o£ naval blockade and ho'v will
these princi pies bear upon your handling o£ Electra and her master?
Discussion: Special Situation 7 A

The blockade declared by Admiral Brown will be conducted as a
blockade in depth. The blockade may be described today as a "Naval
Blockade"-but should not be understood as a "close" blockade o£ the
19th-century type.
The Federal blockade o£ the port o£ Wilmington, North Carolina,
is a good example o£ a 19th-century "close" blockade. The entrance
to the Cape Fear River, the sea approach to Wilmington, is divided
by Smith's Island into two channels-Smith's Inlet and New Inlet.
Because o£ poor communications and the distance between the
channels, the inner Federal blockading force was divided into two
squadrons-one squadron being stationed at each entrance. Each
squadron operated independently.
During daylight the ships were at anchor at close intervals. The
squadron at New Inlet was anchored just beyond the range o£ the
Confederate guns at Fort Fisher. During darkness, the blockaders
raised anchor and patrolled, using pyrotechnics to maintain contact
with the anchored flagship.
Beyond the inner force was a second division o£ cruisers. These
usually were under way. Beyond these was a third cordon o£
blockaders stationed at a variable distance. This distance was estimated by the travel time o£ a blockade runner crossing the W ilmington bar at high water at night. In theory, the blockade runner, i£
sufficiently fortunate to escape the first two forces during egress
at night, was supposed to be snapped up by the third cordon at
daybreak.
While this scheme appeared better designed to capture cotton
leaving Wilmington than guns and ammunition going in, it seems
at first glance sufficiently tight to deter the most ambitious blockade runner.
However, more tonnage entered and departed the Cape Fear River
during the war years preceding the £all o£ Jfort Fisher than in
double the equivalent time before or since. So refined had techniques
become £o'r running "close" blockades that a British naval maxim
declared the best blockader an ex-blockade runner. Hobart Pasha,
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a British naval officer on half pay, who ran the Wilmington blockade
with regularity, conducted a highly effective blockade for the
Sultan of Turkey against the Greeks after the Civil War.
Blockade runners of shallow draft had an advantage of freedom
of maneuver against a "close~' blockade. Slipping in to a point on
the coast, north or south of Wilmington, the runner could skirt the
breakers until she reached the protection of the Confederate coast
artillery. These guns, upon signal, kept the blockaders at bay until
the runner could work her way into the Cape Fear River.
During egress at night, the runner departed before high water,
a voided the inner force by passing so close to the flagship that
patrols could not fire effectively even if the runner was discovered,
and by daylight was beyond the third division on her way to
Bermuda or Nassau.
Experiencing similar frustration at most of the major blockaded
ports, the Federals came to rely to a great extent upon supplementary long-distance interceptions. These were founded upon the
doctrine of contraband and upon the doctrine of continuous voyage.
The effectiveness of these more distant operations was demonstrated
by the significant constriction of Confederate commerce evident
from 1863 until the end of the war. In 1863, operations of this
extended type were the minimum factually effective blockading
efforts. The "close" blockades practiced at Wilmington and other
Confederate ports, regarded as "effective" legally by many international lawyers, were of doubtful efficiency in snaring blockade
runners powered by steam.
"Close" blockades of the 19th-century type were designed to
interdict sailing vessels-and sailing vessels often fell prey to the
blockaders of Confederate ports. Such a "close" blockade might be
useful again in areas in which sailing vessels or vessels of low
power are used extensively in trade. 37 Had the Federal blockaders
at Wilmington been provided with efficient searchlights, other than
the crude calcium lights used experimentally at the time, the number
of successful runnings of the blockade by fast steam vessels would
have been much reduced. 38 The use of radio and radar, had these
devices been avail able, would have made the Wilmington blockade
"ship tight."
Developments in long-range coast artillery; ballistic and guided
37 See Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 337-343 (1957) where the
use of armed whaleboats vectored through mined areas during darkness to cut
out small enemy craft is described.
38 See Schley, Forty-Five Years Under the Flag, 247-250 (1904) for the "practice" blockade off Charleston in 1897 using modern searchlights.
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missiles; efficient mines and mining techniques; carrier and shorebased aircraft; and submarines; are often cited as precluding "close"
blockades. This depends, of course, upon availability of these weapons
to the adversary's forces in the blockaded area; and, if the weapons
are available, whether they have the skill and inclination to use
them.
The Spanish coast defense artillery at Santiago in 1898 was comparable to the coast artillery used extensively in the United States
until World War II. But the Spanish gunners were no marksmen;
and United States naval units maintained a closer blockade of
Santiago in 1898 than of any of the Confederate ports during the
American Civil War. 3 9
During World War I, eleven blockades were maintained by naval
action alone. A Soviet blockade -of Finland was apparently maintained primarily by naval action although it is not clear this blockade was maintained effectively. 40 The blockade of the East and West
coasts of North Korea had analogies to older "close" blockades,41
as have arms control and counterinsurgency measures taken in
waters adjacent to South and North Vietnam.
Many of the devices thought to preclude "close" blockades are
themselves aids in maintaining an effective blockade. This certainly
is true of mines, submarines and aircraft. Developments in communications and electronic scanning devices probably contribute
more to effective techniques for maintaining blockades than to
techniques for breaking them.
There are no doubt ports in weak states which can be blockaded
efficiently today by vessels anchored at the entrance in the 19thcentury tradition. It is equally certain this is seldom a prudent use
of naval resources. Administrative trade controls, such as those
available to the United States on a current or standby basis, can be
used to interdict most commerce to these points. Naval action simply
accomplishes the task more rapidly.
On the other hand, comprehensive trade control structures such
as those familiar in World Wars I and II are emergency deyelopments. With the exception of vestigal remnants, such as the familiar
export controls in the United States today, these comprehensive
structures tend to be abandoned \vhen hostilities cease. For trade
39
40

Ibid., 288-289.
Castren, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, 292

( 1954). This
blockade was imposed in the so-called "Winter War." It was not reimposed
after the German attack on the Soviet Union.
41 Brodie, Guide to Naval Strategy, 236, 244; Cagle and Manson, The Sea War
in Korea, 337-343 (1957); Field, History of United States Naval Operations:
Korea, 58-9,319-21,366-7 (1962).
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interruption beyond the capability of limited "peacetime'~ administrative trade control structures, or when speed is necessary, there
is no substitute for naval blockade.
A modern blockade will apply the weight of the blockading force
at a great distance from the area blockaded. Although not a blockade, the Cuban Quarantine of 1962 illustrates the broad zone of
operations required against a convoluted and indented shoreline
open to many approaches from the sea.
The less blockade running, the closer operations may be to the
blockaded area. In the blockade of North Korea, the blockading
force \Vas employed principally for coastal bombardment and for
destruction of small coasting vessels. Although Red China and the
Soviet Union protested the blockade, published reports indicate no
major efforts to run it. Land transit routes, determined by the military situation of the North ICorean Army, seemed preferred by
Red China and the Soviets.
Although the weight of the blockading force may be applied at a
distance, small naval units probably 'vill operate in the immediate
vicinity of the ports or shoreline. Aircraft and hovercraft are
desirable for this purpose. Small conventional surface units might
also be used. Aircraft, particularly helicopters, and submarines will
be used for reconnaissance, for visits to vessels approaching the
blockade, and perhaps for seizures of blockade runners.
A blockade in depth may be used as in General Situation 7 to
isolate an area until the intentions of a more formidable adversary
can be determined. Such a blockade also might be imposed quickly
and as quickly lifted in the execution of economic sorties.
The role of such blockades will be limited in general wars. There
will be other demands upon naval forces. N A V AD blockades will be
characteristic of these general wars, \vith naval blockades, such as
that described, reserved to accomplish limited and specific objects.

Major Legal Features of Naval Blockade
The major legal features of naval blockade have remained almost
static since the Declaration of Paris, 1856. Ho,vever, there have been
changes in blockading techniques and international organizations
may now be blockaders.
The Security Council may declare a blockade under Article 42
of the Charter. Blockades may be recommended by the General
Assembly or appropriate policy organs of several regional security
organizations including the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States.
When international organizations participate in a blockade, the
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legal requirements for blockade may change. The general community
is likely to recognize fe·wer "nonparticipation" or "neutrality" contentions by member stat-es previously committed to support policies
of the blockading organizations.

Blockade Mu8t be Declared and Established
by Competent Authority
To be binding legally upon nonparticipants, a blockade must be
declared and established by co1npetent authority. The criteria used
to determine "competence" of the authority have received scant
attention by publicists.
Infrequently, "competence" is determined by prior agreement
among states possibly to be affected by a blockade. The salient current
example is the competence to blockade conferred upon the Security
Council by Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.
Absent a treaty, the criteria usually invoked are the ability and
apparent intention of the blockading authority to discharge its
international legal responsibilities. Relevant to these findings of
ability and intention are adequate instructions to the blockading
force and control by the authority over activities of the force. Judicial processes to pass upon the claims of nonparticipants, such as
prize court procedures, must also be provided by the blockading
authority.
Invocation of the criteria described has tended to confine competence to blockade to recognized governments of recognized states.
Competence to blockade has been denied insurgents, although state
determinations in these cases have been influenced by the stability,
size and success of the insurgent group. 42
The first naval blockade was imposed in 1584 by Dutch insurgents against
ports of Flanders in the hands of Spain. Under the Nyon Agreement of 1937,
major European powers refused to concede belligerent rights to the de jure
government of Spain or to the insurgents. The British, for example, refused to
recognize a naval blockade proclaimed by the Spanish insurgents.
Professor Hyde states: "It is improbable that the United States would at
the present time be disposed to pay deference to a blockade instituted by unrecognized insurgents, although it might under some conditions respect their
effort, if effectual, to close ports under their actual control by measures that
were not sought to be enforced on the high seas." III Hyde, International Law,
2186 (2d Ed., 1947).
State Department papers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries reveal
respect for insurgent blockades, although some of these "blockades" may have
been regarded as "port closures" by action within territorial waters. See Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1893, 98-99. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1909, 454-455. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, 756-757.
See Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1901, 110-137. (DiS<!us42
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When insurgents are denied competence to blockade, they may
act within the territorial \Vaters of the state within which the insurgency occurs to deny delivery of property of a military nature
to the opposing government. Recognition of this claim to deny
military goods to the opposing government, does not include recognition of an insurgent right to seize a ship of a nonparticipant for
breach of blockade. It is probable requisitions of ships and cargoes
within territorial waters will have the same limited legal effect of
requisitions of goods on land.
A feature of increasing importance in characterizations of competence to blockade is compatibility of the intensity of coercion by
the blockading authority with commitments made by the authority
under the United Nations Charter. A spectrum in degrees of coercive
acts \viii be involved in a particular blockade; and overall intensities
of coercion among different blockades may vary. Typically, coercive
intensities in blockades have been so high that publicists have described blockades in the past as belligerent acts. The stage is set for
declarations of neutrality by nonparticipants. 43
With the sovereign right to resort to war eliminated in the United
Nations Charter, blockades will come under close scrutiny as possibly illegal applications of coercion. However, the sophisticated
abandonment of a war-peace dichotomy in legal thinking may lead
to exact discriminations concerning the reasons for blockade and the
degree of coercion actually involved. Automatic characterizations of
blockades as "acts of war" may be avoided.
A naval commander acting for a competent authority may declare
a blockade. 44 A blockade is not established by United States naval
forces unless directed by the President.

sion of proposed blockade by Chilean insurgents in 1891, said to have been a
right conceded by the British on the usual condition of effectiveness, and Brazilian blockade of 1893-94) ; Naval War College, International Law Situations,
1902, 57-83. (Collection of statements of publicists relevant to competence to
declare a blockade with George Grafton Wilson and Hay letters concerning
blockades by insurgents-Hay's position being "Insurgents not yet recognized
as possessing the attributes of full belligerency cannot establish a blockade
according to the definition of International Law.") VII Moore, Digest of International Law, 785-788 ( 1906) ; VII Hackworth, Digest of International Law,
169-173 (1943); II United States Foreign Relations, 432 (1924) (U.S. opposition to proposed Huerta blockade of Tampico). For a discussion of United
States policy concerning the "blockade:.' by the Spanish insurgents, see Naval
War College, International Law Situations, 1938, 95-98.
43 A blockade does not spring into existence upon a declaration of war. It
must be declared and notified by the blockading power.
44 See Colombos, InternatiorULl Law of the Sea, 585 (3d Ed., 1954).
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Character of the Declaration:
LVotificat'ion to Nonparticipants
Breach of blockade or attempted breach is treated as an offense
against the law of the blockading state. Vessels of nonparticipants
are subject to seizure. The vessel and its cargo may then be condemned in prize proceedings.
Because of the property loss facing o'vners of vessels and cargoes
through seizures, detentions and possible condemnations for breach
or attempted breaches of blockade, a rudimentary form of procedural due process must be follo·wed by the blockader. There seems
general agreement that a vessel of a nonparticipant should not be
seized until it has actual or constructive notice of the blockade or
unless notice is actually given by the blockading force before the
alleged breach or attempted breach. There has been diversity in
practice as to the method and time of delivery of the notice.
The Declaration of London, 1909, is a guide to declaration and
notice requirements upon which delegates of major naval powers
could agree in the early 20th century. By Article 8, a Declaration
of Blockade and notice of the declaration ·were required for the
blockade "to be binding." Subsequent articles of the Declaration
make it clear that "binding" means a vessel of a nonparticipant
should not be seized without actual or constructive notification. The
Declaration of Blockade is required by Article 9 to state the date
the blockade begins, geographical limits of the coast blockaded and
the delay allowed neutral vessels for departure.
Current practice requires the time as well as the date of the blockade be stated. If the blockade is to extend to air traffic, this should be
stated in the Declaration of Blockade as part of the requirement of
geographic limits. Action contemplated by the blockading power
with respect to submarine traffic should be declared.
Delegates to the 1908 London Conference understood a reasonable
time should be granted for departure of neutral vessels. 45 Times
usually have been established for departures by neutral vessels,
ranging from 2 to 30 or more days. 46 A failure to state a time for
See Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, 37.
The United States Blockade Proclamations applying to Northern Cuba, to
Southern Cuba and San Juan, Puerto Rico, allowed 30 days for departure of
neutral vessels. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, 769 (Northern
Cuba), 773 (Southern Cuba and San Juan).
'Ihis time exceeds that likely to be allowed today. Colombos, commenting
upon Hall's statement that 15 days is the time usually allowed, declares this
excessive under modern conditions. Colombos, International Law of the Sea,
585 (3d Ed., 1954), Fn. 3. Professor Hyde doubts any minimum number of days
of grace are required. III Hyde, International Law, 2216 (1947).
45

46

348

departure in the Declaration o:f Blockade does not, as Article 9
suggests, preclude seizure o:f a neutral vessel :for breach or attempted
breach o:f blockade. However, neutral vessels which depart promptly
a:fter notification should be permitted to pass. 47
This limited privilege accorded neutral vessels extends only to
neutral vessels entitled to fly a neutral flag at the time o:f notification.
A vessel transferred :from enemy o'vnership a:fter notification can be
seized. The privilege o:f ,vithdra 'val does not extend to cargo. However, blockading powers have :frequently permitted cargo sent in on
the neutral vessel before notice o:f the declaration, retained in neutral
o'vnership and then withdra,vn in good :faith, to pass the blockade.
These withdrawals o:f neutral cargo present special problems which
may require diversion o:f the departing vessel :for search. In most
instances under current conditions o:f sea warfare it is in the interest
o:f both blockader and nonparticipant :for the vessel to depart In
ballast.
The Declaration o:f Blockade must be notified by the terms o:f
Article 11 o:f the London Declara6on to governments o:f neutral
powers or to their "representatives accredited to it" and also to local
Hague Convention No. 6 of 1907 stated it was desirable to allow the vessel
of a belligerent in an enemy port to depart immediately or after a period of
grace (Article 1). The British representative at the Hague Conference stated
his government did not regard as obligatory the granting of any period of grace
to an eftemy vessel. See Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare, 29 (1921). Neutral
merchantmen, by contrast, are entitled by custom to leave a blockaded area
without seizure if they depart within a reasonable time.
No period of grace is required to be stated in the Declaration of Blockade
or notices of it. Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 586 (3d Ed., 1954).
Writers appearing to take the position that a period of grace must be granted
expressly, probably simply restate the provisions in Article 9 of the Declaration
of London of 1909. E.g., Smith, The Law and Oustom of the Sea, 139 (3d Ed.,
1959).
Article 16 of the Declaration of London, when read with Article 9, suggests
the blockade is effective legally although the period of grace has not been
stated. As a penalty upon the blockading force, neutral vessels in port at the
time of the notification must be allowed to pass free. See Naval War College,
International Law Topics, 1909, 47-49.
Lord Stowell, dealing with a notice delivered during the blockade of Montevideo, but failing to state neutral vessels could bring out cargo loaded before
notification, declared in The Rolla ;18071 6 C. Rob. 365, 371: "But the blockade
is good, pro tanto J. and the court will not vitiate the effect of it, merely on
account of the omission of one of the conditions under which vessels might be
permitted to go out. * * * Here it was a restriction imposed by the commander
himself 1 * * * distinguishing the case from one in which the area of blockade
was stated defectively * * * 1 who might possibly find himself under circumstances that would make such a restrain perfectly justifiable, though no such
circumstances are stated. * * * "
47
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authorities in the blockaded area. The local authorities are to infonn
foreign consuls in the blockaded area as soon as possible.
The doctrine of constructive notice, derived from the British,
United States and Japanese practice, is adopted in part in Articles
14, 15 and 16 of the London Declaration.
The vessel of a nonparticipant or neutral within the blockaded
area is presumed to know of the blockade when notice has been given
by the commander of the blockading force to appropriate local
authorities. This presumption is absolute (or irrebuttable).
If the vessel departs a neutral port after notification made in
sufficient time to the state to which the port belongs, Article 15 of
the London Declaration raises a rebuttable presumption of knowledge
of the vessel. If, on the other hand, the vessel of a nonparticipant
approaches the blockaded area in ingress, and does not know or
cannot be presumed to know of the blockade, special notice to the
vessel is required by Article 16. This special notice must be given
by an officer of one of the ships of the blockading force. The notice
is entered in the, vessel's logbook, 'vith entry of the day, hour and
geographical position of the vessel.
Contemporary 'vriters agree that no special form of notice is
required. The special notice stipulated in Article 16 of the Declaration of London is conveyed as effectively by a visual signal, or by
direct voice or radio contact as by boarding the vessel. 48
If boarding is feasible 'vith reasonable safety to the blockading
vessel, it is desirable to enter the relevant facts of notice in the logbook of the vessel or upon the papers establishing the nationality
of a diverted aircraft. A printed copy of the Declaration of Blockade
should be delivered to the officer in charge of the intercepted unit.
When the blockade is common know ledge in the port of departure,
this knowledge is imputed to a departing vessel even though notice
has not been given to the government of the port.49 A neutral vessel
in egress from a blockaded port may also observe sufficient signs of
naval and air .activity to put her on notice that a blockade has been
48 "The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea," Naval War College, International Law Studies, 1955, 288.
49 In The Tutela jl805j 6 C. Rob. 177, the vessel sailed from Bordeaux with

a cargo of wheat owned by the Spanish government. The vessel was seized by
the British fleet blockading St. Lucar.
There had been no formal notification of this blockade to French authorities
but the existence of the blockade was common knowledge in Bordeaux. The
master heard of the blockade before he sailed from Bordeaux and remonstrated
with the shipper. He had been obliged to proceed as he had signed the charter
party before notice of the blockade. Lord Stowell condemned the cargo and
vessel.
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established. 50 Any presumption of knowledge of the blockade under
these circumstances should rest lightly when the blockade is in depth.
Many of the vessels approaching a blockaded area will have been
warned by radio that a blockade is established. Publicists have
emphasized the improved intelligence net as a reason for deviation
from formal notice provisions, such as those in Article 11 of the
Declaration of London. 51
Under special circumstances, a blockade may be so notorious that
within a reasonable time after the blockade is announced notice
may be imputed to all vessels and aircraft. An example is a blockade
declared or recommended by the Security Council of the United
Nations.
But when a naval blockade is established, such as the blockade
established in General Situation 7, special notices to all vessels and
aircraft approaching the blockaded area are advantageous both to
the blockader and to the non participant. The blockade is intended to
deny supplies to an adversary and to prevent his export of materials.
This denial must be accomplished with economy of force and with
minimum disruption of public order.
It is in the interest of the blockader to hold diyersions of vessels
or their seizure to a minimum. Notice carefully delivered to vessels
and aircraft of nonparticipants may cause voluntary withdra,vals of
units unprepared to test the effectiveness of the blockade.
The element of administrative convenience inherent in special
notices is demonstrated in the confrontation of Electra by Buchanan
in Special Situation 7A. The blockade has been established rapidly
as a device to preserve the military statws quo pending action by the
United Nations or the Organization of American States.
50 The de facto blockade, distinguished in British, American and Japanese
practice from a notified blockade, is based upon patent naval activity which
the master of a vessel in ingress or egress should be able to observe. Neutral
vessels, leaving a blockaded port after the blockade has existed de facto, are
subject to seizure without special notice. The Vrouw Judith j1799; 1 C. Rob.
150; The Hare j1810j1 Acton 252 (blockade established by notification, driven
off and reestablished without notification).
For a neutral vessel in egress, readily observable naval activity has been
given weight when also coupled with other sources of knowledge by the master.
E.g., The Herald, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.), 768 (1865).
A vessel in ingress through the blockaded area when the blockade is de facto
is entitled to special notice before seizure if knowledge of the blockade is
lacking. This knowledge may be gained from general notoriety in the port of
departure but will not be imputed when there is confusion in the port of departure concerning the area blockaded. The Franciska jl855j 10 Moore P.C.
37 (where it was also held a blockade of Riga was not applied impartially).
51 E.g., III Hyde, International Law, 2206-2209 (1947).
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While Electra's master may have received notice of the blockade
by radio, there is a chance he has not received this notice and will
change his course if notice is given. The most effective notice of the
blockade can be given by visiting Electra, delivering a printed copy
of the Declaration of Blockade to the master, and making appropriate entries of this fact in Electra's log. Probably under the circumstances this can be done with safety to Buchanan.
If the master resists a visit, or if a visit appears unduly hazardous,
special notice should be given by visible or audible signals. If the
master ignores these signals and Electra continues on her course, she
should be seized. There is a strong case for seizure because the
United States has conformed to the requirements stated in Article
11 of the Declaration of London. These reflect international custom
on the point.

Blockade Must be Effective to be Binding
The Declaration of Paris, 1856, states in part: "Blockades, in
order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a
force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."
The Declaration of London, 1909, reaffirmed this point in Article 2,
adding in Article 3 that "effectiveness" of a blockade is a question
of fact.
Although a literal reading of thP- English translation of the
Declaration of Paris might suggest a blockade was "effective" only
i£ it precluded blockade running, by the interpretation generally
accepted a blockade is effective if maintained by instrumentalities
sufficient to render dangerous ingress to or egress from the blockaded
area. 52 Intermittent penetrations by blockade runners do not impair
the effectiveness of the blockade if the breaching unit risks probable
seizure or destruction.
52

This, essentially, is the statement of effectiveness by Dr. Lushington in

The Franciska jl855j II Spinks, 113, 120, 130 (reversed on other grounds in

j1855j 10 Moore, . P.C. 37). The blockade is effective even though some blo<:!kade
runners pass it during darkness or during fog or during the period in which
a blockading vessel has left her station in pursuit of another blockade runner.
In The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. 510 (1899), a French vessel entered San
Juan, Puerto Rico, after the United States proclamation of blockade of that
port and upon egress was warned of the blockade by the auxiliary Yosemite,
the only blockading vessel. Returning to San Juan at a later date, Olinde
Rodrigues was seized by U.S.S. New Orleans which had replaced Yosemite.
Accepting Dr. Lushington's statement of "effectiveness" in The Franciska,
the Supreme Court stated a blockade could be maintained by one cruiser if in
fact ingress and egress through the blockade were rendered dangerous.
The Court declared: "* * * Clearly, however, it is not practicable to define
what degree of danger shall constitute a test of the efficiency and validity of a
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Blockading operations must be continuous. If blockading operations are interrupted, the blockade becomes ineffective. A new
declaration and notifications are required if the blockade is reestablished. 53
blockade. It is enough if the danger is real and apparent. * * * " 174 U.S. 515.
Relevant to the issues of danger are the nature and extent of the coast
blockaded; the character, disposition and degree of efficiency of the blockading
force; and the number of vessels entering and departing a blockaded port without examination and seizure compared with the records of vessels examined
or seized.
Statements by the commander and officers of a blockading force relative to
its efficiency and effectiveness have been given weight in prize proceedings.
Dr. Lushington in The Franciska, commenting upon depositions by Sir Charles
Napier, commanding the force blockading Riga, states: "If Sir Charles
Napier, with this evidence before him, with his means of forming a correct
judgment, has come to the conclusion that the blockade was duly maintained,
I think that a Judge sitting in this chair would, in the absence of conflicting
testimony upon such evidence, feel himself compelled to come to a similar conclusion; and I think so also, more especially because if Sir W. Grant deemed
the opinion of a commander-in-chief adequate evidence of the competency of a
squadron to execute a blockade, a fortiori, multum a fortiori, such opinion
would be of force when the question 'vas of its actual maintenance, and when
the evidence from which the conclusion was to be drawn consisted of logs and
other statements, upon which none but a nautical person can form a very
satisfactory judgment. * * * " II Spinks at 126.
53 Art. 12, Declaration of London, 1909. See Naval War College, International
Law 'Topics, 1909, 41. In The Hofjnung j1805j 6 C. Rob. 112, a British squadron
under Sir John Ord, blockading Cadiz and St. Lucar, was driven off by force
on 10 April. While no blockade was maintained, the British government on
25 April declared and notified a blockade of the two ports. Lord Collingwood
reestablished the blockade on 8 June, or at least appeared before the ports on
that date.
The court received in evidence a letter of 23 July to neutral consuls in Cadiz
which might be construed as notification of the reestablished blockade. Hoffnung, however, sailed from Nantes on 17 July and was seized at "a considerable distance" from the coast of Spain.
Lord Stowell refused to condemn either the Swedish vessel or the Spanish
cargo, holding the notice of 25 April insufficient to cover the reestablished
blockade and the evidence of a de facto blockade insufficient to charge the
vessel or the shippers with knowledge of it. He cited The Christina Margaretha
j1805j 6 C .. Rob. 63, in which a ship on egress from Cadiz on 4 April passed
the de facto Ord blockade without hindrance but was seized in the Channel off
Orfordness by a British cruiser after the declaration and notification of
25 April. Lord Stowell refused to allow expenses to the captors.
Referring to this case in The Hofjnu.ng, Lord Stowell commented: (6 C. Rob.
117) " * * * It was argued on that occasion, that neutrals were bound to act
upon such presumptions * * * ;that the blockade continued or would be
resumed; * * * and on the same principle on which it has been held that when
a blockading squadron is driven off by adverse winds they are bound to presume
that it will return, and that there is no discontinuance of the blockade.
"But certainly the two cases are very different. When a squadron is driven
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Continuity is unbroken if units of the blockading force are driven
away by stress of weather 54 or depart for a purpose connected with
the blockade, 55 such as pursuit of a blockade runner, and immediately
return to their stations. There is no requirement that the same units
or number of units constitute the blockading force for continuity;
off by accidents of weather, which must have entered into the contemplation
of the belligerent imposing the blockade, there is no reason to suppose that such
a circumstance would create a change of system, since it could not be expected
that any blockade would continue many months without being liable to such
temporary interruptions. But when a squadron is driven off by a superior
force, a new course of events arises, which may tend to a very different disposition of the blockading force, and which introduces, therefore, a very different train of presumptions in favor of the ordinary freedom of commercial
speculations. In such a case, the neutral merchant is not bound to foresee or to
conjecture that the blockade will be resumed, and, therefore, if it is to be
renewed, it must proceed de novo, by the usual course, and without reference to
the former state of facts, which has been so effectually interrupted.
"On this principle it was that the court held the former blockade to have
become extinct, and intimated an opinion that there should be a repetition of
the same mea~ures, on its recommencement, to bring it to the knowledge of
neutral states, either by public declaration, or by the notoriety of the fact."
In The Hare j1810j I Acton, 252, the reestablished blockade by Lord Collingwood was held a blockade de facto, binding without special notice upon an
American vessel in egress from Cadiz. By the time of this seizure, the reestablished blockade had become notorious and vessels were charged with knowledge
of it when leaving the blockaded port.
Article 13, Declaration of London, 1909, requires notification if the blockade
is raised voluntarily or if any limitation to it is introduced. See Naval War
College, Internatonal Law Topics, 1909, 41. A blockade de facto expires de facto.
See The Neptunus /1799/1 C. Rob.170, 171.
MIn The Cobumbia }1799/ 1 C. Rob. 154, Lord Stowell had "no hesitation in
saying that the blockade * * * / of Amsterdam 1 * * * was broken" when the
master of an American vessel sailed for that port with the intention of entering "if the wind should continue unsteady and keep the English cruisers off
the Dutch coast." See to the same effect The Frederick M olke /1798/ 1 C. Rob.
86.
55 See VII Moore, Digest of International Law, 844 (1906) (quoting Instructions to U.S. Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, 1898. The same point was restated in the Instructions of 1917). Professor Stone declares: " * * * It is
doubtful whether any circumstances other than stress of weather will permit
withdrawal without interruption of blockade * * * though on principle a brief
interruption to allow pursuit of a refractory blockade-runner should be on
the same basis. * * * " Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 496
(1954) Fn. 33.
During the Federal blockade of Charleston, S.C., which was maintained in
1861 by U.S.S. Niagara, this vessel was ordered replaced by U.S.S. Harriet
Lane. Harriet Lane was "a day or two" late in arriving and Niagara nevertheless left her station. Secretary Seward maintained the blockade had not been
raised in a manner which required notice of its reestablishment. See VII
Moore, Digest of International Law, 843 (1906).
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nor is there a requirement that units of the blockading power
maintain the blockade. Ships of allies may be used. 56
Exceptions for passage of the blockade may be allowed by the
blockading power without rendering the blockade ineffective. Warships and military aircraft of nonparticipants may be allowed ingress
and egress, as may other vessels and aircraft of a nonparticipant
when either under urgent distress or engaged in bona fide humanitarian missions.57
56 During the Italian Adriatic blockade in 1915, a number of ships were
seized by French vessels acting under Italian orders. Some of the claimants contended the Italian blockade was not effective because maintained in part by
French warships. The Italian Prize Commission rejected these arguements.
E.g., The Aghios Spiridon ;1916/ Gazetta Ufficiale, 10 Feb. 1916, No. 33;
Fauchille et Basdevant, Jurisprudence Italienne en Matiere de Prises Maritimes, 5 (1918).
The blockade should be effective even if cooperation by vessels of the nondeclaJ·ing power is voluntary. But a claim of ineffectiveness should be avoided
in the~e ca~es by joint declarations and joint notifications.
57 The exceptions mentioned are relevant principally to the effectiveness of
the blockade. If the exceptions are granted frequently, the effectiveness of the
blockade may be brought into question.
Apart from the issue of effectiveness, there seems no limit to exceptions,
otller than in the three categories mentioned, provided neutrals are treated
imvartially. Blockade operations by the United States during the SpanishAmerican War were noted for the numerous exceptions made for passage. See
Naval lVar College, International Law Situations, 1901, 166-175.
Articles 6 and 7 of the Declaration of London, 1909, state exceptions permissible for warships and vessels in distress. See Naval War College, International
Law Topics, 1909, 31-32. Warships must conform to the conditions of ingress
and egress established by the blockade commander. See VII Moore, Digest of
International Law, 852 (1906). The exception for vessels in distress, apart
from the Declaration of London, is well established. See The Fortuna j1803j
5 C. Rob. 27; The Diana U.S. (7 Wall.), 354 (1868). The Nuestra Senora de
Regla U.S. (17 Wall.), 354 (1868). Nothing but an absolute and unavoidable
necessity will justify entering a blockaded port without permission of the
blockade commander. The H urtige H ane ;1799J 2 C. Rob. 124 ; The Elizabeth
j1810j Edwards, 198; The Charlotta ;1810/ Edwards, 252; The Panaghia
Rhomba j1858J 12 Moore P. C. 168.
There is no mention in the Declaration of London, 1909, of an exception to
pass the blockade for vessels upon humanitarian missions. Hague Convention
XI (1907) Article 4, exempts from capture vessels charged with religious,
scientific or philanthropic missions. An exemption from capture does not mean
that a vessel or aircraft will be granted an exception to pass a blockade.
Thus, both public and private hospital ships are exempt from capture or
attack by Article 22, 24 and 25 of -eeneva Convention, Armed Forces at Sea
(1949). Yet in Art. 31 is made clear that these vessels and their communications
can be controlled. They can be searched, directed upon a certain course and
detained for a period of seven days from the time of the interception.
Substantially the same formulae applied to hospital ships are stated in
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Small unarmed fishing vessels and small boats used in local trade
on the coast of the blockaded state may be permitted to engage in
their usual activities without placing the effectiveness of the blockade in jeopardy. 58 This does not apply to deep sea fishing vessels,
Cmn~ention X (1907) which the Geneva Convention will replace. The
control of a belligerent over these vessels is so extensive that without an attack
or capture a blockade clearly can be enforced against them. The relevant cases
are few.
Whether the object of the voyage is humanitarian or philanthropic is determined by the blockader. See The Adula, 176 U.S. 361, 379 (1900) (vessel entering port to remove refugees said one employed for the personal profit of the
charterer "and only secondarily, if at all, for the purpose of humanity") ; The
Haelen j1918J Grotius Annuaire International, 254 (chartered vessel carrying
wheat for children to Belgium not entitled to exemption because not engaged
in humanitarian work prior to war).
When the vessel passes the blockade, the voyage must be limited to the
humanitarian object. The Rose in Bloom ;1811; 1 Dodson, 57 (American vessel
removing distressed seamen from blockaded port of Bayonne but also carrying
cargo unrelated to this mission condemned with all cargo except stores carried
for humanitarian mission); The Aghios N'icolaos (No. 2) Journal Officiel
(1918), 8944 (vessel departed from assigned route and loaded cargo).
Although the Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not mention blockades, exceptions for humanitarian reasons may be based upon a number of their provisions.
Ships chartered to transport medical equipment and supplies exclusively intended for the treatment of wounded and sick members of the armed forces
or the prevention of disease are to pass. "The particulars regarding their
voyage must be notified to the adverse Power and approved by the latter."
Geneva Convention, Armed Forces at Sea ( 1949), Article 38.
Medical and religious personnel and equipment to remove wounded and sick
from a besieged area may be allowed to pass. Genev·a Convention, Armed Forces
at Sea (1949), Art. 18; Geneva Convention, Civilian Persons, Art. 17.
Neutral craft responding to an appeal by parties to the conflict or those which
of their own accord collect wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons "shall enjoy
special protection and facilities to carry out such assistance." Geneva Convention, Armed Forces at Sea ( 1949), Article 21.
Consignments of medical and hospital stores; objects necessary for religious
worship; and essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children
under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases are allowed to pass if the
belligerent is satisfied there are "no serious reason for fearing" diversions of
the products for military use or an accrual of a definite advantage to the war
effort or economy of the enemy and other specified consequences, Geneva Convention, Protection of Civilian Persons (1949), Article 23. The Conventions
state certain exceptions apparently mandatory for the blockader. These are
mentioned in Fn. 59, infra.
58 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900). Hague Convention XI
(1907), Art. 3 exempts fishing boats used for fishing along the coast or small
boats employed in local trade from capture. The British position has been that
the exemption is a matter of comity only. E.g., The Young Jacob and Johanna
j1798j 1 C. Rob. 20; Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 474-475 (3d Ed.,
1954). See The S. S. Doron, 28 Int. L. Rep. 61, (U.A.R. Prize Ct. 1959) (where

Jlague
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spotter aircraft :for fishing vessels or large vessels trading between
coastal ports.
The exceptions mentioned are in the discretion o:f the blockade
commander upon the conditions prescribed by him. During the
blockade o:f North Korea by United States and other naval units,
no exception was made :for small fishing boats and small coastal
cra:ft. These were seized or destroyed. The purpose was to cut off
a major source o:f :food supply :for the North Korean Army and to
stimulate anticommunist sentiment among the fishermen. 59
fishing vessel was seized having on board a powerful radio transmitter and
receiver, a bathometer and cases containing luminous signals) ; The Gaulfar II,
Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 469, Case No. 169 (Prize Court of Hamburg) ; The Fred
Neumann, Ann. Dig. (1946), 405, Case No. 175, Conseil des Prises.
59 See Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 296 (1957). In 1938 the
Korean fishing industry had ranked third in the world and the Koreans had
consumed about 300,000 tons of fish annually. Hague Convention XI (1907)
because of the general participation clause, did not apply to the Korean conflict.
The use of these vessels to mine Korean waters would provide a legal basis
for attacks upon them.
Although under ordinary circumstances, the destruction of fishing vessels and
small coastal shipping would be highly questionable in view of The Paquete
Habana, Fn. 58, supra, there was a close link between fishing activities and
supply of the North Korean and Chinese Volunteer Armies, both of which
tended to live off the land (or sea-as the case might be).
Disturbance of the fishing fleet had an immediate military bearing upon land
operations. This will be characteristic of economic warfare under modern conditions although the relationship between denials of food and the movement and
tactics of armies unquestionably was accentuated in the Korean conflict.
Naval practices during World "\Vars I and II, in which coastal fishing vessels
and shipping frequently were attacked, have eroded the position taken in continental cases and in The Paquete Habana concerning immunity of these vessels.
The matter is believed usually in the discretion of the blockade commander,
although this discretion should be exercised to a void unnecessary destruction.
This does not mean that destruction of fishing vessels will be discretionary
under all circumstances. Hague Con1?ention XI (1907), Art. 4 may apply. Also
under Article 59 of Geneva Convention, Civilian Persons ( 1949), a contracting
party is obligated to permit free passage of consignments of foodstuffs, medical
supplies and clothing to the inadequately supplied population of an occupied
territory as part of a relief scheme. If an impartial humanitarian organization,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, sought cessation of
interference with the fishing fleet of the occupied territory, and coupled this
with assurances that the fish caught would be used for the relief of the needy
population, it is believed the interferences could not continue consistently with
the treaty obligation.
This is one of the few nondiscretionary features related to blockades found
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Others are the obligation to allow a hospital
ship egress from a port which has fallen into the hands of the enemy, Geneva
Convention, Armed Forces at Sea (1949), Art. 29; and to allow the passage of
mail and relief supplies for prisoners of war and interned civilians. Geneva
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A blockade may be limited to ocean surface traffic. The blockade
need not extend to submarine or air traffic and will be effective also
despite the exclusion from interception of certain cargo, such as
the food and medical supplies mentioned in the Declaration of Blockade stated in General Situation 7. 60
Large cargo submarines may require future "effective" blockade
to be extended to subsurface as well as surface traffic. Currently
there is no requirement that a blockade extend to subsurface vessels
or to aircraft. Depending upon the size and location of the blockaded area, the blockader may reasonably require submarines and
aircraft to travel upon stipulated routes through designated zones or
may prescribe routes for free travel.
Probably the most perplexing current issue relating to the effectiveness of a blockade results -from development and use of submarines, aircraft, mines and electronic scanning devices in naval
combat. In view of these new developments in hardware and techniques for its use, how large a force is required for an effective
blockade and what must be its composition? There are no pat
answers. 61
Convention, Prisoners of War (1949), Arts. 70-75; 77; Geneva Convention,
Civilian Persons ( 1949), Arts. 106-110.
60 A clear basis for this exception is to be found in Geneva Convention,
Armed Forces at Sea (1949), Art. 21. See Fn. 57, supra. Geneva Convention,
Civilian Persons ( 1949), Article 59 makes mandatory under certain circum-

stances passage of food, medical suplies and clothing for the inadequately
supplied population of an occupied territory. See Fn. 59, supra.
Economic attacks upon food supply are discussed subsequently. However, it
is believed the extreme position taken by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong in
The Paklat 1 Br. & Col. Prize Cases 515 ( 1915) concerning the discretion of a
blockader in forbidding relief activity is now subject to exceptions. The Paklat,
a German (enemy) vessel sailed from Tsingtao with refugees and was captu-red
by the British. The vessel sailed before Tsingtao was blockaded but was captured after the blockade was established.
The defense was made that the vessel was engaged in a humanitarian
mission. Condemning the vessel, the Hong Kong Court stated in dicta: (Ibid.,
518) " * * * jNjo rule of law exists which obliges a besieging force to allow all
noncombatants or only women, children, the aged, the sick or wounded, or subjects of neutral Powers to leave the besieged area unmolested. Although such
permission is sometimes granted, it is in most cases refused, because the fact
that noncombatants are besieged together with combatants, and that they have
to endure the same hardships, may, and very often does, exercise pressure upon
the authorities to surrender." Presumably the Court would consider denials of
food and medicine to the besieged noncombatants proper to bring pressure for
a surrender. The case is criticized in Colombos, The Law of Prize, 150-151
(2d Ed., 1940).
61 An interesting consideration of new weapons, detection methods, and
transportation systems available for application to blockade may be found in
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Most commentators upon the issue of "effectiveness'~ have insisted
the blockading force contain some surface units. It has been stated,
for example, that at least one surface unit must be present in the
blockaded area.s2
A surface vessel clearly has advantages as a blockading unit if
the blockading power has air superiority, superiority in surface sea
power, and antisubmarine warfare capability. Often a surface vessel
will have adequate personnel to serve as prize crews of seized vessels.
It has the capacity to rescue survivors of vessels sunk for resisting
seizure. While the matter is speculative, the examination by a surface unit of papers of a vessel approaching the blockaded area may
be facilitated. There is perhaps less of a chance that a vessel will
attempt to resist a surface unit approaching it to examine its papers
than it will attempt to resist a helicopter or submarine approaching
for the same object.
I£ the blockader lacks surface capability, then, as did Germany in
two wars, the tendency will be to resort to air or submarine interdiction. There is no doubt these units can render dangerous ingress
to and from a blockaded area. The question seems ·to be whether a
blockader using only these units can properly discharge the responsibilities of a blockading power. One of these responsibilities
is to maintain minimum order-to enforce the blockade without
unnecessary destruction. Whether this responsibility can be discharged using only air and submarine units or using only one or the
other should depend upon the facts of the particular conflict. 63
A situation can be imagined in which a blockade is maintained by
land-based aircraft supported by submarines. Vessels approaching
Powers, "Blockade: For Winning Without Killing," 84 Naval Inst. Proc., 61-66
(August 1958).
62 See II Oppenheim, International Law, 780 (7th Ed., Lauterpacht, 1952).
(Blockade effective by land batteries if supported by at least one man-of-war.)
Colombos appears to consider some surface units necessary. See Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 581 (3d Ed., 1954) ; Naval War College, International Law Studies, 1955, 289 Fn. 13.
63 See McDougal and Feliciano, Law and MinimU!In World Public Order, 493497 (1961). These authors state at 494:
The lawfulness of the objective of embargoing, more or less comprehensively, commerce with the enemy being thus established, the lawfulness
of any particular modality of achieving this objective in possible future
contexts rationally depends upon the appraisal of the relative destructiveness of such modality as compared to any other available alternative
modality, rather than upon conformity to practices technologically obsolete.
Such an appraisal, essentially an appraisal of reasonableness in detailed
context, entails the careful relation of specific components of contexts to
the relevant competing policies of military effectiveness and minimum
destruction of values.
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the blockaded area could be notified if necessary and visited by
helicopters or other sui table aircraft. Necessary seizures could be
accomplished by submarines; and vessels resisting seizure could be
destroyed either by submarine or aircraft and survivors perhaps
rescued by them.
A blockade of this nature should be distinguished from a war
zone established as a reprisal in which neutral commerce is indiscriminately destroyed without warning, such as the German war
zones in World Wars I and II, and from attacks upon enemy shipping as in American operations in the Pacific during World War II.
If a blockade is frequently challenged (that is, if merchantmen of
nonparticipants frequently attempt to run it), the presence of some
surface units probably should be required. If challenges are few,
submarine and air activity can be combined for the requisite effectiveness and at the same time discharge the blockader's responsibility
to maintain minimum order. 64 In special situations, perhaps submarine activity alone or air activity alone would be adequatealthough a blockade directed against air as well as surface transit
would certainly require air support.

The Blockade Must be Applied Impartially
to All Vessels and Aircraft
The vessels of nonparticipants and those of the blockading authority must receive equal treatment. 65 If the blockade is extended
to aircraft, the rule of impartiality applies to aircraft as well.
64Hague Convention VIII (1907), Article 2 prohibits laying automatic contact mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. This Convention may not be applicable in a particular conflict because of its general participation clause.
:Mining operations may be conducted as reprisals. Mined zones were used
extensively in World Wars I and II to block or channel commercial traffic.
This technique may be anticipated in future wars, perhaps with permanent
blocking of certain channels. Channels may be blocked by nuclear .devices,
unsweepable without substantial loss of life and property damage.
Colombos and other writers have considered Article 2 of Hague Conver~rtion
VIII "illusory," because the state mining the waters may assert an object other
than intercepting commercial shipping. See Colombos, International Law of the
Sea, 583 (3d Ed., 1954) ; McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order, 495 ( 1961), Fn. 271.
65 Declaration of London, 1909, Art. 5. See Naval War College, International
Law Topics, 1909, 31; The Success ;1812/ 1 Dodson, 131, 134 ("The measure
which has been resorted to, being in the nature of a blockade, must operate to
the entire exclusion of British as well as of neutral ships; for it would be a
gross violation of neutral rights, to prohibit their trade, and to permit subjects
of this country to carry on an unrestricted commerce at the very same ports
from which neutrals are excluded") ; The Franciska j1855j Spinks, 287, 292.
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A blockading state cannot, for example, exclude merchant vessels
of nonparticipants and allow ingress and egress to its own merchantmen. The impartiality doctrine does not apply to exceptions made
for passage of the blockade, such as the privilege accorded warships
to enter and depart blockaded ports. 66
The decision to grant an exception is made by the blockade commander in each case presented. Some warships can be granted ingress
and egress and others excluded.
Except, however, in the recognized categories in which exceptions
are permitted, impartiality is the rule. Merchantmen, when neither
in urgent distress nor engaged in humanitarian missions, are not
within the categories which a blockade commander can allow to pass
in his discretion ·without raising the blockade. If Electra is allowed
to pass the blockade, not only will an argument be available to nonparticipants that the blockade is raised, but if the blockade is re66

Declaration of London, 1909, Articles 6, 7. See Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, 31-32; Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 583584 (3d Ed., 1954).
The three exceptions-warships, vessels in distress and vessels upon humanitarian missions-do not appear subject to the rule of impartiality. If an exception is recognized for fishing vessels and other small vessels in coastal trade,
although usually enemy vessels will be involved rather than vessels of neutrals,
probably permission must be granted or withheld impartially. The practice is
insufficient to evidence clear community policy on the point.
In transactions other than the "exceptions," the impartiality rule applies
although the problem is usually presented as one of "effectiveness" of the
blockade.
In The Jufjrow Maria Schroeder j1800j 3 C. Rob. 148, Lord Stowell dealt
with a vessel allowed to enter Le Havre in a lax blockade of that port and
seized upon coming out. The vessel was restored under the rule of The N eptunus
j1799j 2 C. Rob. 110, where the vessel had been misled in entering Le Havre by
an unintentionally false statement of the captain of a British frigate.
Lord Stowell commented (at 3 C. Rob. 158) : "It is impossible for me to say
this, without observing at the same time, on the great mischief that ensues
from this sort of inattention practised by our cruisers. It is in vain for governments to impose blockades, if those employed on that service will not enforce
them. The inconvenience is very great and extends far beyond the individual
case; reports are eagerly circulated, that the blockade is raised; foreigners take
advantage of the information; the property of innocent persons is ensnared,
and the honor of our own country is involved in the mistake."
And see The Rolla j1807j 6 C. Rob. 365 where Sir Home Popham had allowed
a group of slave ships to enter Montevideo, apparently upon humanitarian
grounds. Lord Stowell stated: "It would have been better, undoubtedly, and
more regular, that this intention should have been notified to the governor in
the same manner as the blockade itself. It would then have been a clear and
distinct limitation, and the exception would have been understood according to
its proper limits, because slave ships are in no manner privileged by law, or
put upon a different footing from other ships." (6 C. Rob. at 373.)
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imposed nonparticipants can complain of discriminatory action in
the earlier blockading operation.

The Blockade 11/ust Not Bar Access to Neutral
Ports or Air Termini
A naval blockade must not bar ingress to or egress from sea or air
termini of nonparticipating states.67 The naval blockade of Nueva
and Antioka bars no access to ports of nonparticipants unless it may
be argued that the sea and air activity incident to the blockade is
so extensive that shipping to ports of nonparticipants is being
harassed or interdicted. Whether this harassment or interdiction
occurs is a question of fact in each blockade.
Objections by nonparticipants based upon such alleged interference may be obviated if the blockading authority is prepared to
assume the .administrative burden required to permit free traffic
through the blockaded area between ports of nonparticipants.
Flexible navicerting, clearcerting or similar "pass" procedures will
expedite this. movement. If the continuous voyage doctrine is enforced, and enforcement of this doctrine may be unnecessary when
the naval blockade is quickly imposed and is of short duration, an
effective intelligence service in ports of origin and call may avoid
useless interceptions.
Under special circumstances, not present in General Situation 7,
the administrative burden upon the blockading authority may be
exceptionally heavy. Examples are when sea traffic is interdicted:
(a) into rivers when some riparian states are nonparticipants; (b)
into canals used as routes between nonparticipating states; . and (c)
when a strait bet\veen a participant and nonparticipant is blockaded.
Unless measures can be taken to permit free movement of traffic
to and from the ports of nonparticipants under these circumstances,
the blockading authority assumes the risk of legitimate retaliatory
action by the nonparticipant as \vell as claims for losses resulting
from the interference. Distinguished authorities have suggested in
some of these. situations a blockade valid under international law
cannot be established.
Professor Smith, for example, appears to take the position that
an effective blockade of Copenhagan \vould not be viable legally
because it would interfere with access to the opposite coast of
Sweden. 68 Professor Smith is also of the opinion that "long-distance"
67 Declaration of London, 1909, Article 1, 18. See Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, 25, 18. Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 592
(3d Ed., 1954). A state may blockade its own ports held by the enemy. II Oppenheim, International Law, 771 (7th Ed., Lauterpacht 1952).
68 Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea, 140-141, (3d Ed., 1959).
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blockades (described in this text as N A V AD blockades) imposed
against Germany in World "\Vars I and II are not likely to be
repeated in any future \var in \vhich neutral powers desire and are
able to insist upon their neutral rights. 69 Judge Lauterpacht states
that a river cannot lawfully be blockaded except when all the
riparian states are cobelligerents against the blockading state, or
when they are all belligerents and the cobelligerents of the blockading state assent to the blockade. 70
Precedents cited to support these positions tend to antedate development of modern co1nmunications facilities and means for the
quick identification of vessels. These ne\V techniques can be employed
to facilitate free passage of vessels to and from the ports of nonparticipants. A mere apprehension of possible interference by naval
units of the blockader under such circumstances does not constitute
interference as a fact. It appears possible to blockade legally any
area when the appropriate steps are taken to insure free transit
between ports of nonparticipants.
The appearance of an international organ, such as the Security
Council of the United Nations as a blockading authority; or the
imposition of a blockade upon the recommendation of the Security
Council or the General Assembly; should alter radically the limitation that a naval blockade must not bar ingress to or egress from
the sea and air termini of nonparticipating states. Only states not
members of the United Nations \vould appear to be able to assert the
claim to noninterference to its full extent. Members of the Organization have impliedly \vaived such objections in Article 2(2)
and ( 5) of the Charter.
In the naval blockade of Korea this issue was not forced. The
area of blockade operations \Vas limited to avoid interference with
Soviet ports and also the Soviet-leased North Korean port of
Rashin. 71 How much commerce moved in and out of Rashin has not
been disclosed. I~ut with these significant limitations upon the area
blockaded and the deference sho\vn for Red Chinese and Soviet
freedom of transit bet\veen their respective ports, there was no legal
basis for Red Chinese and Soviet objections to the blockade.
Suggested Solution: Special Situation 7 A

Electra, as a vessel of a nonparticipant in the conflict between the
United States, Nueva and Autioka, or at least as a nonparticipant
in the particular confrontation, should be treated as a neutral in
69

Ibid., 141.

70

II Oppenheim, International Law, 771-772, (7th Ed., Lauterpacht 1952).
See Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 281 (1957), Fn.

71
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maritime blockade. It is important to recognize Scythia's neutral
status-and consequently the status o£ Electra-to maintain the
blockade as an interim measure with maximum economy in the
expenditure o£ values both by the United States and by other states
affected by our naval action. Little could be gained by treating
Electra as an enemy vessel and much could be lost by accelerating
the dispute bet,veen Scythia and NATO to which United States
is a party.
The Captain o£ Buchanan should repeat his special notice o£ the
blockade to Electra allo,ving the maximum time possible for the
master to consult his superiors by radio before bringing Electra to.
I£ Electra then continues upon her course, she must be brought to by
force i£ force is necessary. Elect1;a must then be visited and searched.
I£ a search ·at sea proves impractical, she must be diverted to a port
where a thorough search can be accomplished. A diversion or seizure
of Electra should be avoided i£ this can be accomplished and the
blockade still be enforced.
The Captain o£ Buchanan may be able to persuade the master to
change course when it becomes evident Electra will be seized i£ she
attempts to run the blockade. A failure to seize Electra under such
circumstances would provide an argument for all nonparticipants
that the blockade has been raised.
Although Electra probably is owned by Scythia, she is not a warship to be granted a privilege to pass in the discretion o£ the blockade
commander. There is no indication the vessel is in distress or engaged
in a humanitarian mission. I£ Scythia desires to claim immunity o£
Electra from condemnation as a state-owned vessel, this point can
be raised and tested i£ she is seized and the United States institutes
condemnation proceedings.
The Captain o£ Buchanan has orders that no cargo will pass in
ingress except food and medical supplies. No cargo will be permitted
to pass in egress. He is expected by his superiors to execute his
orders with deference to the maintenance o£ minimum public order
and with a minimum destruction o£ values consistent with accomplishment o£ his mission.

C. CONTRABAND
Special Situation 7 B

The Organ o£ Consultation o£ the Organization o£ American
States, considering the case o£ the United States placed before it
as described in General )Situation 7, determines Nueva has made an
unprovoked attack upon the United States. This attack the Organ
characterizes as "aggression~' under Article 9 (a) o£ the Rio Pact.
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It agrees upon the use of armed force against Nueva and against
N uevan forces in Antioka. The use of armed force is to include
participation by members of the Organization in the naval blockade
established by the United States. Contraband regulations are to be
enforced upon the high seas by naval units of the Organization.
You have been assigned to assist the Advisory Defense Committee
in developing contraband instructions to be issued to naval forces
of participating states. These instructions are to secure uniform
enforcement of contraband regulations and to relate effectively
contraband enforcement measures to the blockade.
The Advisory Defense Committee has received a letter from the
Secretary of Defense of the Antiokan government in exile recommending food and medical supplies be placed upon the contraband
list. Review the principles of contraband and formulate your recommendation to the Advisory Defense Committee whether a contraband
· list is necessary and, if so, whether food and medical supplies should
be listed as contraband.
Discussion: Special Situation 7 B

The history of contraband reveals a constant increase in the eco-~
nomic requirements for 'var and a consistent readiness of belligerents
to interdict transport of all resources useful to their adversaries in
warfare. Items listed as contraband and the techniques developed
for enforcing contraband regulations have been products of rough
and ready compromises bet,veen belligerents and neutrals. Belligerents, usually, have enjoyed both the initiative and bargaining
power as these compromises were achieved. Although the initiative
will remain with the belligerent, the bargaining power of the belligerent may vary 'vith the conflict situation.

Contraband Principles in Declaration of London
A "peacetime" consensus among major maritime nations concerning contraband was developed at the London Naval Conference
of 1908 and expressed in the Declaration of London, 1909. This
unratified Declaration has been described previously in this Chapter.
Many of the basic contraband principles expressed in the Declaration
were heavily eroded by the pressures of two global conflicts. However, some may still be applicable in limited wars.
The Declaration continued a distinction between "absolute contraband" and "conditional contraband," a distinction rooted in the~
writing of Hugo Grotius and the Treaty of Whitehall (1661)
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between England and S·weden. 72 The Declaration also introduced a
list of "Free" goods.
Both categories of contraband ·were limited to goods destined :for
the enemy. The potential use of the goods defined the category.
Absolute contraband included iten1s exclusively for ·war use. 73 Conditional contraband included items susceptible to use in warfare
but not exclusively for ·war use. 74 Food, money and fuel, for example, were listed as conditional contraband.
A belligerent \vas pern1itted additions to either the absolute or
conditional contraband lists by notification to neutrals. However, a
belligerent was limited by the use classification-that is, only items
by nature exclusively for \var use could be added to the absolute
contraband list. 75 A list of free . goods further reduced the scope of
belligerent action.
The "Free List" \vas stated in two Articles of the Declaration.
Article 28 listed principally ra\v materials and machinery used at
the time for civilian end-products. Article 29 covered medical and
hospital supplies for the care of the sick and wounded and articles
and materials used on board the vessel. A belligerent could not place
items from the fr,ee list on either the absolute or conditional contraband lists. Hospital ships and supplies aboard them \Vere not
mentioned in the Declaration because covered by Hague Convention
VIII (1907).
The distinction maintained in the Declaration between absolute
and conditional contraband \vas the basis for differing treatments of
the categories in applying the "ultimate destination" doctrine. The
burden of proof resting upon the belligerent also differed.
I:f goods on an intercepted vessel were absolute contraband, the
goods could be "captured" (seized) 76 if destined for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or if destined for enemy forces. 77
The goods could be seized although transshipment was to be through
neutral territory.
The early history of contraband is developed in detail in Pyke, The Law of
Contraband of War, 29-54 (1915). Shorter accounts may be found in Naval
1Var College, International Law Situations, 1933, 2-5 and Colombos, The Inter72

national Law of the Sea, 541-546, (3d Ed., 1954).
73 See Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, 59 (Art. 22).
74 Ibid., 63 (Art. 24).
7 5 Ibid., 61 (Art. 23) ; 67 (Art. 25).
76 The French version of the Declaration uses "saisissables." As pointed out
by Smith, "capture" is inaccurate in this context because title does not pass
until condemnation. See Smith, The Law and Custom of The Sea, 126 (3d Ed.,
1959)
77
Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, 75, Fn. 2, (Art. 30).
0
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The ultimate destination doctrine was rejected :for conditional
contraband unless goods 'vere shipped to a landlocked enemy. 78
Unless :for a landlocked enemy, the goods could not be seized i:£ to be
discharged at a neutral port. The requirement o:£ enemy destination
as a basis :for seizure was retained.
Conditional contraband, not to be discharged at a neutral port,
could be seized i:£ :for the use o:£ the enemy armed :forces. I:£ not to
be discharged at a neutral port, the goods could be seized i:£ :for the
use o:£ an enemy government department and also :for 'var use,
except for bullion, gold and silver coin and paper money :for which
no special use had to be shown. 79
As to both absolute and conditional contraband, the ship's papers
were conclusive proof o:£ her voyage, absent an unexplained deviation :from her route. 80 Since the burden o:£ proof o:£ ultimate destination (:for absolute contraband) or the specific enemy destination (:for
conditional contraband) rested upon the belligerent, the evidential
weight. ascribed by the Declaration to ship's papers created a substantial obstacle to seizures and condemnations.
For absolute contraband, the belligerent had the benefit o:£ a
conclusive presumption o:£ ultimate hostile destinP~tion i:£ the goods
were documented to be discharged at an enemy port, i:£ the vessel
was to call at enemy ports only, or i:£ the vessel was to touch at an
enemy port or join enemy :forces before touching a neutral port. 81
Although the belligerent might prove hostile destination without
the benefit o:£ these presumptions, this would be difficult without a
highly effective system o:£ economic intelligence producing information of a nature which could be disclosed in judicial proceedings.
For conditional contraband, a rebuttable presumption could be
raised in two situations that the goods 'vere destined :for the enemy
armed :forces or an enemy governmental department. 82 I:£ the consignment was addressed to enemy authorities or to a merchant
established in an enemy country and known to supply the enemy, a
presumption o:£ the specific hostile destination 'vas raised-probably
that the use was either :for the armed :forces or an enemy governmental department. I:£ the consignment 'vas addressed to an enemy
fortified place or some other base for his armed forces, the presumption apparently was that the goods 'vere :for use o:£ the armed :forces.
Unless these presumptions were raised the destination was pre78 Ibid., 85 (Art. 35). Specific use of the armed forces or a governmental
department of the landlocked enemy was necessary for seizure.
79 Ibid., 79 (Art. 33); 65 (Art. 24(4) ).
so Ibid., 77 (Art. 32) ; 85 (Art. 35) .
st Ibid., 75 (Art. 31).
82 Ibid., 83 (Art. 34).
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sumed innocent. As \vith absolute contraband, the belligerent might
produce other evidence to rebut the presumption o£ innocence.
Except for conditional contraband documented to be unladen at
a neutral port \Vhen not for the use o£ the armed forces or a governmental department o£ a landlocked enemy, either conditional or
absolute contraband could be seized on the high seas or in the territorial \Vaters o£ belligerents at any point in the voyage o£ the
transporting vessel. 83 The vessel might or might not be seized.
I£ the contraband cargo, by value, \Veight, volume and freight, was
hal£ or less o£ the cargo, the vessel might not be seized i£ the master
\vas ready to deliver the contraband to the belligerent ship. 84 Circumstances might preclude this delivery. I£ the contraband could
not be destroyed under the supervision o£ the belligerent, the vessel
would be seized but not ultimately condemned.
Apart from the rule based upon the proportion o£ contraband
to the whole cargo, \-vhether a seized vessel \Vas condemned depended
upon her kno\vledge o£ the state o£ hostilities and the contraband
declaration. 85 A . vessel \vas deemed a \vare o£ hostilities i£ she left
an enemy port after hostilities opened. She was also deemed a ware
of a state o£ war or a contraband declaration i£ she left a neutral
port a sufficient time after notification o£ hostilities or o£ a contraband declaration to the port power.
I£ the vessel was ignorant o£ hostilities and the contraband
declaration, the contraband could be preempted but not confiscated. 88
The vessel and noncontraband cargo were not condemned. The rule
permitting delivery o£ small amounts o£ cargo \vithout seizure o£
the vessel applied to these vessels as \veil as to vessels kno,ving o£
hostilities.
There was no permanent "contamination'~ o£ a vessel due to
previous carriages o£ contraband. 87 Such a vessel could not be seized
after its contraband had been discharged. Ho\vever, contraband
carried on a vessel infected noncontraband under the same ownership, rendering the noncontraband subject to condemnation. 88
Prior to the Declaration o£ London, major disputes between belligerents and neutrals tended to focus upon two issues. The first
concerned items which should be listed as contraband and items
which should not be listed. The second concerned treatment of goods
p

sa Ibid.,
Ibid.,
85 Ibid.,
8 6 Ibid.,
87 Ibid.,
88 Ibid.,
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89 (Art. 37).
89 (Art. 40).
93 (Art. 43).
The Declaration states "not
89 (Art. 38).
93 (Art. 42).

* * * condemned

except with indemnity."
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and transporting vessels in \vhich the goods \vere shipped to neutral
territory. On so1ne points belligerents and neutrals agreed.
Contraband enforcement \vas understood as a belligerent act, an
act of war in the sense of \varfare in its 19th and early 20th century
forms. Without belligerency there \Vas no contraband. 89
There ·was agreement that contraband related to property owned
by neutrals. A different regime applied to enemy property at sea.90
How O\vnership should be determined \Vas disputed.
All agreed \veapons and military equipment should be contraband.
Beyond this there was dissent. As stated by \Vheaton in 1815: 91
The almost unanimous authority of elementary writers, of
the ordinances of belligerent po,vers, and of treaties, agrees to
enumerate among these * * * /contraband of war/ * * * all
\varlike instruinents, or materials by their O\vn nature fit to be
used in \var. But beyond this enumeration, there is some difficulty
in reconciling the different authorities, \vhich are extremely
discordant and at variance \Vith reason and justice. * * *
All agreed that in proper cases contraband could be intercepted
on the high seas and both contraband and the vessel carrying it
could be seized. The belligerent \vas conceded to have the initiative
in this matter since the belligerent could establish contraband lists.
The t\vo World Wars reinforced basic understandings antedating
the Declaration of London. But these \vars also indicated the contraband listings in the Declaration could not remain firm nor could a
distinction in practice be made between absolute and conditional
contraband in modern general military conflict.

World Wars I and I I and the Declaration of London:
0 ontraband Features
As previously described in this Chapter,92 contraband principles
and procedures of the Declaration of London \Vere applied in limited
conflicts prior to World War I. But World Wars I and II revealed
the irrelevance to modern general n1ilitary conflict of some of the
postulates of the Declaration and the inadequacy of the contraband
procedures deemed appropriate by the 1908 Conference.
The two global conflicts demonstrated unequivocally the range of
resources and diversity of goods required to support modern general
89 See Le Conde de Thomar, I Pistoye and Duverdy, Traite des Prises Jiarit iln es, 390 (1855). Discussed in Chapter IV, B., Sitmation 6.
90 Contraband can relate to enemy property. For example, under Art. 2 of the
Declaration of Paris the neutral flag covers enemy goods except contraband
of war.
91 'Vheaton, The Law of Maritinw Captures and Prizes, 175 (1815).
92 See subdivision A (1), supra., 653-662.
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military operations. Demonstrated also was the high degree of
governmental control required over the internal economy of a
combatant state to permit its resources to be fully mobilized. New
resources required for ·war rendered the contraband lists of the
Declaration useless. N e\v controls by combatant governments over
private resources needed for war revealed as totally anachronistic
the features of proof thought important by the London Conference
for the hostile destination of conditional contraband.
The institutions for 1nodern contraband control \Vere developed
by the Allies in 1Vorld War I. The same institutions w~re used in
World War II, although in this second global conflict, contraband
control measures \Vere refined and more comprehensively and ruthlessly applied than in the first.
In 1916, the Allies abandoned the Declaration of London as a
legal guideline in economic 'varfare. 93 Article 40 concerning the
proportion contraband must bear to the total cargo to permit condemnation of the vessel 'vas expressly retained. With the relics of
the Declaration thus put to rest, and their memory scarcely honored
by mention during World War II,9 4 the Allies turned to economic
warfare as a secondary policy device in its modern form in general
war.
In both wars, suspected vessels \Vere diverted to contraband
control stations :for examination. Their papers and cargo were there
carefully examined, use being made of the extensive intelligence
often available. In England, these examiners were under close administrative control. A Contraband Committee in London, during
World War II an interdepartmental co1nmittee of the Ministry of
Economic Warfare, determined which cargoes and vessels should
be released and which should be placed in custody of the Marshal of
the Prize Court.
Developments in sea warfare-surface, subsurface and air-discouraged traditional visit and searches at sea except in areas remote
from intensive combat operations. Unacceptable hazards \Yere posed
by exposure of the belligerent vessel and the vessel visited to submarine or air attack.
Naval forces \Vere required to protect commerce, support troop
movements and cover landing operations. Strict economy had to be
practiced in deploying Allied naval units for control of possibly
hostile sea traffic. German naval strength \vas devoted to interdicting sea commerce by destruction. This, coupled with destruction
93

Order-in-Council, 7 July 1916, 110 Brit. & F. St. P., 236 (1916).
See Pari. Papers, Japan No.1 j1940j (Asama Jlaru); The Sidi Ifni, j1945J
L1.P.C. (2d) 200, 204, Ann. Digest (1943-45), 549, 552, Case No. 197.
94
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of commerce in Allied operational zones in European waters and the
Mediterranean, eliminated much commerce which Allied naval units
might otherwise have been called upon to divert. 95
The amount and diversity o£ cargo on an average freighter, many
times the tonnage o£ small craft involved in the Napoleonic war
cases of Lord Stowell, rendered sea examinations o£ cargo perfunctory and useless in any event. Documentation o£ the cargo could be
misleading. Business subterfuges £or carrying contraband were
familiar in World War I and increased in sophistication and generality o£ use in World War II. The papers o£ a ship could not be
relied upon to indicate her destination.
Information needed to determine the necessity £or seizure o£ ships
and cargoes was obtained £rom sources other than the ships themselves. This information could not be communicated in meaningful
form to naval officers enforcing contraband regulations at sea.
Land transportation improvements in neutral territory adjacent
to that o£ the adversary significantly complicated interrupting the
flow of the adversary's supplies. The problem was complicated
enough during World War I due to the improved rail transportation
in Europe. After the £all o£ France in 1940 and Italy's entrance into
the war as an Axis partner, German hegemony on the continent
reduced the effectiveness o£ naval operations as the primary instrument to interrupt commerce. At the same time elimination o£ many
"adjacent" neutrals somewhat simplified and encouraged centralization o£ nonnaval administrative controls over contraband.
The reach o£ these highly centralized administrative institutions
was extended to the source £rom which contraband was derived.
Naval units were relegated to the mundane tasks o£ enforcing
diversions o£ ships to contraband control points.
During World War II, aircraft were brought within the British
Prize Act and could be diverted. 96 Aircraft as well as surface craft
could be used to force diversions. But even this form o£ naval activity
in economic warfare gradually diminished as the war progressed. 97
N avicerting

The inconvenience to neutrals of diversions during both wars was
reduced by navicerting. N avicerting began in 1916, but was not used
95 See Fitzmaurice, "Some Aspects of Modern Contraband Controls and the
Law of Prize," 22 Brit. Y. B. Int. L., 73, 74, Fn. 3 (1945).
oo 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 65 (1939).
~7 Diversions upon reasonable suspicion were sustained by the Prize Courts.
E.g., The Mim (1947), 115. And see Discussion: Special Situation 7 0, infra.,
788-824.
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extensively in World War I. 98 During World War II, until the fall
of France in 1940, the .LL\..llies used a "voluntary" form of navicerting.
In order to avoid extended detentions of vessels diverted to
contraband control ports or voluntarily entering, the British first
experimented with "holdback" guarantees. The ship was allowed to
proceed to a neutral port after giving a guarantee not to deliver
goods being considered by the Contraband Committee to the consignee and to return these goods to an Allied port if the Contraband
Committee decided on seizure.
There were complications to this arrangement. If the Committee
directed return of the goods, they might subsequently be released
by the Prize Court after having been exposed unnecessarily to wartime sea transit. An even greater difficulty was the unwillingness of
neutral port authorities to release the goods for return. The local
export licensing system or other devices might be used to block the
goods. The holdback guarantee system was a concession to neutral
shippers which tended to weaken contraband control.
By the navicert system commenced in December 1939 (the "voluntary" system) two basic navicert forms were issued, Ship Navicerts
and Cargo Navicerts. The master of the ship or his agent could
obtain a ship navicert if the entire cargo was navicerted. There were
variations in cargo navicerts.
A "Z" navicert, used only under the voluntary system, was issued
by the British or French representative in the country in which
the application was sought on his own responsibility. Referred List
N avicerts could be issued only after instructions from the Ministry
of Economic Warfare. The Referred List covered major items of
contraband normally exported by the neutral country concerned. 99
If a ship sailed 'vith a ship navicert, she usually would be cleared
at sea by British or French patrols by identification and without
diversion. If a ship sailed without a ship navicert, but with fully
navicerted cargo, she might be cleared at sea only if circumstances
permitted a visit and she had no mail or passengers. Otherwise, she
would be diverted to a contraband control base. Seldom would she

98 See Ritchie, The Navicert System During the World War (1938). Navicerting is a refinement of the older technique of "ship's passes" mentioned in the
Reprisals Order-in-Council, 1915, to be received by vessels diverted from
German to neutral ports. A good brief description of World War I contraband
control methods can be found in Ritchie, 1-4 and in Salter, Allied Shipping
Controls, 98-116 (1921).
99 "Mewcerts" were briefly issued for cargo coming from Egypt without
references to the Ministry of Econornic Warfare. These were discontinued in
January 1940.
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be detained at the base for a long period unless some of her cargo
na vicerts had been revoked or destination of the cargo was suspect.
Neither the ship navicert nor the cargo navicerts 'vere guarantees
against interception or seizure. Spot interceptions and diversions
were required to check clandestine carriage of contraband in
navicerted ships. A neutral destination might become hostile. A
delay might occur bet,veen the time the navicert issued and the
shipment, additional facts coming to the attention of the belligerent
in the mean time.
But possession of ship and cargo navicerts was a great convenience
to merchants. Shipo,vners, desiring ship navicerts, refused to carry
unnavicerted cargo. o,vners of navicerted cargo would not employ
a ship 'vhich could not obtain a ship navicert.
The voluntary system was first used between the United States and
certain neutral European countries and thereafter extended to other
neutrals. In the summer of 1940, it was used by practically all
shippers not engaged in carrying· contraband.
While the voluntary system had been supplemented by over sixty
agreements with neutral companies-shipping companies, importers
and exporters-in which these companies agreed to use the navicert
system when available, to refrain from buying from or selling to
the enemy, to obtain guarantees of neutral consumption from purchasers, and to undertake similar projects supporting the economic
warfare program, it 'vas decided by the British in 1940 to extend
the navicert system and place it on a semicompulsory basis.
This was done by a "Reprisals" Order-in -Council on 31 July
1940. 100 Both Ship and Cargo N avicerts were issued. By the terms
of the Order an unnavicerted ship or cargo was subject to seizure.
A rebuttable presumption was raised that the ship or cargo, as the
case might be, had a hostile destination.
Although vessels and cargoes 'vere seized for the absence of
navicerts, in no case 'vas a vessel or cargo condemned solely on the
strength of the rebuttable presumption of enemy destination. If
the Court condemned the vessel or cargo, other factors creating
suspicion were always present. 101
1oo S. R. & 0., 1940, No. 1436.
1o1 The Monte Contes, /1943/ A.C. 6; The Sidi Ifni, j1945/ L1.P.C. (2d) 200,
Ann. Dig. (1944--45), 549, Case No. 197. In The Ole Wegger, Ann. Dig. (1943-

45) the German Prize Court held Norwegian whaling vessels in possession of
British ship warrants assisting and facilitating the military and economic
conduct of warfare by the British and thus guilty of "unneutral service." On
the issues presented in "unneutral service" see II Oppenheim, International
Law, 831-846 (7th Ed., 1952) ; Colonlbos, International Law of the Sea, 564576 (3d Ed., 1954) ; Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea, 131-137 (3d Ed.,
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Coupled with the semicompulsory navicert system was a system
o£ "Ship Warrants" supplying a sanction £or navicerting. A ship
warrant, issued to the owner o£ a neutral ship, guaranteed the ship
access to British controlled shipping facilities. These included
bunkers, stores, dry docking, insurance and credit.
In return, the owner agreed to comply with economic warfare
regulations, including a commitment not to sail to or £rom navicert
areas without a ship navicert. Effectiveness o£ the ship warrant as a
sanction was diminished by British inability to control resort by
shipowners to other sources £or services as £or example bunkering
facilities and credit controlled by the United States and other
neutrals. The sanction was strengthened when the United States
entered the war.
The ship warrant system functioned properly only when combined with navicerting. For this reason it was not particularly
effective in the Pacific before Japanese entry into the war, there
being no adequate administrative machinery in the Pacific area £or
navicerting ships and cargoes.
After United States entry into World War II, the British continued control o£ the navicert system. The United States, in lieu
o£ navicerts, licensed its own exports. Imperial Export Licensing

1959). The Declaration of London, 1909, contained provisions on "unneutral
service" in Articles 45-47.
Legal problems in "unneutral service" tend to be peripheral to the conduct
of economic warfare, yet are sometimes involved directly, as in Captain Wilke's
interception of Trent, discussed in Chapter I. Personnel instructed to engage
in economic warfare were removed from Trent.
A vessel or aircraft may "assume enemy character," that is, operate under,
de facto enemy control. Assumption of enemy character is considered in Special
Situation 7 D, infra. A vessel or aircraft may also give "unneutral assistance"
to the enemy. This may become a significant economic warfare problem in largescale carriages of contraband or enemy property. The unneutral activity may
be a minor featur~ in the entire voyage or flight. The latter is often described
as "unneu tral service."
The consequences of "unneutral service" may vary from a warning to seizure
of the vessel or aircraft and confiscation to the cargo. Factors considered in
evaluation "unneutral service" are: (1) The degree to which the unneutral
conduct is likely to enhance the military capabilities of the enemy. (2) The
nature of the contraband goods, the character and status of prohibited passengers, and the nature and volume of prohibited information collected and
transmitted. (3) The degree to which the vessel or aircraft apparently is subject to enemy control. ( 4) The proportion which the unneutral activity bears
to the total activity on the voyage or flight of the unit. ( 5) The extent to
which the unneutral conduct apparently is known to the owners and operators
of the unit.
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in Commonwealth countries was accepted as equivalent to cargo navicerting for the issue of ship na vicerts. 102
Although British semicompulsory navicerting was initiated by
a Reprisals Order-in -Council, its basic feature was nothing more
than a play on the older technique of ship's passes. If the belligerent
could seize contraband, certainly the belligerent could waive this
right in its discretion by issuing navicerts. The burden of proof
feature, as one writer aptly commented/03 is simply a matter of
municipal prize court procedure. So long as neutrals have adequate
notice of the change, and a hearing is afforded, the burden of proof
should be in the discretion of local authorities. Placing the burden
on the claimant, during periods when many seizures are made, is
simple administrative common sense.
The navicert order of 1940 may have been framed as a reprisal
to apply it to goods not subject to seizure as contraband or enemy
property. The expansion of contraband lists, ho,vever, had left
little property in either category.
An extension of contraband controls to property not subject to
seizure may have an inherent virtue of administrative convenience.
Nevertheless, a Board of Economic Warfare should not dissipate its
energies by denying navicerts to innocent trade when time could be
expended 'vith greater advantage in interdicting trade of interest to
the enemy. The injured owner of an innocent cargo or ship during
World War II had little redress in any event other than recovery of
his property seized under the Reprisals order. There were no damages
for wrongful seizure or diversion. 104

Expansion of Contraband Lists
Practice in the two world wars preserved in all essentials the
basic features of contraband. Contraband goods must be of a nature
which will in some way further the enemy war efforts. The goods
must also have a hostile destination.
However, the Declaration of London contraband lists 'vere quickly
abandoned by the Allies and Central Powers in World War I. New
lists ultimately included virtually all goods of possible use in war

102 A comprehensive account of World War II navicerting procedures is to be
found in I l\ledlicott, The Economic Blockade, 94-105, 343-350, 436-448 (1952) ;
II Medlicott, The Ecmwrnic Blockade, 153-159, 420-427 (1959).
1o3 Rowson, "Prize Law During the Second World War," 24 Brit. Y.B. Int. L.,
160, 196-197 (1947).
101 See Fitzmaurice, "Some Aspects of :Modern Contraband Control and the
Law of Prize," 22 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 73, 88-89 (1945).
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except medical and hospital supplies, luxury items in a limited
category and supplies used on board shi p. 105
England and France commenced World War II with a short
contraband list, issued in 1939 and based on the United States 1917
Naval Instructions for l\faritime vVarfare. This list contained four
categories of absolute contraband: (1) arms, ammunition, explosives and chemicals; (2) fuel and means of transportation; (3)
means of communication; and ( 4) coin, bullion, currency and
evidences of debt. Food, foodstuffs and clothing were conditional
contraband. 106
Some of the combatants in World War II continued detailed lists
-but all ultimately had lists as broad or broader in coverage than
those in World vVar I. This expansion of contraband was a highly
conventional and legally unassailable reaction to the all embracing
economic demands of modern \\,.ar.
As the contraband lists were expanded, certain earlier problems
which vexed merchants and publicists began to disappear. One was
the doctrine of infection, covered by Article 42 of the Declaration of
London and much discussed by prize courts and writers in the 18th
and 19th centuries. All of the cargo of the owner on board ship was
likely to be contraband. Thus there was nothing to infect-all of it
suffering the same malady.
The second and third provisions of the Declaration of Paris, 1856,
became obsolete. Contraband goods \vere excepted from the immunity
granted enemy goods under a neutral flag and neutral goods under
an enemy flag-yet most goods were contraband under modern lists.
The special enemy destination, expressed in Article 25 of the
Declaration of London as a condition for seizure and condemnation
of conditional contraband, \vas eliminated as a contraband feature
by judicial recognition of governmental economic controls. With
elimination of special enemy destination for seizure and condemnation of conditional contraband; and extension also of the ultimate
destination principle to conditional contraband-discussed in Special
Situation 7 0/ the importance of distinguishing between contraband
categories diminished.
During World War I, Sir Samuel Evans, in The Kim/ 07 recognized a presumption that all conditional contraband with a hostile
destination was either for enemy military forces or for the government of the adversary for 'var use. This presumption was based

See Naval War College, International Law Doouments,
VII Hackworth, Digest, 24-26 (1943).
107 j1915j, 215, 280-282.

1 05

106

1944-45, 34-42.
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upon the control exercised by combatants over private property for
war ends by requisitioning and other devices.
The feature of increasing governmental control over its internal
economy for war purposes and the relation of this feature to
contraband control had been observed during theN apoleonic wars.108
These facts of wartime governmental control were regularly relied
upon by the German Prize Courts. 109 The presumption was continued in prize proceedings in World War II; no and has been
stressed in recent prize cases. 111
Despite changes in presumptions concerning the special enemy
destination of conditional contraband, thereby shifting to the claimant the burden of showing an inoffensive destination, there still may
be reason for a tenuous distinction between the categories. There
is a suggestion, for example, in British prize practice during World
War II, that a distinction may be made if property is shipped before
hostilities commence. If the contraband is conditional, a mere
diversion of the goods before seizure may save them from condemnation.112 But if the contraband is absolute, not only a diversion of
the cargo but adandonment of the original intention of hostile
destination by objective acts is required. 118
There is also propaganda value in a conditional contraband list
when items other than those solely of military application are to be
1os E.g., VII Moore, Digest, 676-677 ( 1906) (Hammond, British Minister to
Jefferson, Secretary of State, 1793) .
1 09 E.g., The lrfaria, 10 A.J.I.L., 927 (Imperial Supreme Prize Court, 1915);
See Richards, "Contraband," 3 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 1, 9-10, (1922-23).
110 The Alwaki, j1940j, 215, 218; The lrlonte Contes, j1944J A.C. 6; The Sidi
Ifni, j1945j L1.P.C. (2d) 200, Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 549, Case No. 197; The
Nailsea Court, Ann. Dig. (1946) (Conseil des Prises, 1946), 425, Case No. 182.
See Rowson, "Prize Law During the Second World War," 24 Brit. Y.B. Int. L.,
160, 189 (1947).
111 See The Fedala, Int. L. Rep. (1957), 992; and in Annual Digest (1949)
The Klipfontein (Case 210) ; The Bataan (Case 211) ; The Fra.nkisky (No. 1)
(Case 212); The Triport (Case 214) (all by Prize Court of Alexandria, Egypt).
112 The Glenroy (Cargo ex.) (No. 2), j1943j L1.P.C. (2d) 153. However, the
goods were condemned on appeal as tainted with enemy ownership under the
principle of The Anglo-lriexican, j1918j A.C. 422. See Part Cargo ex.M.V.
Glenroy, j1945j A.C. 124.
113 The Charles Racine, /1944/ Ll.P.C. (2d) 177. On appeal j1946J L1.P.C.
(2d) 215, Ann. Dig. (1946) 414, Case No. 179. See The Gabbiano, j1940J 166,
168 (absolute contraband-voluntary diversion). Cf. The Twee Ambt, j1920j,
413 (unexecuted intent of master to run for enemy port not basis for condemnation). A possible solution may be preemption of the goods-compensating
the owner. E.g., The Sorfareren, j1915j 1 B. and C.P.C. 580; The Selandia,
Ann. Dig. (1938--40), 571, Case No. 218 (South Africa, Supreme Prize Court,
1940).
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interdicted. Intercepting shipments o:f :food and clothing has stimulated much antagonism among neutrals in the past. The :food or
clothing supply o:f a neutral may be constricted; producers or
vendors of :food in neutral :food exporting states may be injured;
the civilian population o:f the enemy may be starved or frozen to
the dismay o:f neutral beholders. Placing :food and clothing on a
conditional contraband list suggests the belligerent is sensitive to
humanitarian dictates even though in practice :food is treated as
absolute contraband.

Food as Contraband
The general population growth, coupled in many areas with
natural limits upon agricultural production by current methods, will
make belligerent operations against an adversary~s :food supply
probable features o:f future general and limited wars.
These operations may involve the use o:f chemical or biological
we a pons against plants or domestic animals. 114 The use o:f rice blast
against the Japanese crop was considered in World War II but
rej ected. 115 Chemical agents have been used against insurgent :food
crops in South Vietnam.
_
Operations can also be expected against the food supply of an
adversary by interdicting its transportation, a1though the circumstances o:f a particular conflict, such as that de-s cribed in General
Situation 7 may make interdiction o:f :food transport undesirable.
The British philosophy during World War II was summed up by
Sir Winston Churchill : 116
* * * Let Hitler bea.r his responsibilities to the full, and let
the people of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every
way the coming of the day when that yoke will be broken.
~feanwhile, we can, and we will, arrange in advance :for the
speedy entry o:f food into any part of the enslaT"ed area when
this part has been wholly cleared of German forces and has
genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our best to encourage the building up o:f reserves o:f food all over the -world
so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the
peoples of Europe-including-! say it deliberately- the German and ~~ustrian peoples, the c-ertainty that the shattering of
114

See Rothschild, Tomorro-w's W ea pons, 121-131 (1964) for toxins useful in
antifood warfare . .As to legal problems, see :Xeinast, "united States use of
Biological Warfare" 2-± Jiil. L. Rev., 1 (196-± ) ; Brungs, "The Status of Biological Warfare in International Law," 2-± Jiil. L. Re?;., -±7 (1964) .
11 5 Leahy, I Was There, 439---±40 (1950) .
116
See I ~fedlicott, Tlz e Economic Blockad e, 666, A.pp. II (1952 ) (Churchill
statement on Relief to House of Commons, 20 A.ugust 19-±0).
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the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom
and peace.
Interdicting the enemy food supply will weaken his labor force.
Automation may offset this to a degree but is unlikely to develop
as effective defense. Hardships suffered on the home front directly
affect the morale of troops. This can be reduced to a degree but not
precluded by censorship.
Denials of food can influence the deployment of enemy troops.
This was clearly demonstrated during World War I. During World
War I, the German government abysmally mismanaged its food
resources. It failed to prevent "holdbacks" by local producers, withdrew excessive agricultural labor for the armed forces, failed to build
up a sufficient stockpile of chemical fertilizers, and diverted an
exorbitant amount of food into military supply channels.
By 1915, Germany had been brought internally to the brink of
chaos by Allied contraband controls. \Vhen Romania entered the war
in 1916, Germany was thus forced to invade that country promptly
to secure the Romanian wheat supply. Even so, she almost collapsed
during the winter of 1916-17.
Sir Arthur Salter states: 117
* * * In "\vhat precise proportions privations at home and
defeat in the field contributed to the acceptance of the Armistice
cannot be stated. But the blockade may justly claim to have
shortened if not to have 'von the war. It succeeded at the moment
when the counterblockade by submarine had just definitely
failed. * * *
Nazi Germany profited by the earlier experience. Although in
1938 she was estimated to have food stocks on hand for only a few
months of hostilities, by April 1939 she had stockpiled approximately
a year of her "peacetime" needs.
Germany was then importing about 11% of her annual calory
requirements. It 'vas possible she could overrun other sources of
supply, as in fact she did. This 'vould reduce the additional imports
of food required to sustain the country on a war level.
During the early months of World War II, adjacent neutrals,
even major food producers, such as IIolland, Denmark and Belgium,
were importing food much in excess of their probable consumption.
While contraband controls upon food and other supplies were
enforced by the Allies, the problem 'vas also attacked by War
Trade Agreements 'vith the Northern Neutrals, Belgium, Holland
and S,vitzerland. These countries could be persuaded to control
their exports to Germany to some extent in return for British and
117

Salter, Allied Shipping Control, 102 (1921).
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French liberalization of contraband controls and their export control policies. These agreements were compromises and the flow of
foodstuffs and other commodities to the enemy did not stop.
After the fall of France, and elimination of many of the neutrals,
agitation increased for liberalization of the contraband policy to
permit food and clothing to reach these "captured" populations.
President Hoover has stated the cause for relief of the victims of
Nazi aggression quite ably. 118 The reasons for opposition to relief
of those engaged in economic warfare have been expressed with equal
force. 119
A Commission for Polish Relief had been organized in the United
States in September 1939 and permits were obtained from the
Chamberlain government for relief shipments of food. Relief \vas also
sent to Finland during the Russo-Finnish War. But when Churchill
became Prime ~1inister, exceptions for food shipments ceased.
In November 1940, the National Committee on Food for the Small
Democracies \vas created with Hoover as Honorary Chairman.
Around this Committee developed much of the pressure for relaxation of contraband regulations to permit aid to the occupied countries and also to unoccupied Vichy France.
This pressure, although ineffectual in achieving its aim, embarrassed British blockading efforts at a critical war period. The
Ministry of Economic Warfare was placed on the defensive.
The British position \Vas that of the "man under the gun" who
resists any aid to his immediate adversary-direct or indirect. The
position of American relief agencies stemmed from genuine humanitarian impulse, although there \vere no doubt some minor political
ramifications and perhaps an element of profit motive as Professor
Medlicott discreetly suggests. 120
The important point \vhich the British difficulty demonstrated is
that the state interdicting food as contraband must anticipate
emotional reactions among neutrals. These reactions can jeopardize
the belligerent~s entire system of contraband control. This hazard
should be balanced against the advantages to the belligerent derived
from interdicting food.
That food currently can be declared contraband of war is no

us IV Hoover, An American Epic (The Guns Cease Killing and the Saving of
Life From Famine Begi.ns, 1939-1963), passim (1964).
119
See Gordon and Dangerfield, The Hidden Weapon, 132-137 ; I l\1edlicott,
The Economic Blockade, 549-584 ( 1952) ; II Medlicott, The Economic Blockade,
612-619 ( 1959) .
120
I Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 553, 554, 555 ( 1952).
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longer seriously contested. 121 So :far as its interdiction is concerned,
whether :food is conditional or absolute contraband today makes no
practical difference. Prize courts have regularly condemned :food
supplies even though listed as conditional contraband in view o:f
the requisitioning and other control practices o:f combatant governments.122
It is speculative whether Article 23 o:f the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection o:f Civilian Persons in Time o:f War 123
will affect significantly belligerent contraband :food operations.
Contracting parties are to allow :free passage o:f all essential :foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended :for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.
This obligation, however, is conditioned, :fatally it appears, upon
satisfaction o:f the party there is no serious ground :for :fearing: (a)
the consignments may be diverted :from their destination; or (b)
the control may not be effective; or (c) a definite advantage may
accrue to the military efforts or economy o:f the enemy through the
substitution o:f the consignments :for goods which would otherwise
be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release o:f
such material, services or :facilities as would otherwise be required :for
the production o:f such goods.
Furthermore, the Power allowing passage may make distribution
conditional upon supervision o:f the Protecting Power. It can also
prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is
allowed.
Medical and Hospital Supplies
Apart :from Article 29 o:f the Declaration o:f London, 1909, and
Article 23 o:f the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time o:f War,I 24 there is little guidance concerning the status o:f medical and hospital supplies as contraband. These
have not appeared on absolute or conditional contraband lists and
a practice is believed to exist to exclude them on humanitarian
grounds.
Article 29 o:f the Declaration o:f London permitted, i:f the military
121

Oppenheim states it is generally agreed that foodstuffs should not under
ordinary circumstances be declared contraband. He does not state what extraordinary circumstances are unless he has in mind food destined for the use of
the enemy army or navy. II Oppenheim, Internation.al Law, 805 (7th Ed.
Lauterpacht, 1952). See III Hyde, International Law, 2108-2123 (1947).
122 E.g., The Sidi Ifni, j1945/ L1.P.C. (2d) 200, Ann. Dig. (1944-45), 549,
Case No. 197.
1 23 6 U.S.T. 3516; TIAS 3365. See Naval War College, International Law
Documents, 1950-51, 175.
1 24 Ibid.
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situation was urgent, requisition of these supplies if destined to
territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to the armed
forces of the enemy. This is currently the international custom.
Provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of t he
Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, applicable to hospital ships, in relation
to blockades as previously discussed, should also apply to the enforcement of contraband regulations. 125 Individual shipments of
medical supplies to prisoners of war probably should be passed without seizure. 126
Article 23 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons provides for the free passage of medical and hospital stores intended for the civilians of another high contracting
party, including civilians of the adversary. But this passage is subjected to the identical conditions imposed upon the passage of
essential foodstuffs.

The Need for a Contraband List
The trend to shorten contraband lists in World War II, stating
general contraband categories rather than attempting encyclopedic
listings of specific items, worked adequately when coupled with an
efficient navicert system. The items considered contraband by the
belligerents seldom were placed in transit because no carrier could
be obtained for unnavicerted cargo.
The major function performed by the short list was guidance
to administrators issuing navicerts. The function of notice to shippers
who might unsuspectingly send their property to sea, and there
have it seized, was of secondary importance.
It was, of course, important to shippers to know that a program
of contraband control was in force. If a shipper applied for a
navicert and could not obtain it, he was on notice that his shipment
at least was suspect, although as noted previously, absence of a
navicert was never the sole ground of condemnation in a prize case. 12'7
See Fn. 56, supra; Naval War College, International Law Documents,
1950-51, 109.
126 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949,
Art. 72. (The provision is directed specifically to the Detaining Power but
might be applied to a third power enforcing contraband regulations against
the Detaining Power.) See Naval War College, International Law Documents,
1950-51, 140.
127 See Fn. 100, supra. In The klount Taurus, Ann. Dig. (1946), 427, Case
No. 183, the French Conseil des Prises indicated previous British denials of
navicerts to companies did not make all cargo shipped by those companies
suspect. (See In the Jfatter of Ten Registered Letters ex Eastbound Aircraft,
125
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Sir Daniel Somervell, Attorney General, is said to have suggested
during his argument in The Jurko Topic 128 that it was unnecessary
as a matter of law to publish contraband lists. He was taken to
task for this by Mr. Rowson because the consequences of carriage
of contraband might differ depending upon knowledge by the shipper
of the proclamation of contraband and the contents of the proclamation.129
During the American Civil War, the Union had no general contraband list other than the list issued by the Secretary of the Treasury
to the Collectors of Customs and by the Secretary of State to Consular Representatives covering trade with southern ports (Beaufort, Port Royal and New Orleans) permitted by Proclamation
in 1862.120 All trade was to be interdicted with other southern ports
by the blockade, although contraband controls were applied to
shipments through Mexico.
A proclamation that contraband goods will be interdicted seems
necessary, just as there must be notice of a blockade. Whether a
statement of the goods to be interdicted also is required should
depend upon several factors. If the goods interdicted are to be those
traditionally treated as absolute contraband, i.e., goods suitable only
for war use, there seems no purpose today in setting forth a list
other than to coordinate the activities of administrative and naval
personnel enforcing contraband regulations.
The more general the conflict, the greater the need there would
seem for a list because of the increasing range of contraband control activity. If navicerting is used generally, this should reduce
the need for a contraband list published generally for the benefit
of neutrals, although guidelines must be established for the administrative officers issuing navicerts.
Suggested Solution: Special Situation 7 B

The Advisory Defense Committee should prepare a contraband
list both for guidance of nonparticipants in the enforcement action
and for guidance of the nationally diverse American naval units
which will participate in enforcing the contraband regulations. No
navicerting scheme seems justified unless the action promises to be
Ann. Dig. (1949), 583, 585 (Bermuda, Supreme Court in Prize) where the

court discussed notice implied f:rom the mere setting up of censorship of
postal correspondence.)
1 2 8 j1941j L1.P.C. (2d) 89, Ann. Dig. (1941-42), 631, Case No. 178.
129 Rowson, "Prize Law During the Second World War," 24 Brit. Y.B. Int. L.,
160, 188, Fn. 9 (1947).
1 3° See Savage, Policy of the United States Towards Maritime Commerce in
War 1116-1911,, 446-449 (1934).
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of extended duration. Thus, a list seems vital for the guidance of
shippers and to reduce the burden upon intercepting naval units.
The items listed as contraband should be limited to those: ( 1)
immediately enhancing N uevan and Antiokan military po,ver; and
(2) reasonably discoverable by a search at sea. Diversions of vessels
for close examination should be minimized.
The industrial resources of Nueva and Antioka seem sparse. The
emphasis in contraband control should thus be upon manufactured
items such as weapons, uniforms, ammunition, communication equipment, and transportation which cannot be produced locally. In view
of the past history of conflict between the United States and Nueva,
biological and chemical munitions and means for their delivery
should be listed.
The suggestion of the Antiokan Minister of Defense-in-Exile to
include food, medical and hospital supplies on the contraband list
should be rejected. The list should be coordinated with the restrictions of the blockade 'vhich now excludes these items from coverage.
Placing food on the contraband list risks mobilizing opinion
against the Organization of American States. This might embarrass
further action by the Organization as well as any similar action
the Security Council might decide to take.
Denials of food will also injure the innocent populations of Nueva
and Antioka against 'v hom the action of the Organization is not
aimed. These people, no'v possibly uncommitted, may be prejudiced
in favor of the Salvaje regime by unduly harsh economic measures.
If denials of food later become necessary, both the contraband
program and the blockade can be expanded.
Medical and hospital supplies, in addition to their exclusion because of the exception permitting them to pass the blockade, should
not be placed on the contraband list because customarily excluded
for humanitarian reasons.

D. ULTIMATE DESTINATION (CONTINUOUS VOYAGE)BLOCI{ADE AND CONTRABAND APPLICATIONS:
CONSEQUENCES OF CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND
AND BREACH OF BLOCI{ADE
Special Situation 7 C
The Advisory Defense Committee of the Organization of American
States accepted your suggestions tendered as a result of your study
in Special Situation '7 B. This contraband list was prepared and
approved by the Organ of Consultation:
1. Arms of all kinds; ballistic and guided missiles and launching
equipment; ammunition, explosives, igniting devices; chemical, biological and nuclear munitions and devices for their use.
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2. Electrical and electronic equipment.
3. Transportation, armored and unarmored, sea, land and air.
4. Lubricants. Fuels adaptable :for military purposes without
:further processing.
5. Military clothing and equipment.
6. All manufactured components o:f and machinery :for the manufacture or processing o:f articles on this list.
Naval units o:f the Organization are to limit contraband enforcement to waters o:f the Western Hmnisphere. A :further extension o:f
enforcement activity may be made i:f required.
Surface sea traffic only will be intercepted. Submarines and aircraft will be intercepted by the blockading :force.
Vessels seized are to be diverted to the nearest convenient port o:f
a member o:f the Organization o:f American States at which a court
having jurisdiction in prize is sitting.
In the opinion o:f the Advisory Defense Committee, strict enforcement o:f contraband regulations will minimize blockade running
and will permit the blockade to be maintained by a :few surface units
with air support.
An OAS Economic Measures Command with United States naval
personnel attached, is established at Miami. Admiral Albuquerque
o:f Rio Oro, a member o:f the Organization o:f American States, is in
command. You are on his staff.
The Captain o:f U.S.S. Tattn.all has intercepted a Corinthian
:freighter, M.S. Truant, on the high seas within the Western Hemisphere bound :for Georgetown, Guyana. Her papers appear
in order. About lj8 o:f her total cargo consists o:f 20,000 waterproof
ponchos made o:f tan material ; 400 pounds o:f assorted red, brown,
green and yellow oil paints suitable :for camouflaging waterproof
cloth; and 2,000 16mm paint brushes suitable :for applying oil paint.
The ponchos, paint and brushes are consigned to Rochambeau et fils
o:f Georgetown by Vulcan Metals Company o:f Parnassus, Carinthia.
On an intelligence summary received by the Captain yesterday, he
noted Rochambeau et fils sold eight tons o:f canned rations and 6,000
jungle boots to Salvaje approximately two weeks before the blockade
mentioned in General Sit1tation 7 was established.
The Captain requests instructions whether he should divert
Truant or permit her to continue to Georgetown. Instruct him.
Discussion: Special Situation 7 C

Ultimate Destination ( 0 ontinuous Voyage) :
Background
The :foundation cases :for modern applications o:f "ultimate destina-
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tion" to carriages of contraband and breaches of blockade are The
Peterhof! 131 and 1'he Springbok, 132 both arising from Union economic warfare at sea during the American Civil War, and both
handed down by the United States Supreme Court on the same day.
The Bermuda, 133 another case in which continuous voyage principles
were discussed by the United States Supreme Court, also has been
frequently cited in later prize decisions.
As mentioned in the Discussion of Special Situation 7 A, the
Federal close blockade of Confederate ports was breached successfully by blockade runners. The Federals thus reinforced their close
blockade by seizures of neutral vessels during their voyages between
ports in Europe and neutral ports in the American area. It was not
always clear whether these seizures were for carrying contraband,
carrying enemy property, or for intended breach of blockade.
The Federal navy used a rudimentary blacklist of vessels engaged
in transporting goods intended for the Confederacy. The names of
firms and persons engaged in this trade also were generally known.
A ship carrying goods for the Confederacy might stop at a port
in neutral territory convenient to a Confederate destination, bunker
and refit if necessary, and then run the blockade. More often, the
cargo was transshipped and either run by another vessel through the
blockade or carried by land through ~fexico to Confederate territory.
Peterhof! was seized near St. Thomas in the West Indies on a
voyage from London to the mouth of the Rio Grande. Her cargo,
part of which seemed principally for military use, was documented
for Matamoras, Mexico. The cargo was to be lightered from the
mouth of the Rio Grande to Matamoras.
The Supreme Court held the mouth of the Rio Grande not
blockaded and Peterhof! not guilty of an attempted breach of blockade. The cargo, however, was condemned on evidence that part
of it was to be transshipped from Matamoras to Brownsville, Texas,
for Confederate use. While part of the route was by land, the contraband part of the cargo had a hostile destination. The remainder
of the cargo was condemned on a theory of infection since owned
by the owners of the contraband. 134
The same line of reasoning was applied to an attempted breach
of blockade in 1~he Springbok. Sprvngbok was seized en route from
72 U.S. ( 5 Wall. ) 28 ( 1866) .
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1 (1866).
1aa 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1865).
134 Frau Houwina, II Sirey 795 (1855)
(French Imperial Prize Court) was
not cited. The ultimate destination rule was there applied to saltpeter seized
on a neutral Hanoverian vessel bound from Lisbon to Hamburg, a notorious
point of transshipment to Russia.
131.

122
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London to Nassau. Her papers were in order. Her cargo was
packaged. Bills of lading were "to order or assigns" and disclosed
the contents of approximately one third of the packages on board.
Apart from eight swords and eleven bayonets, probably intended
for use in Nassau, contraband items were blankets, buttons, boots
and shoes.
Both Springbok and her cargo were condemned in the District
Court. Rather than taking evidence to acquit or condemn in the
first instance from the ship (her papers and testimony by her
officers), as was then customary in prize procedure, the United States
introduced evidence from The Gertrude 135 and The Stephen Hart. 136
Gertrude, seized while running the blockade, has been condemned
about a month previously. Stephen Hart was then before the District
Court. 137
On appeal, the Supreme Court restored Springbok under the rule
of The Bermuda 138 because there was no evidence Springbok intended
to breach blockade or that her owners had an interest in the carga
or knew its destination. But the entire cargo was condemned as
shipped by its owners with an intent to breach the blockade.
The Supreme Court gave weight to the fact the bills of lading were
silent both as to the owners and consignees of the property and
the contents of many of the packages. This silence was considered
suspicious since the cargo was shipped to a. notorious resort for
blockade runners.
A letter of instructions to the master, found on board, directed him
to report to an agent of the charterers in Nassau "who will give you
orders as to the delivery of your cargo." The property interest of
the owners in the cargo apparently was to remain unchanged in
Nassau. The contraband nature o£ part o£ the cargo was also thought
to indicate a probable hostile destination.
Then using evidence developed in Gertrude and Stephen Hart,
the Supreme Court confirmed its suspicions raised by evidence from
Springbok. Packaging and markings on cargo found on Gertrude
were similar to packaging and markings on cargo on Springbok.
A charterer of Springbok, and part owner of her cargo, also owned
Gertrude. Gertrude had been in Nassau at about the time Springbok
was due to arrive. Claimants to the cargo of Stephen Hart (arms
and ammunition) were also part owners of Springbok's cargo.
VII l\foore, Digest, 707n. (1906).
Ibid., 704. On appeal, The Hart, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 559 {1865).
137 Peterhofj, Springbok, Gertrude and Stephen Hart were all before Judge

135

138

Betts of the Southern District of New York.
1as 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1865).
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Brokers for the cargo on Stephen Hart were also brokers and
shippers of the cargo on Springbok.
Peterhoff and Springbok brought clearly into focus for the first
time that the continuous voyage of the vessel was not necessarily
the major offensive element in this phase of economic warfare.
Instead, the ultimate destination of the cargo was the matter of
principal concern. For enforcing contraband and blockade regulations, the cargo should be condemned even though it was transshipped.
Although the British government accepted ultimate destination
as applied in both Peterhoff and )~:pringbok, there was much criticism
of Springbok by English and continental publicists. These critics
objected to the concept of a blockade being breached other than by
the ship herself. They also objected to condemnation of the cargo
without some substantial suspicion first being raised by evidence
from the vessel. Nevertheless, the use in Springbok of evidence from
other ships provided an opening wedge for later general uses of
intelligence obtained from any sources. This intelligence was used
both for the initial seizure and for condemnation even though the
ship's papers and other evidence aboard suggested no enemy
destination.
Ultimate destination had been used in various naval contexts
long before Peterhoff, Springbok and related American Civil War
cases. Also, the basic technique had long been familiar in commercial and fiduciary law as tracing.
The term "continuous voyage" was used by Lord Stowell in 1805. 139
He then recognized the principle as long established.
Continuous voyage was applied by English courts to seizures under
the "Rule of 1756." 140 The doctrine was also applied to carriage of
contraband in the 18th century and to blockade in 1806.141 Features
of the principle can be traced to the early 17th century. 142 Peterhotf
139

The j faria, 6 C. Rob. 201 ( 1805).

England prohibited trade by neutrals between her adversaries (France
and Spain) and their colonies under special licenses during war when France
and Spain did not permit this trade in peace. Direct trade between the neutral
and France or Spain was not prohibited. Neutrals sought to take advantage of
this exception by circumnavigation-touching an intermediate neutral or British
port. They were foiled by being seized on the last leg of this journey, between
the intermediate port and France or Spain, under the "continuous voyage"
doctrine.
141 The Jesus, Burrell 164, 167 Eng. Rep. 521 (1761)
(Contraband); The
Charlotte Sophia, 6 C. Rob. 204n. (1806) (Blockade).
142 See Briggs, The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, 11-40 (1926) ; Gantenbein,
The Dootrine of Continuous Voyage, 1-28 (1929); Woolsey, "Early Cases on the
Doctrine of Continuous Voyage," 4 A.J.I.L., 823 (1910) for material on the
early history.
14<>
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and Springbok were only specializations of this settled principle to
cargo, a development predictable when a shift from sail to speedier
steam power rendered older forms of commercial interdiction of
decreasing value to belligerents.
Between the American Civil War and World War I there were
no major developments in application of the ultimate destination
principle. The Peterhoff rule was applied by the Italian Prize Court
to arms and ammunition carried by a Dutch vessel from Rotterdam to Djibouti, a French port, from which arms were regularly
sent to Abyssinia, with which Italy was then at war. 143 An abortive
attempt was made to apply the rule to Bundesrath, Herzog and
General, 144 German mail ships seized by the British while bound
for Lourenco Marques, a Portuguese port. The ships were suspected of carrying contraband for the Transvaal and Orange Free
State but no contraband was found aboard. 145
As discussed in Speaial Situation 7 B, the distinctions attempted
in the Declaration of London, 1909, between absolute and conditional
contraband failed to survive World War I. One of the earliest
casualties was exemption of conditional contraband from application of the ultimate destination principle unless the shipment of
conditional contraband was to a landlocked enemy.
lJfodern Applications :

Ultimate Destination-Continuous Voyage
During World War I, the basic pattern of ultimate destination as
outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Peterhoff and
Springbok was reshaped to the conditions of modern general war.
Under the London Declaration, ultimate destination could be applied
to absolute contraband and this was done by all participants from
the beginning of hostilities.
There was also heavy erosion of the Declaration limitation of
ultimate voyage as applied to conditional contraband by a series

The Doelwijk, 24 Clunet 850 (1896).
VII Moore, Digest, 739 ( 1906) ( "Delagoa Bay Cases").
145 In The Tetartos, I Hurst & Bray, Russian and Japanese Prize Oases, 166,
181 (1912) the Russian Supreme Prize Court reversed condemnation of a
German vessel carrying railway sleepers from Otaru to Taku, rejecting the
doctrine of "continuous voyage" in the process. In The Carthage, The Hague
Commission refused to pass on an "ultimate destination" issue presented by
Italian seizure of a French vessel carrying an aircraft, allegedly contraband,
between Marseilles and Tunis. The aircraft was thought destined for Ottoman
forces in Tripolitana. Wilson, The Hague Arbitration Oases, 353 (1915).
143

144
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of British and parallel Allied administrative provisions. 146 Application of ultimate destination to conditional contraband by the
British Prize Court in 1915; 147 and administrative orders in 1916
placing conditional and absolute contraband upon the same footing
for applying the ultimate destination principle; 148 simply applied
the coup de grace to an already dying distinction.
When ultimate destination was clearly established as applicable
to conditional contraband, the Allies shifted their major weight in
maritime economic warfare from the equivocal blockade thought by
some to have been established by the Reprisals Order-in -Council of
11 March 1915, to contraband controls. The main developments
thereafter were the clear shift of the ultimate burden of proof to
the claimant in prize proceedings and the increasing range of
evidence considered by the prize courts in determining whether a
vessel or cargo should be seized or condemned.

Burden of Proof
The absence of a navicert under the "Reprisals" Order-in-Council
of 31 July 1940 raised a rebuttable presumption that the ship or
cargo had a hostile destination. 149 Although, as previously indicated,
no ships or cargoes were condemned during World War II simply
because unnavicerted, the burden of proof of innocence of destination was shifted to the claimant to ship or cargo as the case might
be. Presumably this praotice will continue in any future war in
which navicerts are used; although the "clearcerts," issued during
the Cuban Quarantine of 1962, the closest approach since World
War II to a navicert, were for shipping convenience and had no
relation to a burden of proof concerning destination of ship or
cargo.
But when navicerts are not used, as in future "limited wars,"
the issue of burden of proof again can be troublesome. Prior to
World War I, the burden of proof of hostile destination rested
on the captor.
In Declaration of London, Order-in-Council, No. 1, 20 August
1914, the presumptions of Article 34 of the Declaration of London
were continued. However, enemy destination was to be presumed,
and thus the burden o£ proof shifted to the claimant i£ the goods
were consigned to or for an agent of the enemy state, or to or for a
146

These included the two British Declaration of London Orders-in-Council
(1 & 2) (20 August and 29 October 1915) and the "Reprisals" Order-in-Council,
11 March 1915. 108 Brit. & F. St. P. (II) 100, 156, 109, 217 (1915).
147 The Kim, j1915j, 215.
148 Order-in-Council, 30 March 1916, 110 Brit. & F. St. P. 173 (1916).
149 S. R. & 0., 1940, No. 1436.
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merchant or other person under control of the authorities of an
enemy state. 150
This statement of the burden of proof was simplified in Declaration of London Order-in-Council (No. 2) 29 October 1914 151 to a
presumption of hostile destination -if the goods are "consigned to or
for an agent of the enemy state." But further presumptions of
enemy destination were added if the goods were consigned "to
order," if the ship's papers failed to show the consignee, or if the
papers showed a consignee in territory belonging to or occupied by
the enemy.
When the ultimate destination principle was extended fully in
1916 to conditional contraband, the burden of proof of innocence
also was shifted to the claimant. The presumptions of Declaration
of London Order-in-Council (No. 2) were continued with the
addition of a presumption of enemy destination if the goods were
consigned to or for a person who had forwarded during the war
imported contraband goods to territory belonging to or occupied by
the enemy.
English prize courts recognized these changes in the burden of
proof as administratively necessary in general ~contraband control.
Their position was summed up by Lord Parker in The Louisiana :152
* * * /I/t is well to bear in mind that, according to international law, neutrals may during a war trade freely as well
with belligerents as with other neutrals. If, ho-wever, the goods
in which they trade are in their nature contraband, the traffic
involves certain risks. For a belligerent State is entitled to
seize the goods in transit on reasonable suspicion that, being in
their nature absolute contraband, they are destined for the
enemy country, or, being in their nature conditional contraband,
they are destined for the enemy government or the enemy naval
or military forces.
The goods when seized must of course be brought into the
Prize Court for adjudication, but in the Prize Court the neutral
trader is not in the position of a person charged with a criminal
offense and presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt. He comes before the Prize Court to
show that there was no reasonable suspicion justifying the
seizure or to displace such reasonable suspicion as in fact exists.
The State of the captors is necessarily unable to investigate
the relations between the neutral trader and his correspondents
1W

108 Brit. & F. St. P. (II) 100, Art. 3 (1914).
Ibid., 156.
152 j1918j A. C. 461, 464.
151
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in enemy or neutral countries, but the neutral trader is or ought
to be in a position to explain doubtful points. I:£ his goods had
no such destination as 'vould subject them to condemnation
by the Prize Court, it is his interest to make full disclosure o:£ all
the details o:£ the transaction.
Only i:£ his goods had such destination can it be his interest
to conceal anything or leave anything unexplained. I:£ he does
conceal matters which it is material for the Court to know, or
i:£ he neglects to explain matters which he is or ought to be in
a position to explain, or i:£ he puts forward unsatisfactory or
contradictory evidence in matters the details o:£ which must be
within his knowledge, he cannot complain i:£ the Court draws
inferences adverse to his claim and condemns the goods In
question. 153
Earlier, in The Kim, Sir Samuel Evans conceded: 154
* * * It is, no doubt, incumbent upon the captors in the first
instance to prove facts from 'vhich a reasonable inference of
hostile destination can be drawn, subject to rebuttal by the
claimants. * * *
From the claimant's point of view, however, the difficulty was that
it was not enough for the owner to show the cargo had been shipped
innocently, if its ultimate destination in fact was hostile. Also, the
facts proved in the first instance by the captor, as described by
Sir Samuel, no longer had to be derived from the ship herself.

"Intention" in Enemy Destination
In The Bermuda, the United States Supreme Court, citing Sir
William Grant in The Willia1n,l 55 declared: 156
* * * I:£ there be an intention, either formed at the time o:£ the
original shipment, or afterwards, to send the goods forward to
an unlawful destination, the continuity o:£ the voyage will not
be broken, as to the cargo, by any transactions at the intermediate port.
During World vVar I this point was expanded to exclude the
intent o:£ the consignor o:£ the goods as necessarily the decisive
153

See The Anta1·es, ;1915/ II L1.P.C. 219, 251-2; The Kronprinsessan Marj1921j 1 A. C. 486; Tlze N orne, j1921j 1 A. C. 765; The Falk,
;1921/ 6 L1.L.R. 503; The ]1 onte Contes, j1944/ A. C. 6; The Arsia, Ann. Dig.
(1949), 577, Case No. 206 (Enemy Property); In The ]latter of Ten Registered
Letters ex Eastbound Aircraft, Ann. Dig. (1949), 583, Case No. 208.
154 /1915;, 215, 283~
155 5 C. Rob. 385 (1806).
156 70 U.S. (3 Wall ..) 514, 554 (1865).
gareta,
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factor. In The Pacific, 157 for example, coffee was consigned from
Salvador to an agent in Sweden to dispose of it for the best possible
price. Although the consignor had no special intent that the coffee
go to Germany, the coffee supply in Sweden was such that Germany
was its likely destination. The agent, furthermore, had previously
engaged in contraband trade and had acted as intermediary for
sending other goods to Hamburg.
In The Noordam, 158 cotton goods were shipped £ro1n New York
to Amsterdam consigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust Co., for
the firm of S. I. De Vries of Amsterdam. The Netherlands Oversea
Trust Company was a body of Dutch traders who had agreed with
the British Government to act as intermediaries to obtain goods from
abroad.
Cotton piece goods were absolute contraband since usable in
the manufacture of explosives. It was known De Vries so] d large
quantities of cotton goods to Germany. While the shipper was
innocent and it was known that Netherlands Oversea Trust Co.
would have exacted guarantees of neutral consumption from De
Vries, it was nevertheless possible that De Vries might evade the
vigilance of the Company and ship the goods to Germany. Lord
Stern dale stated: 15 9

* * * The

question is, what is the ultimate destination, what
is the destination intended by the person who will have control
of the goods when they arrive? I£ they had arrived at the neutral
port De Vries would have had the control, subject to this, that
they would have had to give undertakings to the Netherlands
Oversea Trust Co. that they would not send the goods into an
enemy country. But De Vries were the purchasers; they would
have become the owners of the goods, and their intention, I
have no doubt, was to send them into enemy countries. I£ that
be so, in my opinion it cannot be said that there is not an
enemy destination simply because some association, such as
the Netherlands Oversea Trust Co., would do all they could to
frustrate it. * * *
The goods were condemned as contraband. 160
The German Prize Court applied "ultimate destination" when the

j1920 j L1.L.L.R. 105.
j1919j, 57.
15 9 Ibid., 64.
1 60 Cf. The Louisiana, ;1918/ A.C. 461; The Norne, j1921j 1 A. C. 765; The
Castor, ;1921/ 6 L1.L.L.R. 143; The Charles Racine, j1946j L1.P.C. (2d) 215,
Ann. D i g. (1946), 414, Case No. 179.
157

158
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shipper and consignee were innocent of intent of hostile destination
but the charterer took the cargo to an enemy port. 161
In future applications of The Springbok rule to attempted
breaches of blockade, it may well be that the intention of the owners
or shippers of the property to breach blockade will be the material
issue upon which condemnation of the property will depend. But
while doubt has been shed in The Monte Oontes 162 upon British
practice in World War I relating to the material intent in ultimate
destination contraband cases in which condemnation is based on
contraband theories rather than breach of blockade, the position
taken in The N oordam will probably be resumed in any future
con:flict. 163
The N oordam position, for exa:rp.ple, seems to lie at the heart of
contraband cases in which the property is to be reprocessed or
manufactured and then pass to the enemy. The problem arose in
World War I in The Balto. 1 6 4
Leather had been shipped in Balto consigned to the manager
of a Swedish shoe factory. The manager, claimant in the case,
declared the leather was intended solely for consumption in the
Swedish factory, the evidence being clear nevertheless that it was
to be manufactured into boots for the German and Austrian armies.
The cargo accordingly was condemned. The consignor was innocent.
But the intent of the consignee of the goods (the owner, since title
had passed) seemed amply clear to send the manufactured product to
the enemy.
In The Behar/ 65 ho,vever, a Swiss consignee, who was shown
simply to have had business relations with Germany, lost a cargo
of gallnuts by condemnation which were to be manufactured into
tannin at its factory. The Franco-Swiss War Trade Agreement
was construed not to prohibit the possible export to Germany of
tannin extracted from the nuts.

Evidence on the Issue of Enemy Destination
The efficiency. of operation of Allied contraband controls in both
world wars hinged upon effective gathering of economic intelligence.
161

The Kiew, ;1917; 23 DeutBche JuriBten Zeitung, 640 (1918). See The
Norden, j1917j GrotiuB, Annuaire International, 272 (1917) ; The ZaanBtroom,
j1916j Fauchille et de Visscher, JuriBprudence Allemande en Matiere de PriBeB
Jf aritimeB, 97 ( 1922-24) .

j1944J A.C. 6, 10.
And see cases on innocent shipment before hostilities, Fns. 112-113, supra,
this Chapter.
164 j1917j' 79.
165 An.n. Dig. (1946), 430 (Conseil des Prises, 1946) Case No. 185.
162
163
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This intelligence was gathered by censoring the mails, monitoring
cable transmission and radio messages and by other covert and
overt devices at the disposal of the respective governments.
By the Prize Court Rules of 1914, the customary rule that the
ship had "to be condemned out of her own mouth," ignored in The
Springbok, was also abandoned in British prize procedure. In addition to evidence from the usual sources, such further evidence could
be received "as may be admitted by the Judge." 166
Sir Samuel Evans, ·in The Kim 167 remarked in response to objections by counsel to the use of intercepted letters against parties to
whom they did not refer:
* * * The letters show an intimate knowledge of what was
being done by the various shippers in reference to consignments
of foodstuffs to Copenhagen; of the difficulty of exportation
from Denmark to Germany; and of the probable fate of some of
the cargoes now before the court.
It was objected that they could not be evidence against any
persons other than Ascher & Co. and Cudahy & Co., and that
they ought not to read in any of the other cases. If they stood
alone, I should not act upon them as affecting those cases. But
it must be remembered that Prize Courts are not governed or
limited by the strict rules of evidence which bind, and sometimes unduly fetter, our municipal courts. Such strict evidence
would often be very difficult to obtain, and to require it in
many cases would be to defeat the legitimate rights of belligerents.
Prize Courts have always deemed it right to recognize wellknown facts which have come to light in other cases, or as
matters of public reputation. (Citing Lord Stowell and The

Stephen Hart)

***

In discussing the evidence required for seizure of cargo, Lord
Parker stated: 168
* * * It is clear that the ultimate as opposed to the ostensible destination of goods would seldom, if ever, appear on
the ship's papers or be within the knowledge of the master or
crew. It would have to be proved or inferred from other sources,
and it could hardly be contended that if the Crown were in
possession of evidence obtained from such other sources from

Order-in-Council, 5 August 1914 (Order XV, 2 (e) ) 109 Brit. & F. St. P., 72
(1915).
167 j1915/, 215, 250.
168 The Baron Stjernb~ad, j1918j A.C. 173, 176.
1 66
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which an ultimate destination in an enemy country could be
inferred as reasonably probable, the seizure of the goods would
not be justified. * * *
In The Oonsu,l Oorfitzon 169 'vhere the Privy Council held the
President of the Prize Court could make an order for discovery of
certain business records of the claimant to cargo, Lord Parker said:
In the present case one of the matters in question is how the
appellant intended to dispose of the goods to which these proceedings relate after their delivery at Karlskrona. Were they
intended by him for consumption in Sweden, or had they a
further destination, and if so in 'vhat country~
It appears to their Lordships to be beyond dispute that inferences on this question might properly be drawn from the
course and nature of the appellant's business in goods of a
similar nature both before and after the outbreak of the present
war, and in particular from the volume of his trade with
Germany before and since such outbreak. All documents which
throw light on these matters must therefore fall within the
principle laid down in the case above referred to. * * * /Compagnie Financiere de Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co. 11
Q.E.D. 55/ * * * The order for discovery being limited to
documents which may throw light on the nature and course of
the appellant's business and the volume of his trade with
Germany for some months before the war and since the outbreak of the war, it is in their Lordship's opinion impossible to
hold the order was wrong in law. * * *
The evidence considered by the Prize Courts in determining
ultimate destination was varied. As in 1 he Springbok, consignments
"to order" were thought to raise suspicion,I 70 as 'vere failures by
ships' papers to name the consignee of cargo. 171 Shipments to blacklisted firms 172 and to points of active trade in contraband seemed
persuasive.l 73 The most interesting group of cases on evidential
7

169
170

/19171 A. C. 550, 554-555.
In The Kim, j1915j, 215, 276, Sir Samuel Evans accepted the position of

the United States Supreme Court in Springbok on this point although he emphasized suspicion might be disspelled by evidence produced by the shippers.
See The Nieuw-Amsterdam, j1915j, Fauchille, Jurisprudence Francaise, 14; The
Insulinde, Ibid., 102; The Gorontalo, Ibid., 72. As to the use of evidence in
World War I see Garner, Prize Law During the World War, 535-574 (1927).
171 E.g., The Ellispontos, Fauchille, Jur isprudence Francaise, 319.
172 E.g., The Stanton, 23 June 1917, Off. Trn. N. ; The Almazora, jl918j
Journal Officiel (27 December 1918).
173 The presumption of hostile destination was especially strong when the
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points developing from World War I were those in which statistical
evidence, derived usually from administrative economic warfare
efforts to ration neutrals, was offered to indicate the hostile destination of contraband.
An administrative rationing system was used in both world wars.
Rationing in this context means limiting shipments to neutrals
based upon statistics concerning their need for local consumption.
During World War I, rationing was commenced in 1915 and
became the mainstay of Allied economic warfare. Rationing of
neutrals during World War II was reinstituted on 30 July 1940.
N avicerts were to be issued sufficient only for their domestic needs.
Thus, while War-Trade Agreements might have limited effect in
reducing exports from neutrals to the enemy, constricting their
imports by navicerting would limit the ability of the neutral to
export everything not produced in quantity locally. Operations
against this surplus local production took the form of preemption
(buying up the surplus) and barter for goods in local short supply. 174
As statistical evidence developed incidental to administrative
rationing, it was logical to use this evidence to determine whether
cargoes should be seized as contraband and to condemn cargoes in
prize proceedings. During World War II, statistical evidence was
used in determining seizures but was not relied upon extensively
for condemnations, other evidence usually being adequate for this
purpose. In World War I, a number of important statistical evidence
cases were decided, although in none were a cargo or vessel condemned
on statistical evidence alone.
In The Kim,I 15 a leading case on many points relating to contraband control in modern war, Sir Samuel Evans dealt with extensive statistical evidence relating to the destination of cargoes on
four neutral vessels bound for Denmark. Thus, in considering, the
ultimate destination of lard, which formed part of the cargoes,
Sir Samuel noted: 1 76
* * * Some illustrative statistics were given by the Crown, with
regard to lard of various qualities, which are not 'vithout
significance, and which form a fair criterion of the imports of
consignees had prior contacts with the enemy. E.g., The Tysla, j1916j 5 L1.P.C.
433. The Egyptian Prize Court has placed much stress on shipments to Genoa,
Italy, as a notorious point for transshipment to Israel. E.g., Ann. Dig. (1949)
The Good Hope Castle, 574, Case No. 204; The Carbonello, 581, Case No. 207.
174 On rationing and preemption, see I Medlicott, The Economic Blockade,
515-548 (1952) ; II Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 129-134, 242-247, 291313, 323-329 ( 1959) .
175 j1915j, 215.
176 Ibid., 222-223.
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these and like substances into D enmark before the war ; and
they give a measure for comparison with t he imports of lard
consigned to Copenhagen after the outbreak of the war upon the
four vessels no'v before the Court.
The average annual quantity of lard imported into D enmark
during the three years 1911-1913 from all sources was 1,459,000
lbs. The quantity of lard consigned t o Copenhagen on these
four ships alone 'vas 19,252,000 lbs. Comparing these quantities,
the result is that these vessels ' vere carrying towards Copenhagen ,vithin less than a month mor e than thirteen times the
quantity of lard 'vhich had been imported annually to Denmark for each of the three years before the war. * * *
Although Sir Samuel observed Denmark as a small country, t hen
with a population less than three million, a food exporting rather
than importing country and convenient to many German points
for transshipment, he considered these features with the statistical
evidence merely "important to bear in mind in their appropriat e
place" and "not in any sense conclusive upon the serious quest ions
of consecutive voyages of hostile quality, and of hostile destination,
which are involved before it can be determined whether the goods
seized are confiscable as prize." 177
But as the statistics became both ample and accurate, judges of
the Prize Courts became more readily persuaded by them. In The
Pacific, 178 for example, dealing ,vith coffee shipped to Sweden, Sir
Henry Duke declared : 179
* * * Where would these goods have gone? That is the question I have to answer, and I ans·wer it by having regard first
to the state of the market. Sweden had been glutted with coffee
which had poured into Sweden during the latter months , of
1914 and 1915. What 'vas the multiple of the imported quantity
to the total consumption, I do not at the moment bear in mind,
but it makes a ridiculous sum in arithmetic. The Swedish population could not consume the coffee which was notoriously
coming into Sweden, if they had devoted themselves to nothing
else but the consumption of coffee. * * *
In The Urna 180 dried prunes shipped to Denmark were condemned
because of the claimant's failure to carry his burden of proof of
innocent destination shifted to him by a statistical table introduced
Ibid., 223-224.
j1920j, 5 L1.L.L.R. 105.
1 79 Ibid., 106.
1 8° j1920j A.C. 899. See The Tiber, }1918/ Journal Ofjiciel (17 May 1918),
4356.
177

178
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in evidence. This table showed imports of dried fruits into Denmark of 18,651 tons in 1915, whereas the annual average of imports
before the war during the years 1911-13 was 6,300 tons. In The
Baron Stjernblad 181 statistical evidence concerning importations of
cocoa beans into Sweden was held a sufficient basis for seizure,
although the beans were not condemned as contraband.
There seemed general agreement on the issue of condemnation
of the cargo as prize that if the goods were simply imported into
the common stock of the neutral no hostile destination should be
implied. This point had been stated by Sir William Grant in The
William 182 and was adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in The B ermruda. 183 Sho,ving that the goods imported, although
actually for domestic consumption, released other goods for export,
was insufficient to condemn them for hostile destination. 184 Of course,
the releases for export 'vould be material to an administrative
officer establishing a rationing policy for the neutral.
Exercises of export controls by the neutrals, many of these controls having been established or strengthened pursuant to WarTrade Agreements, were considered by the British. Prize Courts as
insufficient to rebut presumptions of hostile desti~ation. Although
these controls might be applied efficiently and in good faith, it ·was
easy for an enemy's commercial agents to evade them. 185 The French
took a more liberal position in World War I but examined neutral
export control policy with greater care in World War II. 186 Consignments to semiofficial bodies, usually established under WarTrade Agreements, ""ere held not to preclude hostile destination of
the goods consigned. 187

DiIferences ln Weight of Evidence Required
for Seiztttre and Condemnation: The Economic
Warfare Importance of Delay
Prior to a possible prize adjudication, with evidence then taken for
a decision to condemn or restore the vessel or cargo, the vessel might
/1918/ A.C. 173.
5 C. Rob. 385 ( 1806).
183 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1865).
184 The Bonna, ;1918;, 123. (Coconut oil to be manufactured into margarine
possibly releasing butter for export from Sweden to Germany.)
185 The Louisiana, ;1918/ A.C. 461.
186 The Apollonia, j1915/ Journal Officiel (12 July 1915), 4740; The Rioja
(No.2), j1915j, Ibid., (2 December 1915), 8778; The Sibilla, ;1915/ Ibid., (22
January 1916), 593. Cf. Ann. Dig. (1946) ; The Nailsea Court, 425, Case No.
182; The Mount Tau'f'us, 427, Case No. 183; The Nyhorn, 429, Case No. 184;
The B ehar, 430, Case No. 185.
187 E.g., The Orion, j1921j6 L1.L.R. 207.
1s1
182
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be visited and searched at sea or diverted for a thorough search
in a contraband control port. I£ contraband is fou nd, the vessel or
contraband or both may then be seized and in British practice placed
in custody of the l\1arshal of the Prize Court.
Emerging as of great importance in both World W ars I and II
'vas the economic warfare function of diversion and seizure. Although the vessel and cargo might later be condemned, with the
evidence previously discussed relevant to the condemnation issue,
_from the perspective of the officer engaging in economic 'varfare the
delay in transit and possible detention of the property 'vas important.
In both world 'vars Germany possessed inadequate stockpiles of
many materials and seriously underestimated her armaments r equirements. Merely disturbing the regularity of flo'v of critical war
materials to a manufacturing establishment suffering shor tages will
seriously disrupt its manufacturing processes. Indeed, when cargo
is condemned, unless it is destroyed or kept within the detaining
state by export controls, it may still find its way into the hands of
the enemy.
By the English practice, if the goods are seized and then released
to the owners, the effect of the release order gives the owner possession of the goods within the realm and thus places them under
the aegis of British export controls. 188 Shipping space from England
might also be denied the successful claimant. There is no judicial
remedy in the Prize Court or in most cases in the ordinary courts
for denial of an export license or a denial of shipping space. 189
After property has been seized and is in the custody of the Marshal
of the Prize Court, it may also be requisitioned. In The Zamora/ 90
the conditions for requisition set were: (1) a real question to be
tried so an immediate release 'vould not be proper; ( 2) the vessel
or goods must be ,urgently required for the defense of the realm,
the prosecution of the 'var, or other motives involving national
security; and (3) the right must be enforced by application to the
Prize Court which determines judicially whether under the particular
circumstances the right is exercisable. American and continental
practice permits requisitions without these stringent limitations in
cases of national urgency. 191
See The Falk, j1921j 1 A.C. 787.
See Fitzmaurice, "Some Aspects of l\1:odern Contraband Control a n d the
Law of Prize," 22 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 73, 74-78 (1945).
190 j1916j 2 A.C. 77.
191 As to American decisions and practice, Ibid., 103-105. For the handling of
requisition during World War II, see The Selandia, Ann. D i g. (1938-40), 571,
Case No. 218 (South Africa, Supreme Court, In Prize); Th e Pomona, j 1939j
L1.P.C. (2d) 1; Glen Line Ltd. v. Jfinister of Transport, A nn. Dig. (1949), 569,
188
189
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In The Falk,l 92 the Privy Council stated there must be such suspicion to justify seizure as warrants inquiry into the :facts and
adjudication o:f them by a properly constituted court. Suspicion
is sufficiently raised by the contraband nature o:f the goods (quebracho and chestnut extracts). Officers seizing the goods are entitled
to the benefit o:f information then possessed by other officers o:f the
Crown or acquired thereafter and are not limited to information
:from the ship's papers. Statistical evidence was held sufficient as a
basis :for seizure in The Baron Stjernblad.l 93
Even less evidence is required to support the officer directing
diversion o:f the vessel. In The Bernisse 194 neutral vessels were
diverted :for lack o:f a "green clearance.~' A green clearance was
issued to vessels cleared at a British port o:f departure or a British
port o:f call.
An Order-in-Council o:f 16 February 1917 required a vessel be
brought in :for examination i:f encountered at sea on her way to or
:from a port in any neutral country 'vithout calling at a port in
British or allied territory (emphasis added). The boarding officer
:found nothing suspicous except lack o:f a green clearance. The ships
did have an acquit de caution indicating they had touched at an
Allied colonial port.
The boarding officer sought instructions :from the Commander
o:f his cruiser. The Commander, in turn, communicated with the
Admiral and was ordered by hin1 to take the ships to Kirkwall.
This 'vas due to misconstruction o:f the Order-in-Council, there being
no basis :for suspicion that the ships were carrying contraband. The
court gave restitution ·with costs. (One vessel had been sunk by a
submarine while being diverted and the other heavily damaged.)
The Bern.isse was distinguished in The llfi1n. 195 The diversion was
there held proper "' hen the vessel was off course and carried a cargo
o:f wheat which was conditional contraband. There was no irregularity in the ship's papers. Sir ::F'rancis Hodson stated: 196
* * * /I/n the absence o:f reasonable suspicion the ship must be
allowed to proceed. I:£ she is detained, :for example, by mistake,
as in The Bernisse, or i:f she is detained :for some ulterior reason
7

Case No. 201. For the reverse situation, release of vessel from requisition for
the purpose of seizing in prize, see The Inginer N. Vlassopol, Int. L. Rep.
(1951), 725, Case No. 223.
192 j1921j 1 A.C. 787.
193 j1918j A.C. 173.
194 /1920;, 1.
195 j1947j, 115.
196 Ibid., 121.
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connected with search, the Crown cannot rely on t he belligerent
right o:£ visit and search as an ans-wer to the plaintiff's claim.
No question o:£ mistake arises. It cannot be said that there was
any ulterior object in sending her to ICirkwall, the pur pose can,
on the evidence, only have been that she might be examined. * * * 197
Once the vessel is diverted a reasonable time is allowed to determine whether the vessel or cargo should be seized. In The Patrai 198
a Greek ship was detained :for twenty-three days at Weymouth
with a part cargo o:£ emery stone. She had come in to Weymouth
voluntarily. Her cargo plan, manifests and bills o:£ lading were
sent in advance to the Ministry o:£ Economic W ar:fare in London.
Further documents were supplied at the request o:£ the Ministry.
The requirements o:£ the Ministry were met on 6 November 1939
but the vessel was not released until 23 November. The claim 'vas :for
damages :for unreasonable detention.
Lord Merriman dismissed the claim, pointing out the complexity
o:£ the evidence which must be examined be:fore a seizure could be
determined. He stated: 199
* * * /I/t ~s well settled that where there is probable cause :for
seizure, the Procurator-General is not to be held liable :for
bringing the case to adjudication, though unsuccessfully. * * *
Moreover, the test o:£ 'probable cause' or reasonable grounds o:£
suspicion is not confined to what was kno,vn at the time o:£
the detention, still less to 'vhat was then actually known to
the individual officers concerned, but 'vhat is known by the
officers o:£ the Crown generally. * * * But though after-acquired
know ledge is a vail able to j usti:fy seizure in Prize, arbitrary or
capricious arrest, ventured on the hazard that a case :for conviction
may turn up, may involve liability :for damages. * * * But i:£
it is blameworthy to venture on a capricious arrest on the
chance that something may turn up, it :follows that those with
whom rests the decision, on behal:£ o:£ the Crown, whether to
seize or not, must be allowed reasonable time to consider the
information on which this decision is to be based. * * *
Emery stone was absolute contraband. It was urgently needed in
1939 by Germany :for war purposes. The emery stone on Patrai,
together with that on another vessel arriving in the Channel at about
the same time, was more than one-hal:£ o:£ the total emery imports

See The Regina D'Italia, ;1919/ 9 L1.P.C. 265.
Int. L. Rep. (1952), 634, Case No. 148.
199 Ibid., 635-636.

197
198

402

into Holland in 1938 and three-quarters o£ the normal imports into
Holland £rom Greece.
Claims were allowed £or delay in The Remon8trant 200 and The
Jurko Topic. 201 In The Remonstrant, there was an undue delay
(about three months) in discharging cargo which was seized even
though the master was willing to discharge it. In The Jurko Topic
a delay in discharge o£ a contraband cargo o£ bauxite was due to
the difficulty o£ the Admiralty Marshal in finding a suitable buyer
and other administrative complications. The vessel was detained
originally at Gibraltar on 16 September 1939 and her cargo was
not unloaded until 10 December 1939. 202
Delays in prize proceedings have given rise to no liability on the
part o£ the Cro·wn or Cro·wn officers when the ship or cargo is
reasonably suspect. The reasonable time £or delay has been extended
by the mass o£ evidence to be considered. 203 However, detention
appears to be emerging as an economic warfare weapon, and any
incidental governmental expense involved may be fully justified in
appropriate cases by the impact upon the industry o£ an adversary.

Consequences of Carriage of Contraband
and Breach of Blockade
The consequences to the owner o£ contraband cargo were the same
in both world wars. The cargo was condemned. It was understood
this condemnation ·was not £or violation o£ international law but was
instead simply a sanction open to the belligerent to support his
military operations.204 A shipowner acting in good faith might be
allowed compensation in lieu o£ freight £or the condemned cargo.205
The effect o£ carriage o£ contraband upon the ship depended,
according to the older English position formulated by Lord Stowell,
200 j1917J 3 B. & C. P. C. 14 (P. C. from Sup. Ct. New South Wales).
201j1941/ Ll.P.C. (2d) 89, Ann. Dig. (1941-42), 631, Case No. 178.
2<> 2 See The Edna, Ann. Dig. (1938--40), 578, Case No. 221; Estate of Edward
A. Breitung v. United States, Ann. Dig. (1941-42), 598, Case No. 174; The
Oarbonello, Ann. Dig. (1949), 581, Case No. 207.
203 See The Falk, j1921j 1 A.C. 787, 794 where Lord Sumner comments upon
the change in evidential practice in prize cases as affecting "reasonableness" of
the delay. The quebracho and chestnut extracts were detained in April and
May 1915. The products were .!hen caught under export licensing and were
finally purchased by the War Office in 1917 with the prize proceedings discontinued in 1919.
204 See The Kronprinsessan Jf argareta, ;1921/ 1 A. C. 486, 494-498; The Prins
der N ederlanden, j1921j 1A.C. 754,. 760.
2os See The Prins der N ederlanden, j1921j 1 A. C. 486; The Juno, j1916j, 169;
The Katwijk, j1916j, 177; The Glenearn No. 2 j1942J, 50.
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upon kno,vledge by the shipo,vner of the contraband being carried. 206
In The H akan, 207 Sir Samuel Evans, dealing 'vith a full cargo of
conditional contraband, condemned the vessel, inferring kno,vledge
of the shipowners from the amount of the cargo, although other
facts, such as the high rate of hire, also suggested guilty knowledge.
Although Article 40 of the Declaration of London was expressly
retained when England abandoned the Declaration in 1916, the
Privy Council on appeal in The H akan did not stress this Article
but stressed the substantial nature of the contraband and special
facts from which the o'vner's. knowledge might be inferred. 208
In The Sidi Ifni 209 it 'vas stated the shipowner's knowledge of
enemy destination could be inferred if he kne'v facts which would
cause a reasonable person to suspect the destination and yet refrains
from making inquiries. The quantitative test set forth in Article 40
of the Declaration of London has virtues as one avoiding inquiries
into subjective elements. The Declaration of London principle
appears to have been applied by the German Prize Court of Hamburg during World War II 210 and the French Conseil des Prises in
World War I. 211 The Egyptian Prize Court by contrast has applied
the knowledge test to condemn a ship carrying about one-tenth
contraband in its total cargo. 212
Breach or attempted breach of blockade depends on knowledge
express or implied of the ship. As pointed out in Special Situation
7 A, this knowledge can be inferred by notice to the port from
which the ship departs. 213 The ship is condemned for breach or
attempt to breach blockade. The vessel may be seized at any
time before the completion of her voyage. 214 The cargo on board
also is conde1nned unless it is shown the owners could not have
known of the blockade 'vhen they placed their goods on board.
The Springbok 215 is authority for condemning the goods while
releasing an innocent ship.

206

The Ringende Jacob, j1798j 1 C. Rob. 89; The Neutralitet, jl801j 3 C.
Rob. 295.
207 jl916j, 266.
20s j1918j A.O. 148, 156.
209 j1945j L1.P.D. (2d) 200, Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 549, Case No. 197.
21o Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 573, Case No. 206.
2 ll The Zoodochos-Pighi, j1916j Fauchille, Jurisprudence Francaise, 313.
212
The Frankisky (No. 1), Ann. Dig. (1949), 591, Case No. 212.
2 1 3 E.g., The Columbia, jl799j 1 C. Rob. 154.
214 E.g., The Welvaart van Pillaw, j1799j 2 C. Rob. 128.
215 72 U.S. (5 Wall.), 1 (1866).
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Suggested Solution: Special Situation 7 C

There is reasonable suspicion that the ponchos, paint and paint
brushes consigned to Roohambeau et fils will pass through the
hands of this firm to N uevan or Antiokan forces. This suspicion
is grounded upon the nature of the goods (their quantity and
susceptibility to military use) and the past relations of Rochambeau
et fils with Salvaje. Even though the materials are to be completed for military purposes in Guyana or elsewhere, the ultimate
destination rule should apply. The rule has now been so well
settled that it is no longer open to question whether the ponchos,
paint and brushes are regarded as absolute or conditional contraband.
It is doubtful, on the other hand, that there is any reasonable
suspicion that the owners of the vessel know the contraband
nature of part of the cargo. Nor is there any reason to suspect
the vessel intends to breach blockade.
Thus, the Captain of Tattnall should not seize the ship but
should divert it to the port nearest his current position at which
the suspected cargo can be discharged and examined more closely.
The cargo may be condemned either as contraband or, under
1 he Springbok rule, as cargo shipped with an intent to breach
blockade.
A route should be prescribed for Truant and periodic checks
made on her progress to her port of diversion by naval air. If
the Captain of Tattnall desires suggestions of ports for diversion,
these will be furnished at his request. If necessary, personnel
will be flown from OAS Economic Measures Command to inspect
the cargo and to determine whether or not it will be seized at
the port to which diversion is ordered. The cargo is considered
too large for transshipment at sea.
1

E. MARITIME ENEMY PROPERTY CONTROL
Special Situation 7 D

You are Captain of U.S.S. Tattnall. Radio reports received by
Tattnall this morning indicate Scythia has launched ground and
air attacks on the NATO member described in General Situation
7. Twenty-five Scythian divisions have been identified in the
ground action. No United States ground or air units have been
committed. There have been no attacks upon United States ground
or air units or upon the United States Sixth Fleet. The Security
Council of the United Nations is in emergency session as is the
National Security Council of the United States.
This morning you intercepted the Scythian freighter, Frolic.
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Your boarding officer found 200 tons of tin ingot aboard as her
only cargo. The tin was shipped by Rochambeau et fils of Georgetown, Guyana. A Nuevan supercargo on board has told your
boarding officer that the tin is shipped under a c.i.f. contract made
by Rochambeau et fils as agent for the N uevan Ministry of Resources, a Department of the Nuevan Government, with Vulcan
Metals Company of Parnassus, Carinthia. The tin was shipped
from Nueva to Guyana prior to establishment of the blockade.
A copy of the bill of lading indicates the shipment is "to order"
of Rochambeau et fil'8. Consideration for the sale includes the
20,000 ponchos, paint and paint brushes shipped on M.S. Truant,
a Corinthian freighter, diverted by you yesterday as described in
Special Situation 7 0 and $20,000 (U.S.). Frolic is bound from
Georgetown, Guyana, to Parnassus, Carinthia.
You have attempted to contact OAS Economic Measures Command without success. You believe it unlikely radio contact will
be made in the next six hours. Will you capture Frolic, divert
her, or permit her to pass?
Discussion: Special Situation 7 D

By the Declaration of Paris, 1856, a neutral flag covers enemy's
goods with the exception of contraband of war; and neutral goods
with the exception of contraband of war are not liable to capture
under the enemy flag. 216 Tin is not on the contraband list proclaimed by the Organization of An1erican States as described in
Special Situation 7 0. There is no evidence that either the ship
or the goods have broken blockade. The basis for capture, diversion or such other action the Captain may deem necessary must
turn: (1) upon the character of the Scythian ship-whether it is
to be treated as neutral or enemy; and, (2) upon the ownership
of the cargo, i.e., whether the tin is either still owned by the
Nuevan government or whether it is so closely associated with it
that the tin must be treated as if it were owned by the enemy.

Character of the Ship
Under Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty,217 an attack by
Scythia upon a NATO member is deemed an attack upon the
United States·. Consequently, without a formal declaration of war
the United States is entitled to regard Scythia as an enemy even

216

See Naval War College, International Law Topics and Discussions, 1905,

109.
21163 Stat. 2241 (1949).
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though attacks have not yet been directed against United ~tates
units.
An enemy vessel on the high seas is subject to capture without
notice of hostilities. The United States is not a party to Hague
Convention VI (Relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships
at the Outbreak of Hostilities). Article 3 of this Convention
provides the vessel can be detained but not confiscated. It is also
uncertain that Scythia is a party to this Convention and doubtful
that it will be applied by any co1nbatants in the hostilities
beginning.
Had Frolio been in the harbor of an adversary at the commencement of hostilities, days of grace might have been granted for
departure. The United States gave days of grace in the SpanishAmerican War but not in World Wars I and II. 218 State practice
varies in the matter .219
Frolic does not fall into any of the categories of vessels exempt
from capture by custom or convention. The major exempted
categories are hospital and cartel shi ps.220 The treatment meted
out to fishing boats and small boats engaged in local trade has
been discussed previously in this chapter.221
The character of Frolic as neutral or enemy is determined
primarily by the flag she is entitled to fly. 222 Prize Courts will
go beyond the flag and inquire into the real character of the
vessel when there is suspicion that the flag is spurious, where the
papers are irregular, or where the registered owner is only nominal.
The vessel may be found controlled by the enemy rather than by
For the Spanish-American War position, see The Buena Ventura, 175
u.s. 384 (1899).
219 The British regard the matter was one of grace and not of right. The
Marie Leonhardt, j1921j, 1. In The Blonde, j1922j 1 A.C. 313 the Privy Council
took the position that the vessels could be allowed to leave but if detained
could not be confiscated under Hague Convention VI. The vessels could be
detained with a duty to restore or requisitioned with a duty to compensate.
However, in 1925 England denounced Convention VI. See The Pomona, j1943j,
24.
220 See Geneva Convention, Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
(1949), Arts. 36-37 (medical aircraft) ; Geneva Convention, Wounded and
Shipwrecked Jfembers of the Armed Forces at Sea (1949), Art. 21 (private
vessels used for transport of wounded), Arts. 22-28 (hospital ships and medical
transports). A cartel ship sails under safe conduct or pass. See The Daifjie,
j1800j 3 C. Rob. 139.
2 21 See Fns. 58-59 and cases there cited where the matter is discussed as
exceptions to blockade.
2 22 The principle is stated in Art. 57 of the London Declaration, 1909. See The
Unitas, j1950j A.C. 536. If the ship flies an enemy flag there must be exceptional circumstances to a void condemning the vessel.
21s
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the nominal owners.223 Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas 224 is likely to have little effect upon determinations
of enemy or neutral character. The Prize Courts seek not only
a "genuine link" between the ship and its flag state but actual
control of the ship by states other than the flag state. It is the
actual control, not the flag that ultimately determines enemy
character for prize purposes.
Frolic apparently is a state-owned vessel. Ownership at the
time of seizure is critical. The rule is the same for ships and
cargoes. 225 The status of lienholders is immaterial.226
Although no transfers of title to Frolic seem in issue, transfers
during wartime are examined closely and if merely colorable,
rather than bona fide, divesting the enemy of all interest, the
transfer will be declared invalid. 227 An attempt was made in the
London Declaration, 1909, to establish an absolute presumption,
subject to certain conditions stipulated, of validity of the sale if
made more than thirty days prior to commencement of hostilities.228
The Declaration also set forth a presumption that_a transfer was
void if made during a voyage or in a blockaded port, i:f a right
to redemption or reversion was retained, and if the requirements
of the new flag state have not been observed. Otherwise the presumption could be rebutted by proof that the transfer was not to
avoid the consequences of enemy character. 229
The London Declaration formula was rejected by the British in
World War I in The 1 ommi j 230 and although applied by France
in The Dacia,231 France later returned to its position that a
transfer after war began ·was void.
1

223

E.g., The St. Tudno, /1916/, 271; The jJfichigan, /1916/ 5 Ll.P.C. 421;
The Hamborn, ;1918/, 19 Cf. The Nordmeer, Ann. Dig. (1946), 401, Case No.
172 (no papers on vessel). The United States has emphasized the flag as
determining nationality, but has not dealt with prize cases involving this problem since the Spanish-American War. See The Pedro, 175 U.S. 354 ( 1899).
2 24 TIAS 5200.
225 E.g., The Rijn, ;1917/, 145 (Cargo); The Tommi, (1914), 215 (Ship).
226 The Konsul Hendrik Fisser, j1940j Ll.P.C. (2d) 16, Ann. Dig. (193840), 561, Case No. 215; The Odessa, j1916j 1 A.C. 145; The Marie Cflaeser,
/1914/, 218.
227 The Sechs Geschwistern, jl801! 4 C. Rob. 100; The Kankakee, ;1918/
8 L1.P.C. 74; The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568 (1900). By the French practice, any transfer prior to war was recognized and any transfer after war
began was not. The Victoire (ex Virginia) j1920j Journ.al Oj]iciel (16 January
1921), 651.
228 See Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, 123, Art. 55.
229 Ibid., 125, Art. 56.
230 j1914j, 215.
231 j1915j Journal Officiel (28 September 1915), 6912.
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Since Frolic flies a Scythian flag, and there is no apparent
problem concerning transfer o£ title to her, she is subject to
capture as an enemy vessel. If the Captain of Tattnall captures
Frolic and places a prize crew aboard her, this answers his problem
of diversion and he has then no concern about the cargo. The
cargo will be restored or condemned by the Prize Court.
There are reasons why he might prefer some other basis for
diversion of Frolic. To capture Frolic, he should place a prize
crew on board to prevent her rescue by another Scythian vessel. 232
This may unnecessarily reduce the strength of his vessel at a time
when he may be directed upon more active naval warfare missions
due to the impending military operations against Scythia.
He is also enforcing contraband regulations for the Organization
of American States. Capture of the Scythian vessel as an enemy
vessel may unnecessarily involve the Organization in United States
action as a NATO member.
The United States position vis-a-vis Scythia and NATO has
not been delineated by the President; and until the President
acts, the Captain of Tattnall should not create a situation which
will limit the President's freedom of maneuver. The factual matrix
is within the control of the Captain of Tattnall.

Character of the Oargo
There is a strong presumption that if the ship is an enemy
it also carries enemy cargo.233 According to Article 59 of the
London Declaration, 1909,234 this presumption can be rebutted
by proof of neutral character of the goods. Permitting the presumption to be rebutted is consistent with Article 3 of the Declaration of Paris, 1856, 'vhich states neutral goods with the exception of contraband of war are not liable to capture under
the enemy flag. 235 The rebuttal presumption of enemy character
of goods has been applied consistently by the Prize Courts.236
The presumption is useful, ho,vever, to the Prize Court which
However, the ship may be captured without putting a prize crew on
board. The Hercules, ;1819/ 2 Dods., 353 (taken by ruse de guerre); La
Esperanza, j1822j Hagg., 85.
233 E.g., The Roland, j1915j1 B. & C.P.C., 188.
23 4 See Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1909, 135.
235 See Naval lVar College, International Law Topics a.nd Discussions, 1905,
109.
236 The Sahda, j1915j Journal Officiel
(10 September 1916), 8072; The
Moravia (No. 2), /1916; Gazetta Ufficiale (29 May 1916) No. 126; The Este
(Cargo ex) Ann. Dig. (1943-45), 511, Case No. 180 (Prize Court of Curacao,
D.W.I.).
23 2

409

ultimately passes upon the disposition o:f the cargo, and not to
the officer capturing the vessel initially based upon its enemy
character. Since it may be desirable :for the Captain o:f Tattnall
to avoid a position that Frolic presently is an enemy vessel, although she certainly has that status, at the same time he should
not permit such a vessel to pass but should insure that her enemy
status and character o:f her cargo are subject to adj udication and
especially that a metal o:f such strategic importance as tin will
not pass into Scythian hands. Consequently, a possibly useful
approach in solving his problem is to consider the character o:f the
cargo and use the cargo as a basis :for diversion o:f the ship.
Enemy character o:f the cargo is determined by the enemy
character o:f its owner.237 How ~he enemy character o:f the owner
is determined is a complex matter to which various tests h ave
been applied by belligerents. The only exception to determining
the enemy character o:f the cargo by the enemy character o:f t he
owner is made :for the produce o:f enemy soil. The produce o:f the
enemy soil remains enemy even i:f the owner is neutral. 238
The various tests :for enemy character o:f a natural person who
owns the cargo in question turn either upon domicile or nationality.
The preferred continental test has been nationality.239 The preferred
British and American test has been domicile.240
Domicile is a question o:f :fact depending upon residence o:f the
person and his concomitant intent at the time o:f taking up
residence to make the place his permanent home. A national thus
permanently resident in an enemy country is presumed an enemy
:for treatment o:f cargo o\vned by him. 241 He may unequivocally
abandon his ·enemy domicile and be treated as a neutral. The
same general test applies to changes o:f registration o:f a ship and

This basic point was made in the Declaration of London, 1909, Art. 58,
but no tests for enemy character of the owner were attempted. See N aval War
237

Conege, International Law Topics, 1909, 133.
238 E.g., The Ma1·ine Cap, Ann. Dig. (1949) , 570, Case No. 202 (Prize Cour t of
Alexandria) (Lemons); The Asturian, ;1916;, 150 (sultanas); The Amy
Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black), 635 (1862) (tobacco). It ma y

be possible to extend this theory to minerals although the cases reported involve agricultural products.
239 E.g., Le Hardy, j1801j I Pistoye et Duverdy, Traits d es Prises M ari t i 1nes,
321 (1855) ; The Jl,fartha-Bockhahn, j1919j Journal Of]iciel (2 ~larch 1919 ),
2348; The Ambra (No. 2) j1916j Gazetta Ufficiale (12 July 1916) No. 163;
The Lestris, j1917j Grotius, Annuaire International, 191 ( 1918) Cla im 11.
240 The Anglo-JI,Jexican, j1918j A.C. 422; The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 377 (1866).
241 See The Anglo-Mexican, ;1918/ A. C. 422.
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domicile of its owner.242 Territory in enemy occupation is treated
as enemy territory for the domicile test.243
In addition to the civil domicile of the natural person, there
also is commercial domicile relevant both to the character of his
cargo and to the character of his ship. There is likewise a possibility that a neutral domiciliary may be associated with an enemy
house of trade.
A natural person acquires commercial domicile by residence,
even for a short period, plus trade with an enemy country making
this trade a part of its resources. No fixed establishment in the
enemy country is necessary .244
If the owner does not reside in the enemy country, he may
nevertheless be affiliated with an enemy house of trade. For a
reasonable period after the ·war commences the owner is given
an opportunity to disassociate from his house. 245 He must bear
the burden of proof of disassociation.246 If he fails to disassociate,
his interest in cargo transported on behalf of the house of trade
is subject to condemnation. 247 The house of trade rule has been
extended to the corporate enemy subsidiary of a neutral parent
corporation.248
The domicile of corporations o"\vning cargo or ships has caused
much confusion. The basic difficulty lies in the fact that in economic warfare it is not the place of incorporation or the place of
doing business but the control over the corporation that is significant. There have been no United States prize cases in which
the domicile of a corporation as owner of ship or cargo subject
to condemnation has been in issue. Ho,vever, in other questions in
which possible enemy control might exist over the corporation,
the United States has treated a corporation as an American national
although the Alien Property Custodian ·will vest shares owned
by alien enemies. 249 There has been a tendency in freezing and
See The Inginer N. Vlassopol, j1951j 1 Ll.P.C. (2d), 307, Int. L. Rep.
(1951), 725, Case No. 223 (involuntary residence of owner).
243 The Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases) 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
244 Th e J(ara Deniz, ;1922/ 3 B. & C.P.C., 1070; The Frances, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch.) 335 (1814).
245 The Vigilantia, j1798j 1 C. Rob. 1.
246 The j}fanningtry, j1916j, 329.
247 If the owner has interests in two or more houses of trade, one being an
enemy and the affairs are confused, all of the property may be condemned
unless the claimant can bear the burden of distinguishing neutral from enemy
property. The Posteiro, ;1917/ 3 B. & C.P.C., 275.
248 'J he Glenroy (Cargo ex)
(No. 2), ;1945/ Ll.P.C. (2d) 191, An.n. Dig.
( 1943-45) , 365, Case No. 123.
249 50 U.S.C. Sections 2, 7, 12, 616. Silisian-American Corp. v. Clark, 322 U.S.
469 (1947).
242
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blacklisting procedures to consider the actual control over the
domestic corporation. 250 It is possible that in a prize case involving
a question of enemy character of a domestic corporation , the Prize
Court might inquire into actual control of the corporation by t he
enemy.
In Daimler Oo., Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Oo., Ltd. , 251
the House of Lords held a company prima facie a friend when
registered in England. The company could assume enemy character
if persons in de facto control of its affairs were either residents in
enemy territory or controlled by the enemy. Daimler was applied
by the Prize Court in the St. Tudno, 252 in which the directors of
a domestic company were under enemy control, and The Hamborn, 253
in which the domestic company_ was a subsidiary of a Germancontrolled corporation. In The lJfichigan 254 all of the shareholders
of the corporation ·were enemy persons except the holder of one
share who was a French former German resident. The corporation
was held to have enemy character.
_
The enemy character of the o'vner o£ the tin on Frolic is simplified
because the N uevan Ministry of Resources is an administrative
department of the Nuevan Government. Nueva is no'v under blockade and contraband regulations are being enforced against her.
Although no war has been declared formally, military enforcement
measures are being taken against her. She should be regarded as
an enemy until these are djscontinued. The question remains 'vhether
the Nuevan Ministry now owns the tin or whether Vulcan Metals
Company owns it.
A c.i.f. contract is one in 'vhich the amount to be paid by the
buyer covers the invoice figure of the goods and insurance and
freight to a designated terminus. An f.o.b. contract may be to the
place of shipment, to carrier or to destination, the seller bearing
the expense of shipment and insurance to the point indicated. When
title to property (the jus disponendi) passes under these contracts
depends upon the terms of the particular agreement.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, now widely adopted in the
United States, title (risk of loss) under a c.i.f. contract passes to
the buyer upon shipment if the seller has properly performed all
of his obligations 'vith respect to the goods. 255 Under the British
250

See Domke, Trading With the Enemy in World War II, 120-144, (1943).
251/1916/ 2 A.C. 307.
252 j1916j, 291.
253 /1918;, 19.
254 ;1916/ 5 L1.P.C., 421 (distribution of the shares is described in The Poona,
j1915j 2 L1.P.C., 291.
255 DOC-Section 2--230.
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Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the intention of the parties to the contract
concerning passage of the property is emphasized; 256 but under
c.i.f. contracts the position preferred seems to be the jus disponendi
remains in the seller until actual release of the documents to the
buyer and his acceptance of them. 257 In continental practice much
emphasis has been placed upon the bills of lading as indicating the
passage of title. 258
United States Courts have had no occasion to construe a c.i.f.
contract in a prize case. By the British practice a distinction is
made depending upon ·whether all the material parts of the business
transaction (apparently both the contract and shipment) take place
during war or in anticipation of \var or whether, on the other hand,
the material parts of the business transaction occur during peace and
unanticipated \var intervenes.
For transactions prior to \var and not in anticipation of it, the
British have applied their municipal la,v, although it has been
indicated that if the contracting parties intend some other law to
govern their transaction, the la\v intended will be applied. 259 The
intention of the parties as to whether the buyer or seller has the
jus disponendi at the time of seizure will be the material factor
under British law.
In The 11/iramachi 260 wheat \vas shipped from Galveston to GerInany before outbreak of war under a c.i.f. contract. A bill of exchange \vas dra\vn by the sellers upon the buyers accompanied by
an unendorsed bill of lading and certificates of insurance to be
delivered to the buyers upon payment. The buyers did not accept the
bill of exchange. Sir Samuel Evans held there was no intention to
transfer the property (the jus disponendi) until the bill of exchange
\vas accepted. The property \vas restored as neutral property.
When the sale transaction is entered into in contemplation of war
or during hostilities, title passes only upon actual delivery of the
goods to the buyer. A mere transfer of docu1nents is insufficient to
bind the captor, the property being subject to capture as enemy
property so long as it rmnains in transit1L 261 If the consignor is
neutral, property consigned to the enemy is presumed delivered to
56 & 57 Viet., c. 71 Sections 17, 18.
257 See Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 475 (2d Ed., 1959).
258 E.g., The J(yzicos, jl9l6J Ga.zetta Utfieiale (24 1\fay 1916) No. 122.
259 The Parchim, ;1918/ A.C. 157, 161.
2w }1915;, 71. Cf. The Parchim, op. cit. See The Gabbiano, jl940j, 166; The
Glenroy (No. 2), jl943j Ll.P.C. (2d), 153, on appeal, ;1945/ A.C. 124.
2 61 The Vrow 111argaretha, }1799/ 1 C. Rob. 336; The Baltica, jl857j 11 :Moo.
P.C. 141; 'l'he J(ronprinsessan llfargareta, jl92lj 1 A.C. 486; The Glenearn
(Cargo ea:.) jl94lj, 51.
256
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him upon capture. The intents of the parties under the contract do
not control. 262
When these rules are applied to goods allegedly shipped in contemplation of hostilities, the burden lies on the claimant to prove
the transaction ·was bona fide. The clai1nant might be able to sh o·w,
for example, that the contract \Vas made when no hostilities \Vere
foreseen; 263 or that the hostilities apprehended \vere bet\veen st ates
other than those of the contracting parties. 264
The \var-peace dichoto1ny in British practice apparently has had
no influence in continental prize jurisprudence, the question in
continental Prize Courts turning upon the intention of the parties
no matter when the transaction occurred. The bills of lading, as
pointed out, carry great \Veight on the issue of intention. 265 Neither
the British nor the con tin en tal · courts recognize transfers after the
property is seized or captured. 266
vVhile the actual o\vnership of the tin on Frolic cannot be deterInined \vithout prize proceedings, the c.i.f. contract, coupled with
the fact that the bill of lading is to 9rder, and that payment for
the cargo has probably not been received by the N uevan agent, in·
dicate the jus disponendi to the property has not passed to Vulcan
Metals Company. The cargo thus remains enemy property. The
contract and shipment \vere also made after enforcement action by
the Organization o:£ An1erican States commenced. Thus the transfer
might be brought under the British rule treating transfers of title
ineffective \Vhile the property is in transittt.
The problem remains that if Frolic is regarded as a neutral
ship, the enemy property aboard her falls under Article 2 of the
Declaration of London, 1856. The tin is not on the contraband list,
and the Declaration states a neutral flag covers enemy goods except
contraband of war.
The problem is to detain Frolic ,vithout detaining her as an enemy.
A Prize Court may treat her as an enemy vessel when our national
policy concerning Scythia is fully clarified. Two approaches may
be taken upon \vhich a diversion of Frolic, other than as an enemy
vessel, can be. based.
It may be reasoned, first, that Article 2 of the Declaration of
262

The Sally, ;1795/ 3 C. Rob. 300n.-302; The Louisiana, j19l6j 5 Ll.P.C.,
230, j1918j A.C. 461.
263 The Southfield, jl915j 1 B. & C.P.C., 332.
264 The Daksa, jl9l7j A.C. 386.
265 See Colombos, Law of Prize, 92-94 ( 1940) and cases there cited.
266 E.g., The Palm Branch, jl916j, 230; The Jfercia, ;1939/ A.nn. Dig. (194345) , 564, Case No. 203 (Germany, Prize Court of Hamburg) ; The Good Hope
Castle, jl949j A.nn. Dig. (1949), 574, Case No. 204.
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Paris was intended to protect goods in the ordinary course of commerce and not goods shipped on a neutral ship expressly to obtain
protection of the neutral flag. Such an argument was successful in
The B awean 261 in which tea had been transshipped from a German
to a Dutch vessel during hostilities for carriage between Padang
to London to be sold through a firm of brokers.
Unneutral service of the vessel also may be a basis for diversion.
Although Frolic has not been supplying enemy warships or land
forces directly, the tin is carried as exchange for ponchos, paint and
brushes believed destined for Salvaje's forces. 268 Also Frolic carries
a Nuevan supercargo ·who might be regarded as a Nuevan governmental official. 269 Both are rather weak grounds for unneutral
service as a basis for condemnation of the vessel but are sufficient
bases for suspicion justifying a diversion.
No diversion can be founded simply upon the enemy "origin''
of the tin. Allied controls of enemy exports during World Wars
I and II ·were based on reprisal orders. The reprisal Order-inCouncil, 11 March 1915,270 provided for interdiction of all property
"laden" at a German port and for goods "which are of enemy origin
or are enemy property." Goods laden in a German port if not
requisitioned ·were to be detained or sold; although proceeds of sale
were not to be paid until the conclusion of peace except upon application of a proper officer of the Cro·wn. Upon application of this
officer, neutral property could be recovered. A similar scheme was
applied to property of enemy origin laden at a port other than a
German port. A reprisal Order-in-Council in 1939 271 reinstituted
similar controls. The order ·was subsequently extended to other
belligerents.
These orders ·were fr~uned as reprisals largely because of the
li1nitations placed by Article 2 of the Declaration of Paris, 1856,
upon noncontraband enemy goods carried under neutral flags.
"Certificates of Origin and Interests,'~ certifying goods as free from
enemy taint could be obtained from consuls in various ports. In 1940,
certificates of origin and interest ·were made semicompulsory. Goods
shipped from a port giving access to the enemy were presumed to be
of enemy origin or o·w nership absent the certificate. During World
/1918/, 58.
There are no cases on indirect service to the enemy. However, the tin is a
full cargo and in exchange for property which is for the use of enemy forces
and absolute contraband. The law of unneutral service is in flux and such an
argument might be received favorably by a Prize Court.
269 See The Orozernbo j1807;, 6 C. Rob. 430.
21o 109 Brit. & F. St. P., 217 (1915).
271 S. R. & 0., 1939, No. 1709.
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\V ar II, the export control program "'aS administered by an Enemy
Export Comn1ittee in the ~finistry of Economic vVarfare. 272
Suggested Solution: Special Situation 7 D

Frolic should be diverted to a United States port on the ground
she carries as her total cargo enemy goods shipped during hostilities
\vith the special intent to use the cover of a neutral flag. The master
should also be informed that he is suspected of unneutral service in
transporting a N uevan supercargo. X o prize cre\v should be placed
aboard Frolic. Ho\vever, a route should be assigned her and periodic
reports made on her progress by naval air. If Frolic deviates from
her route, she may be seized. She could be captured at any time as
an enemy vessel; but her enemy character is preferably left in suspense until United States policy concerning the Scythian attack
upon our NATO ally is determined.
272 See I l\1edlicott, The Economic Blockade, 112-124 (1952) for a discussion
of World War II problems.

